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lN'.l'HODUCT'lfJr.;

o:f' America was able to

di'~~mJop

it::: posit:,ion

because of itd relative

isolation~

tho country lay betvveen

tJv~

and the

Pacific~

posed almost
f'or any

world pcni!(H'E:"

a world power

The major land mass of

~;:cont

ocearw ~ the Atlo.nt:te

Until recently these two expanses of water

insurmou1~able

would~-be

t1rm

a~;>

naval and logistical problema

aggr·EHHJor among the older 1 mo:r·(J C)StabJ.ished

Additionally~

th~;

:twt:i.ons to tho no:rt~h an.d to

and :firm econmnic

the south had been cultivated
ties insured a certain

dngr(~e

of s·:.tpport.· .

,.

and security and the promotion of the ·well bcd1.1g of
nationG tv1

t.h(·~

The disr.::harge of the governme.nt Y s re1:1pons:i..b:i.l:i'ty

:i.n domestie and foreign. af:fa:i.rs was predicated to a large
~xtent

upon

tho.nat.:i.on~s

geographic advantago.

The eoun'try

relied to an ever increasing degree upon marine transport in
:tts .for·eign trade and on sea povler as j_ts
defEmse ,, 2

:fLrBt~

l:.tne o:f

Itr~ geogro.ph:tc. position enab1ed :tt in t.vn• W'l">rld

lsta.ff, 'l'he Internat.:lona1 Studie( Group~ f.!Qjsi~ Ji:t:'gll~
Qo§.~ ~~:£~El:ign. J~gJJcy!.Y J..2lt~~:··1c22.Q,
Washington, DoC a:
o:r.ookings Irwt.itute) 19h9 , P~ 20.

~'\~.!!1.§,

.2.-f..

2

}1?..:1-ct~

2

wars to rely on others for its injtial strategic protection
and to keGp it; almost immune
itself o

,:cittaGk on th(') country

fr'\)iTI

A tremendous L:u;d m::tss v.nd a huge variety of

rosourees made th.e

Unitr~d

rest of the world than

vr,~w

Stc:J.tes J,:::Bs dependent on the
the c:a.::>a with most na.tions ..

Hmrev·er, as the govo:rTunent vs comndtment to the ecoa•
nom:i.c system

grew~

and as the demand :for ever g1 eater quem-·

tities of raw materials
more coraplex.

developed~

foreign policy became

The gro1r.rtng rwed for foretgn

:i.nvc-~stmeni.;

kets increased, as did the need to dispose of surplus

mar=
pro~

duction through trade channels.,

.. n·t',
e ....V..t....;d' 0'\,~-·,.

4
1
<".
Wo-~'].!'
T'fa~_,,
'·-.,·
.t.l~.t-,c·r
\. V
J_ _ .J,.
VU
t.

't,••~",~'.'.",
~.A.

a··~·\..:
"'C'O"'l•. (""''!'f'C->(1
.. r 'if/n;,:1t'i
\!J,<C>',''
'['
·:'•'- (.. .....r ... ~ .· · }•.·
.,)<j
· ,,,., ......,. .~
···
y,•

.;,.._.

vacuums in the colon:ial spheres of the European nation::,
in

<~astern

Europe

&

....

Hnd.

World War II also saw the advent of

H.ussia as a modern m:U.itary pm.'ler, and vJitnessed Russ:Lan

dominated Communism as a threat to the vested economic

interests of the western powers&
'I'he United StatefJ of Amer:Lcc.1. had come to rely heav:tly

upon the commeJ.. . cial intereBts,
tlm western European countl'"ies o

:ceSOlJJ:'(~e~3,

and markc.:rts of

It had become obvious· to

many in government circles that the economic future of the
Unit0d States was inext:c."'icably intertvrined with the status

and prosperity of the established friendly (capitalistic)

3
pov-.rers of t>ho Old World,
grav~::ly

War II

altered

·.i'f.'to d.c•fl'l.;rnetive f'orce:::J of World

wnt1~·

th~->

of

eco~·

basic political and

nomic frameworks of all Df t,he F;u!.'Opean nations, and consequently· the intricate

·vn.:;1J

of c<m:mcrc:1a1 :r·elat:ionships,

so painstakingly developed over so many years> appeared
in jeopardyo

In addition to the desir·e to p:rotoct ver.rl;ed commer-·
c:i.a.l interests from the vic:Lssltudes of an

um:rt<:~.ble

postu•

war era, certain p:t"'e sr:3i:ng domEH:1t:i.c and rn:il:J'i.:..ary cons:tdera-

tions

1tJt;re

·

'PhE~

to greatly :i.nf'luerwe policy docif.!.:tons"
itiestern powers had cH::>sumed that collaboration

among the allies could establish peace and stabil1ty and

policy of noninterference in tho affair::; of the smaller
stat(~S

Such a posture on the part of eneh of the allies

0

Nould have been most favOJ."'able to the

Unit~<~d
pmnr·~rs

tb.t::J commEn·c::i.al system of the vv·estern

Stater:; and

o

From 1945 onward, hovmvm:- ~ the actions of the SoviE;t
Un:ton ran counter to assumptionr:i of cooperation held by

the th·(·De mc:tjoi.. wer.:te:r.n

all:f.c~s

o

At:l

....,

~o·v·J·.. C''l·
~ 1

'-'

aggl"f"'
o
v ,. . c· 4
.l. van'~
-,;.;.
::)

U!.,..l .

,~

\,.•t~),)l-~

intrans j_gerwo increased, UrdtE:d States policy toward that

country

st:i.ffem~d

o

The orthodox view held that the deterioration of
East . ~\flest l'f11ations
'\.~CJ.s

whic~h

took pJ;.H:o between 19hh and 19l,.?

due to a number of :-3ov:i.et · Hct.s

-~Jhich werEJ

impossiblt:l

to juGt:tfy, such as the :ccfusal to permit free e1r:!etions
in EH.-1.stern

Eu:r.op~),

the fa:iluro t-o c.b.sarm, and the co:nt:l.nued

m:se of the Soviet veto :Ln 'che Un:Lt;cd
ment of' Communist governmc·mts in

Nation~;

t~aste:r.n

o

rrhe o ;:-;t.:-~bl:i.sh~

Europo, and Com'"··

mun:ist threatr-J to the gover·nmerrts of Italy, France,
:indj.e~.:tt.e

Iranp and Turlr.ey appeared to

that

G:t'fl<~f:.<-J,

thf~ ~3oviet

ha.d

embarked on a program dic:tated not by Soviet national needs
but by the Commu.nist

doct:c:i.nt:~

of world conquest;.

Regardl6ss of.thA view held, it is generally concedad
that the proclanvrt,to:n of the 'l'ruman Doct.r:tne, arid its

impl.e-~,

mantation of the Greek-Turkish aid program, was the first
opE!n adm:l.ss:i.on that thG

tr·ust~

placed j_n Soviet coopr:.rat.ion

was d:J..ssolvod and that force was to be the guideline in

ground of the :t··ift

betwc~cn

by selE<ct:tng r;ev(?.ral of

t~he

the Soviet and the Weste:cn nllies

more c:c·:Ltical point::.:; of con ....

troverc:y involved w:tth the formulation of the Truman Doct:.c:l.nEl.

The paper 'V'llll also scr·t.r.. .>. n:v,;e ·chc domestic problems that
had a bear·ing on .the for:nm:J;.i.t.ion c;f.' national po1:i.cy ~

It

will also touch upon personulitios 8nd motives of those
• .. ...
'J "I'\ecl :.Ln
.!
·th e d eve•1.. opllh:-.d•.·
,.... , . i· nf·
'1 T'"''"'i
'tl
:t.ncro
". ·"''"'-:
..•.... c,c:n

Necessarily, thi:;:;

pnpr:~r

'r"10]
l.~ •• .•
~ C·:\1' ~

\•::1 .11 deal

v~:'Ltl.1

the general

and Gpecif:i.c background of the Tr·o.mo.n Doctrine and t.he aid
prograws to Greece and Turkeyo

No

l':~ffort.

·v-rill be rnacle to

project the rrruman Doctrinr:: into the l\·1arshall Plan? Point.
Four

Programs~

rt:~cogn:l.zed

or the Policy of Cont.a:i.nment wh:lch are

as out grovvth.s o.f the fi'J'ruman Doct:d. nctt itself"

cH!\ p·rr:n

1·

aJJ. :ted coalition agcdtt:::'t the

'rh~;

thrt~e

axis powers,

Japan, and Italy hAd cr0atad an unlikely union&

Germany~

albeit aut of necessity 1 with tho foremost advocate of

"VfE~r(:J

:cetieent ·co coope:cate w:i.th one anot.hryr· ~

·:ce ."1.<.T~
~ · ..
·t" onB J:n.p
•
J::tc.a.
"' , no t b· een a cc
~"I o n""'
"' ~
"' H'C1·J.c.:l....

'l''t..l."'"
1 .__

The allied
·l'·.;t;'<.-.)~··.c"'·'. ···n.· 1'~.•. i··.•

lt:H~k:i'.ng ..

si.ngula:C'ly

l?rom ,,.,h:i.Ghever angle you look at :Lt the eold -v.ra:c
(the co:nfli.ct between the He stern pov·ters and. Russia)

has been unavoidablec The tensions underlying the
..,· 3 l>.l.
n -~ . J•.·•tan
· c 8 c!:fgc
· _.,..,..•.L 11 •c•t
I·I·l·t·
--· '•'
.....0 Cl eepE.J:
:-.· · · · t:..n
'' · r1.. g.t
y·"' a •\Tel..
G...! ,.:-~no.
.>
-· ... ,U:;r
.. e.t
than tr1osc1 that can bE; found in any -vmrtime co ali t:lon;
noth:i.ng vras more natural th.;;.n the r0vcrsal of alliances
~ e o

t1

Iii-

1'1

co

f:<

"

s •

o "

b''>t'Y.,rr•r~n
) .. OJ
Wl• tll,.·'c'S'·'d
'.:.- U
~
Y 1 v-1 '-:; \·.:.
/
-!~ /t:

and• •19 ./1~0 ~., 2

< •

-lPaul Y~ Hammond~ ,!h~, .Q.Q}:!i W~n: Y£.~rq,: Am..~1.:1g,§;l£
13.4207 t San Francisco: H<n·coul"t ~ Brace
a:nd vvorldj Inc.~ 19o9), p. 5.
_

EgE~~~En .L<?)j;;,g}l .§,];}]_q_~

2cF Isaac DeutsGher, .I.~~2DJ:~.§n .9!:. lttQ~_2ry_, p o lhR, by
Paul Seabury, vvcold Vlar Origins 1, n .Journal of Contenmorary
lii s_!~gJ:Y,, Vol.. 3 #l ~ ( 196E~) , _, p ~ 178 ~ ·-·--~-=-~---·· --.. --·-"·~.r.::.~·~.,...... _

7
the enormi t·~r of the comrnon caur!'i'' ~
oppos:Lng nation.al

inter~~t':;i>,

lf!:i.th the enemy defeated,

qu~i.c:kly

surfaced and

tbemselvns in a variety of conf1.ictse
pated that the defeat of

1·,;·1~~

Russia had nntici-

m·:J s vwuld secure:! her v'lest.ern

bord(:!1:"f; through thEl est;.]bJ:inhmen'l.:· of governments

to the Soviet.D :i.n the seYe:cal

"At

the~

ea::~tC:n..,n

very least Mosco·w wanted

sphere of :tnf1u.once. n3

man~ifested

ame~1able

European states.

E~:wtern ~urope

vlith:tn her

Wb:i.le the general conc<-:lpt. of spheres

of influence had some appoal, especially for Great Britain,4
there were <:u... eas of overlapping
be eas'ily

:r·occ~nd.lecl

:Lntr~rests

wh::i..ch could not

to end.' thcD.' ln av

,.

At the: conclusion of hosti.J.ities the Soviet v'lfas j_n
a t:l:'emendous pot:d ti on of military sta"ength in Bu. rope o

It~

was estimated that the Heel Army numbered six rrd.ll:i.on men05
Addi.tionally, it was
largE~

believt::~d

that the So,r:i.et Union had

numbers of rese:cves. maintained at a high level of

3r.rr ammonc1, ..J?.£•
J

•
f:~kY~G

l~-Ll?.;i<i··
5wn.liam Hei tzel., Morton A$ Kaplan, Constance G..
cH b1en z ' !b.llt.f:~J. §.:~.~~-~ el'L ~~9..=s:~J:.&1Tl Pg].J£.Y.. J..2u:2·~ lli2.' (wash e
The Brooki.ng;D. :J.nst:Ltute ~ 191+9 , Po 100 •.

alr.lo pointod to a btd.ldtip cf Hed !\..~·my forces in the Balkanso
Th:lc:J buildup coincided '!41th.

·i_n(~·J'.('
. a·te"d
~

..L

fkrv-:L:.~.;.:

domm1d:::1 or.t Turkey f<._:,:r

tl·1a·t. +-t.J.e
Pe"l
A.·.:·
. • .•.".' For.c.;;.
,.,.rr•,"".··
v!. .1.. '
•
•

full strength, and that
:l.n D.n effort

JGO

equip

th~.~ U.V':L~.t.:t

tht~;

a.i.:t~

a·'··v

bc~-;--lg
rn''~n·t,.,.;nt:'.·d
·, ..!.!. :'>
r.~.l . . . •ct •.!.. .<'.~

I. . L .

on indust;ry

retool:ing

Hal3

e.rrr.: vdth the--; most effec!ti ve

weaponery.
VTbile t.ho Western nll:i.os had d.emobilizr;d nwny key

tlapan, the

So1.riet:~;

had ma:i.ntainnd the bulk of her vvar

. mach:i.nEJ.,

G:hrcn th:l.s lDiJ.:l.tary L1i:rength and th':' ~tJf;:::J~n<'-'.':::y:;::: of
op~o2e it, it wan 0ffici~lly
conslde~:'ed in 19h6 and 19h'! t'.l~tat the Sov.{:t';L Un::.(YO"
.• ](" ..; ,t...
•'\, 't)(
('0'
1lr"' o.,r,..~··•:••rt-'t''l
r! ._, ~-J
()f' I1'll't·'lc ...
~)·····
~~.,..-) ~ .:~
::L . •t.lJ l..l .. h:>d?
, L. .t
·''-''·l·'"-"l c. ........
J.~<..1..-'·:;
\.l'-"·'"'·'r'~' '.. :.tl:.c.\t•
1
·lr·'L··'l·•:,-J.l1
th<-'
l\1-~dcll"'
l:
'~~c·~~"~"''-l
J'To···th
J\.r.oc·--··'f'•'!\
·i1·•
-~
-F'n···
E .• ;cc.
.;:. . . -'·
.;.
c ........,
'
<:<. ,,.,,:.\'\'
months o Soviet aid to the Chinose· Conrmm1:i.sts was
co~;u:d..de:~d c~~~?~~ ~f pro~h~_C:in_~. rni~itr:n'y victory j_n
Ch~na Elli.Cl po''"''~.Llhy Souvhedst A,.,J.ao .

the forces that oquld

)'"'•!\

('q:

~

Th1.~

·"<:>.!.>\..·~

.1.

'.

• ..

~

I

_,,,.,·.:,,

!'u '':\:-.,,;,..

••

/;

.

'

percept:i.on of the SoviE:t military menace at the end

of vlorJ.d War II v-tas only onE) aspect causing grer0. t apprehen-

sion to the Unj.ted States and her \'lestern Hll5.es"

World War II has left Europe in a disheveled and
chaot:Lc condt tion o

Lines of eormm.m:J.cat:J.on had been severed

and normal trade ch.anmHs had been disrupted.

Machirwry

ha~ been destroyed and large tracts of land wore rendered

9
untJ.llable

G

effort in 194.5 to avert

for tho ensuing winter
Unit.ed States had

il

f:1od c:r:i ~;us~ tho proJections

gravely pessimistic.

w01~

produ,~~c:zJ

h.ad .further rc-Jcluced the

nEH::tr .. ,r'e cord

nK':~:..:;~(jr

The

crop::; but droughts

gr·ai n ·yj_e.lds :irt Europe?

North Africa, and Asia.

Americans lived on a diet of 3300 calories per day9
averagl~d

2000 and :in cert.ain parts of Eu:r,ope
no· morE~ than 1000. World f'or)d. production VlcH3 12%
below normal prewar product:tm.J.o In Em::..ope 2S% belen'>~"
normal"<· o.
In the O:.c:i.e:o.t \AJOr'f3G "than in Ettrope ...... ~
The effoct::1 of w:ideD:flread famlnc:l would make infin:U;;ely·
~ . "f J. cu1 t t 1:1e \'<for..l :: o··
f 1J1.:t:t...d1.ng
•· "J . •
more ClJ.J.
a f.;mnJ d· peaco (, ?

Kuropeaml

By the early months of

19~-7

i.t, had

b(~come

evident

.that

fox·eign

exchange~

European E·:conorn:1.e rect)vcr·:'l

lt-Wf:> rapid th2).n antj_cipa'ced.
wint~er

disast;erous
fa:i.lu.r·e;:;.

(

wc:n~e

cala:mitous

thf; Unit(2!d Nations HoJ.J.ef' and

Rehabilitation Agency) waG dangerously low on funds.
had not beE:m rlr::::-dgnod fen·
i r). a. l'J·"'/

('o~ C~·'·'
'::; <' l:j.
,._,

6

nm::h

'rhe dr·ought vms follovred by

\ITeatber and the:: harvests

U0H •. R •. R .,A o

h;,~d bec-J:!.

~\

ftmction on

It

sueh a vast sc;ale

[-5

?Harry- S ,, Truman~ ~:i~Qgir:§!.~. Y~Jl!: .Q.:f. P~~.Q.;b,.?.,:lgn§.t Vol. 1,
(Garden City, .New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955J, p. ·467 •.
BGeorg;e D. He Cole, ~Y-2;(1.9..:\n; 1'r_€:l!lS:it_:l.q_l2, (New York:
Oxford Unj_v-e!'sity Press, 19h9), p~ 284.• ·

10
Throughout Europe tSe~~ wa~· n general deficiency of
purchasing power that c:ouJd be U;>ud to hny t'l1J.pplies to meet
tihq immediate needs •

rel1.ef, not only to

'rhc;: GOntlnc:n·i, stood in grave need of'
pre·vc~nt

war~devast:.atc:;d.

rest:.or:Lng the

.st.a:cv::{ti on,, but also help in
eccuon1.les of the European

.countries&
Economists in the United States warned that American
prosperity

WP,El

dependent on a p:cuspet'ous itvorld.,

of those nations iflith whieh the Un:lted

StHt;G~~

'l'he collapse

had developed

close ecc)nom:i c t:tea ~ Great Britain i France) and other West
Eu:r·opean nations~ ~tvould be a

~We""

to the domestic economy~ 9

IJ~·~
~111
E~m·IJ]ovJ~erlt
,C. V '-'
L
-"
. , .... ._ .'f J..
••

c·an•1ot
"c-1.
,J..

d:i.f:iDBt<'H'

~--

_.

...1

equally direct :Ln his econom1.c re.po:et. to Cone:(·'') ~:;s :J.n J antlDT'J'
of

19h7.
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employment for neaPly 2. 5 million

Clearly a collapse of America's European mar-

kets poBGd a. grD.ve threat to AmElr:tca 1' s economic well

bc~ing.,
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Europe's plight.
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c~

orniJ')cus pol:it.ical ovc~rtone~:; i.n

The United

definite possibility th8t

Stat0~

government foresaw the

disaster of great magnitude
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political maneuvEn·ing l0d to Gorrnnunir1t. Party con.:.

trol o.f.' the governmerit,

'I'he

Unit.<.~d

States and Great; Britain

p:r·otested such developments J.n Hungary, Human:ta, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Albania, and
de~1p:l.t.c_,

Poland~

vrrn all of tht-)se count.r·ies,

American. and B:r'it:tsh protests, it was evident that

the pov-IG:C'. of the Communists vvas be:'Lng stElad:l.ly :tncreac;ed,
and that all parties that wore not prepared to cooperate
closely Vli th thorn 1-1ere bej.ng, o:r had already been, squE;ozed

out.ttl3
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Whilo the econom:i.r.: c•rt..l p·~. :L:\ ;:,:I.eal situation :i.n EuropH
gave cause fo:r· great conce:. ·n,
unleashed by World War II.

complico.'GH t.he European

of national:tsm rose to

c~t;h::n'

political forces had been

Th6sc forces were to further

:.:.:r···:Jblem~:

eha11Emg~:;

nnd further heighten

weakened dom-

alrc:~acly

the

world

.inance of Europee
The war catalyzed profound changes in the political
patternD of the world aud 1D.unched an er·a of decoloni~
zat:ion that ~'.law Southeast A~:d.a ~ the Ind:i.nn subeontinent,
and most cd:' Africa d:t v:\.dod :i.nto a yarl.ety of :'lnd.epend·,
ent st&tf!.iS e 14

Tb.e d:i.sint.("\gr·at:lng influ.Emce of "che war '!\fiOn t.hc o:J..d colonial ·

the

ne~~

emerged independence movemente also

movements had been i.n mot :ion pr1or to Wo:cld

mov·ements of national

j .. nclependrm.c:o

can~Ed

a loss

vv·ar II, these

I'Tere na.tural po1nts of

conflict bet.·weel1 the nei'Jly emer·ged pmver

blocr~

of the Soviet

and the WeBtern e.ll:tese
.rrh:l.s

\'laS

the setting fo:e the nmrf <:!ra of Ameriean
~~he

new A:meriean pol:i.cy was to bo based

upon Nhat Fl.0)inhold N:i. c buhr

bE-31:1.c~vod

t.vas the only hope of

the Western alltes, the crElat:lon of' a

balance~

of povwr,

"Hussian truculance cannot be rn:ttigated by fur'thor
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adjusted the demands

th~y

Gaw made on the United States

accord1.ng to the external conditions they observed.
demands were reeond.led l:'!lth the
tions o:f the

Americ~an t~c:onorrr:v·

The major componontD of

e:~~ped:i.ents

and domes·tic
Anl<?;~d.can

and

These

restric~·

politics~

fo:r'e:i.gn poJ.:i.c:y were,

These events. some
r

har:~

p:r.·ovided

thl~

ess<:-:rrti.al philosophy bohl r,d

since 191.1.'7 ~ had its orJ.gj.n i.n the
pmt.rl~r

deve::1lopm~.mt,
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p·:d.:i..cy

of the tw-o
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'rHE DISINTECRftTJON C:fi' 'J'I-JE ALLIES

'rhe Hod Army and tJ.t8 har;:->h x·oality o.f Rw::;slan winter

had stopped the Nazi juggr::l'n8.ut;.,
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Rurw:lan m:t1i'Cary 13UCcess

initiated a series of disputes that began to divide the
allies~

Events in Poland alarm\:;d Ghur·chill ·to t.he trn."'eat.

of the Soviets as an expansionist poVJ<H" o 2

A n.mnber of

Roosev-elt t :::; advisors began to strongly challenge t;he United.

States policy of unconditional aid to the RuPsians.
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The secur:i. ty of R.ussic1.,

co,_;n.trtes and the absorpt.:ton

o:f strategiC! terr:i.torie s .int;o tbr· Uoviet Union was t-Hl.otlher
The third major point of

was the extension of Lend-

confli~t

Lease and flr.r·t. her econor(J:'ic'

0

credit:~

to the SovietG by the

United States e

The United States had resisted as early as the winter

eastEn·n boundar:LC'S of Europe e

an

agreerm~nt 1rtas

Union.4

'The Rusr.dans had sought a

essential to tho secu:c·:i. ty of the Soviet

Additionally, thn UnitGd States h~d been ev~sive

Weste:n.1 allies 't·muld eoncent:cato thei:t.'

the fJfedit.er:eanetin routeD ·ch.J.'OU.gh Sue.z ,.

While thE-;

Hue:.~sians

· felt that the invasion of Italy 1rJas a good d:i.ve:c:siona.ry
campaigns S·.talin po:Lnted out repEwtedly that he! felt thcrt.
any effocti ve campaign should

lx~

aimed cU.rect.ly at

th~)

hea:ct

While Churchill veiled the British objectives in the
Mediterranean . .··cente:ced campaigns as des:i.gned to ?'keep
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On March
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UnJ.ted States Of'f':lce of
Wolff at Zu:c:i.ch ~ 12
principal Italj_an

~::erviees,

m~)t

w=L th General

'rhe mccti.ng ted been arranged by I-Iinunle:rt s
reprez;ent;~?..t:Lve ~

who had made initial

ccnt,;;~:";t

border d.ty of Lugano "1?·

v--rith

Colonel Frj_edrich Do1lmarm,
t~he

O.,S6So at the Swi.ss

r:'VJolf:::· v.;w::; bluntly told that there

vm.s no quer·rt:!.on of' 11.egot.:l.ationt3 1 rmd that if the mati;er vmre

pursued :i:t could only be on the basis of unconditional
surronder-,,ul'-1-

On l\1areh 15 the B:c:ttish (tnd Ame:r:Lcan Chiefs

of Stafff traveling :i.n

di[~gu:I.r::e

1 met. in SvvJ.tze:d.a.ndo

eral Wolff met v.r:ith thE>m on Ma.J.:•eh 19.
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Wh:ll.c1 Churchill ctisplay·ecl real concern that :tnforma,;

tion relating to tho clandestine meeting with Wolff might
ser:l.ou:sl:y j.:::opard:i.ze

Sov:i.et~

c:ooperat:Lon, he had ea:r.-·lier

told President Roorsevelt that the Vlestc::r·n allies should
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occupy as much o.f Aust:r·i<:\ t::.e; p\x·.;::::t bJ.e.
there should be no more
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Although the British'Ambassador t.o Moscow informed
t.hG Soviet government. of the meet:Lngs with Genr;n:"al Wolff on
March 21 ~ t.\11/o days :following the meElting VJith the Western

Chi(ifB of Staffs- tb.o Hussi&ns wore :l.ncensed , ,
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Molotov handed the Britj.sh
Kex·r a :t:'E!pJ.y vv-hich was

A~basaador

cuu.<;h~:~d

To Ken;,v s [H3f'3Urances that; tbe:3E:

Sir Archihald Clark

:!. n IJJunt. d:i.plmnat.ic: language •\

Wl::O:ce no more

negot~iations

than an attempt t.o test, the c::codent:i.als of Wolfff Molotov
cau~~t:l

t"'epl:!.ed

cally, nrn this in:c:;t;ance the SovJ.et Gmrernment

sees not a m:i.su.ndG:r.·standing ~ but someth:i.ng worst.?,, tt20

'rhe Huss:ians

""~~"ere

cornrincod that their

ii1tended to make a separot;e

pencE"~

l'rhich Nould

, .......l

we~:rtcrn

perm:U~

all:tes
Ge;::i1mJ1

On April 5

Stalin nsuspicious of' American motives. trt.::.L.

Stalin :i.n:l t:i.ated a startling ser:Le s of irrterGhanges between

himself 1 Roosevelt and
Pros:i.derr'c b.e

levelE~d

Churchill~

In his letter to the

Rtws:i.a t s eharges.

e .. ~A~:; regards my. rn:i.l:i.:tary co1leagt:tt3S
,, c • they do not
bave any doubt.f:> t.ha't the negot.iat:i.onB have taken plac(~ ~
and that the;r have ended in :,.m agreement w:i th the
Ger·n1D.n.::>r on. thG basis of wh:J.c:h tho Germa.n commander
oi1 the V!este:cn Front., Marr:;ha11 Kessr::.<l.ring ~ has agreed

'l

c

·- 3Churchill' 1l:t.!~E!!P..t!
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to opon. the front and pn•·m·H t h,,, Ani!] o~"ArnE-~r.·:J C'an tr·oops
to advanc:o- t.o the e;;~;t :·. ~nd ·'t:r~~;~· AngJ:~v·Ame:t~i~~ns have

promised'') in return to ease for the Germans the peace

terms. 2 ~--

subsequent mnnner in Vlb.:i.cL. the ne_;.:;otiations for the ItaJ.ian

surrender were handled.
The ac:Gusation:::i gr··Gatly a:n.gex'ed Roosovd.t., and GenHral

Marshall dr.s.ft.ed the Pr0sldent '1 s reply vv-hich concluded,
"Frankly~

I eannot. avoid a

f<:~elh;p.;

of bitter l:'l'.:!se:ntment

toward your informers.p .• for such vile misrepresentations
of my act:Loxw or_ those;; of my trunt,1:3d ~?ubo:cdinates. n23

The Soviets had not been.consulted on the details
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Alth.ough the pol :icy of unc:onclit:l orw.l su:tT'Ol.:c!-::::r had
agre,~d

a.a tho te:r·ms for all of the axis

powers~

\

·u.:::~<:'.i'l

the \rvestern

allies had held out hope to the Jt;al:Lans that they might
b\:l :fo:cg:l v·en :l.f they di[\8.Vowed the') axis aJJ.iance .. 2 4·
On J'uly· 2lt, 191+3 t;he Fascif;t Grand Councj.l
JVlu.r.H:;ol:i.n:i...

King Victor EmmantJ.e 1 formally stripped Il

Duce of Pow·er and appo:l.nted
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B.ccepting Italy as an al.ly aga.:!..n:::rt Germany but;

~

..

'l:nts

•

.

able to

a pa:ct.y to the cau::;e by· declaring wa.:c on Germany

bf~coming

'
on Octobo;:13 ~

l9l~5 s

Italy \1/as treated v'rith tt:Lncreasing

leniEn:wy o vr 2 ?

Stal:l:d vV'as grE1at·ly e..gitatod by Bl"'i tJ. sh and Americ:an
vdll:tngne::m to c:oop8ra-te vr:i:t.b F'::1::icd..::st C:l~!.t=;m~nt~:t~~~ It2J.y~ 2 8

:tn ·thEi fy•amc:rt'\fork of the nev1T Italian government., 29. Many dip-

lomats forGsaw

t}~

possibility that the British and American

d:tspos:l:cion toNard 1J.n:i.lateraJ.
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vons~

itfell

ostabli~;;h

a precech':nt 1"1y vrh:\c';h the Soviets might exclude

the United States and

peace

tJettl<:.~ments

Brit~in

from participating in the

in ter::•:it:.oriet; nc·cupied by the Red Army.

HThe contret;empt.[3 over It.::i.ly boch.;eri J.11 for th<.:; futurE:;~ n30
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Many western di.pJ.orM.tts wer·<.::

doc~ply conci'~X"ned

what. appeared to be a serious and. widening breech
the Western allier:'l and t.b<:; Soviet Union.,

by

bettrm<~n

Ecwh subsequent

development exposed new signs of fundamental Soviet suspi-

perhaps not vJ:i.t.hm.:tt sorne justification, that Hooseve1t and
.,
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thing from within the context of the horrors v-rhich had

devastated the Soviet between 191+1 and 1945 ~32
settlement~
alli~;;:.;

combined. vdth the fa:Llure of their

to IHE:kc firm

tan en to tJ.w E3ovJ.ot.

cormnitm~::mts

Un~.on ~

in areas of

'rhe Italian
West(~rn

r:>tr<:~tE:'!gi.e

:i.mpor~

corlv:i.nf.':e;d tbe R.ussians "that the

\'lt-:st.(:n•n democ::cac;ies wanted the Soviet to remaJ.n

expo~_;cd

to

30~3mith~ QJ2.~ _yj_:t~~v Po 69.
31Dav:td Cronen 1 1:v-r~?!J.:t:te.~1~ ·g~~:u1tu~:y Am§£~~S':.fl, (Homewood,
IJ..JJ.no:ts: Dox·sey Press~ 1966T'; p9 2ffif:.
y·>
~~Ralph K o Whi tt:1, "Image f) :Ln the Contex'ti of Int<_;:;rna<~

0a

t·i.on~l Conf~.. ~~·~ t "- J..l!Y.fq~r!.§:1toll !i.§~bPYt.£r, (New York: He:r.·bort

KElman, 19J5J, Pe 271&

assault :frorn the west,

~-uv.i

lrte:r.e bont. on maintaining ... ., a

government "Vlhich, in the r;u:lt::le of 1nciependence.9 would be

unfrj_endly.n3J

The economi.c agreemonts and pol:i:tical· settle-

ment--,s sought. in the Balkans and Po.1.and again rej_nforced

this feax· and convinced tltr::.1 Sovic::t leadership that their
earlier suspicions had
Stalin had

b8~n corr~ct.

develop~')d ~

therefo:ce, his postwar policy

upon the basis of preserving freedom of action in areas the
Soviets confd.dered essent.ial for Russian security and economic
recovery. 34

'rhus, the Soyiet, :for both psychological and

strategic rea.sOrls, divided Germany <md establ:i.shed. a serie.s
of satellite buffer state::; along the R.nss:i.an frcm.t.:i.er.,
Sta]:J."1 l1ad
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Give them tv-rel ve to fifteen

be on t.hej.r feet again&

is import ani~ .. u3 5

y·f);':l.r.i.:J

l>TJ·.·.l
__·r.
'
-

&md thfly' 11

And tha.t is why lDl:Lt.y of the n1.;;1Vf>

Clearly then, th~~ Soviet leadership saw

the creation of a bulwark of friendly states as essent.ial

as a defense against not only Germany but the West in
general,
The question of security was certainly of paramount
importance for the Soviet Union,.

6

In no case we.::; this

33Herbert ~e ist Be:~.J:!~!2 ~!:
Princeton Press, 19 OJ, p. 31..
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~34La:F'eber, 2.E9 £1~."~ p. 12b
35cF Milovan .Djilas, Qony~;rJ?_~~ Nitl·!. fi.~~lj.n,
(New York: 1961), p. 114.
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At Yalta Sta1:in stated,

11

Tvrjr~o

\~.::'n

tn

last. thirty years

o~n·

enem:L01.> ~ the Germans~ bD:J•') panr::~;d through this GOrriclor.

It

:ts in Russia? s inte:t·c~trt ch::,t: Po1:nv3. :;,:;b.ould be ntrong fm.d
pm~mrful ~ in E'< posl.tj_on t-<i ~.,hut t.:nJ; doc}r of this co:cr~dor by

her own force. n 3 6 · 'I'he T-\.u~.w:i.an:::;) th·:~H·-\c:.foro, have stipulated.
that the neH Polish governJ1FHtt

Sovint Uniono

11111~>t. be~ 11 frj_end1y 11

to thG

It was a dmnand the Huss:Lans ''.10\..J.ld enforce :i.n

all areas trrhJch had. been occu.p:tGd by the Red Army o
'l'he Soviet! guEH'rt; for Beeu:ri t.y Nas to lead to a nurn-

ber of l.nc:1.dcnts which apJ.'1ea:r·EHl to be, in the min.ds of the

LEND-LEASE AND THE HUSSIAN LOAN
BeB:i.dcs the frictions t•7h1eh arose over the conduct
of th.e ,. ..rar, and the Rust'lian position relat.i ve to her n.o:igh=
boring

~3tatos,

·the major

dt~velopment.s

which may v'lell have

crystalli.zed E!ov:i.et v:i.ews of

th(~

cancellation of Lend Lea8e.

'ri-10 e..brupt termination oi'

3 6J ames F. Byrnes)

Harper and

Snns~

Wem':.ern threat 'tvas the

:~B~§lsLnf.'~ t:r:§.nl'SlYs (Novv· York: .

1947), pp.

31-32~

37La F'e ber, £P..~ £.tt,• 1 p o 10.
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this aid~ c(ru.pled vd..th tb~ ta:Ll:ti:1'·o of the United States to

fears of

we~;tern

illtentionr:;.

The Soviet Union had bean
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Standley ''Jar:; rebuffed iL h;U3 Ed.":fc·!.·l:.;.; to achieve a stiffening
of U ~S. pollcy on Sov-it~t s.::l.d. ~ at1cJ

'i''':iB

ult;iJnateJ.y recallc-:-:d )+5

and a::> politieal diqmtes began to d:i.v:Lde thE: a11ies, a

the policy of uncondit:iorl<:Cl'

aid~

to th(::J fa.et that the Soviet

VVI·\S

cun.~s·crmces

Q

I:ncrE~as:i.ngly

-v,rh:tch i.t appt'Jar'Cld thC:l'f
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n.ot, u.r-:.e .cmd -vrh.i. ch !J;:H'l. b·~·.en

H'l'hoy had req1.1ested vast. quantities
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Prerddent :i.t waB clear i:.b<Yt; ;:;:om.n !JJOi.tlfj_cation. of the
lease progrm:n could not b0 dolr:\.·ynd.,

'J:'he advi:::lOJ.'S to whom

the Pr<:H3ident turned, thT::x; mot:.t k:nov.rleclgeable. vli th the

generally, -v\l·ere bas:ically agreed that. •che policy of

Harriman :felt

fr\~rongly

uncondi~

that:. Ru.st:dan c ooperntion c:ou.ld be

obtaJ.ned only Lf Americ<:J dealt vrlt.h th.e Russiano on a
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fix~

policies in defense of

U~S.

to

conflict with American
l{i~'

to fo:cce the Soviet to obl·Jge U,.S .;. :tntorests. · On April 6,
191.,~) ~'

Harriman Nrote the 8\;'c:r·et;:.:.ry of State th<:rc the United
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'rhe Foreign Econondc: .1\dw.Ln.i:::;trator· having policy-

making responsibility for the Lend-Lease program, Lee
Crowley, vm.r• a former utiiJ:J.ty executive.

Some regarded

Crowley as banically an :i.solat:tonist; and. cons:Lde:cGd that.
his natural inclinations

:C'el t that

thf~

v.re~:r.e

Crowlf.;y

al:ten to his .dut.i<::1s o

intent o_f Congress :in approv:tng the fore:i.gn

a:id measuref,~ \•ms th::J.t rmch aj_d f;;hou.ld be terminated at the
On Mt:ty 7, 1.91+5 thG GermtlrlS

signed the .f.:l.nal cap:tt.ulat:ton at Reirns., 51

<1ga.:l.nst Germany, on May 11 ~ 19h5 ~ President

That ~'ame day

~eruman

direct.od

tlw.t nearly all aid to the Sovtots should be r.ta1tEHl.
later related that he had initialed the Grew-Crowley

Truman
recom~

mendat.ion vrithout. fully unde:cr1tandi.ng tho ov-erv.,all impa.ct
of

~:mch

curtHi.lment o

HWhai~·

they. told

me~

made good son:::1e

to me; vr.i.th Germany out of the war, Lend ..·Lease should be

50FH5..8, .QJ2.• £:}:!!..•, p .. 27 o
, 51w:tns.ton Churc)•hill, 1'1:!§.
York: I':i.mo Ince, 1959 , p. 55he
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f~.9.Qnci Wo_l.:li ~L?J'~, (New
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reduced.

They asked me

t·,.::) .~·,:Lgn ~u·."

'I'he response frorn
'l'he Huss:i.an govermnent

Germany~

~3ta1in

Ho:~;coH v?.c.V~>

h1~.d.

I reached. .for my

pen~

immediate and critical.,

felt th::;:f:; American a.ld was junt

interp:c·,:;t.cd the oJJru.pt

cur·tai:.l.m.~mt

of

assistance as an effort to force the Soviets to compromise
O.n 0 -t·he:.t•
\_,.

-'

·,~"'.l.J'"'··· 51+

. .l,}.) ....1_H\;-'I:.:Jcli

Whilc:.1 both· General DGan, head of the Un:U;ed Stat;G s
IViil:i.tary Mi.s::don, and the .Americc:tn Ambassr..:1doJ:- 1 Averell

Harrirtv'.nt had long

advocc~t:ed

a eh_;:tnge :in aid pol::Lcy, both

direc:t:i.ve r:.5
& .)

the Soviets \fEn-:-e orcle red D.bn:rt ~ dock loHd:i.ngs were halt Gel 1

.

L'6

and pr:to:ci.ty product:i. on w·;;w reaJ..:Lt1c:t'.ted" .>

On May· 11 the Pres:i.clerrt, no"t"r <:rvral'"'C:3 thn:c. the manner.·

in

~1ich

hia order had been implemented gave real grounds

for griov~nce, approved a reinstatement of Lend-Lease to
)r3
ual"'"'Y
. fl
' J. ..

s ~ T..."'l"l'""r
..~ ~c•f'
.,.•l''i
OJ""'
(l'IJEn>\f York:
l
J ~ 'V"c•a
,;!:;-~_:._.;:,.,
. .~,~~... .I'("'
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Doubleday and Company, 1955)~ p .. 22~. ·
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proceed to their

origin~l

destinations.

All ships awaiting
rmd certain of t.he

production priorities wore roinst2teda57
The United States, desiring .a careful study of the
use to wh:tch all a:i.d 1ivaB to be pu.t ~ JJ.mited the goodE; to
be sh:tpped to good.f.> for use :.:.n the

11Ja:C'

ag;:d.nr:rt:.
·c:

r~

and in other• p:eov:tously approved progr<:~ms. ::>o

~Tapan

only

Subseqtu~nt

study of the poJ.J.cy by the tT o:int CJ:d.efs of' Staff and tho

Secreta:cies of Navy and \'Ja:r- vms to confirm tht:;! policy of

restricted f.J.id"

we:cc·:

e ••c:.•O.j"l'l··~.. a]..
,:)o,~.--~vJ <:~

f'O"''
""11"'
C'owl.'e>·.
....
')()'":t..'nc:·t
.L
l' .\..~
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v
_, '-" PI"r-"o
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V~>.J
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~

A

Ta· p-:'"
.
'..J..t"59

t.

t ..

1

'.l.'he

shortly to e:xpreus furthe:t"' d:Lsple<Cxsu.:co over the manne:c of
tb.e original curtailment. CH'dc::r
St;t1lin w<::.s later to

G

prote~::Jt.

the abrupt nw.n.ner o:f tb.H

aiel c;ut. to Ha:cry Hopkins vrho had gono to Moscm'\T to pave

v-;ay fen"' the coming Big

~rhrf;e

IneGt:i.ng at Potsdam~

th~~

Stalin.

did not question the right of the United States to curtail

33
,.

mutually- benoficial

arrt~nr•.emf.~nt L:.tr1

been terminatod

11

i.n a

for the reconstruction of Russja wor0 involved with projections bar;ed upon the aid ur·u?;rrj'r;J,

.:~nd

that f.wme vn3.rn:i.ng of

the imperJding slasb in cmr,m:ttmo:nts vmul.d have
. desirable.

b(:H~n

highly

He said that if such. pJ.al:'JB had been dJ. seussed

·v1:i.th the ~)ovJ.e)ts that no ill~··\<\rn.J. -y,roul.d have rE!f:>ulted. 60

Hopkins immediately sensed the gravity of the sj.tuation, especJally the Marshalrs view that the United States
vmuld emplOy J. . end··Lease as a means of d:Lsplaying U~S. pique

leD.der that tJ1e

methods. v?61
day~>

after the

StaJ.J.n.~Hopk:Lns

enGes, I·Jiolotov· and Mikoyen

I:JUbtd.tt~~d

to Ambassador Harriman

On May 2R, tvm

the Russian requests for the latter half of 1945.
:C'E;quents i•rerc

tn add:i.tion to

th~:l

61.nu~~J.

Sons~

l94HJ

~

These

balances due from the

60nob(~rt. go E>herwoo~ ~ !L9.2-~!.p~.s~Jj~, .f::n.£ li2l?.l.sJ-n§.,

York: Harper and

confer-

p. <.9:2,. ·

Annex III of tho F'ourth lJr:.rt.oc.oJ..,

'l'he total amount of

goods reque.::;ted C:Jrnomrt:,ed \:.() Aomr:: l ~ £500 000 tons, of v"J'hi.ch
j

some L1.00 9 000 tons were o.Lt and pct,roleum p:rodu/.!ts ~ 62

Washington G.long v'ltth cr::;rttdn .t.'.,::comm(-mda.tions

The Protocol

ft

Committee, :in conc<:'lrt l.VJ.th. the Chiefs of f.)t.aff s authorized

The precipitate alash in Lend-Lease
abru.pt end to what. had
ti ve

:i.n'tE~r·rJ.e:i:~io:nal

bE~en?

a~d

heralded an

up to that point, a eonstruc-

rel.:.ttionsldp..

Somo challenge 'Truman's

explanation of th.e rJTay 11 order and have cited t.he Lend-

to exert economte prcnBure OlJ. a
0 ....J,"._ de.1~

Un::L\::>::t :J. n

\\I()D.ke.nHcl ~~Oir5.t::t

•c·.o p"··o'···lr)·f·
-, Jl1.u"1t"'~''.·l
"'"t' ,_,l!i..,.h-::;_;,
-··c·"")r:·v· ---~-c 1'
""1•.• ,"~·'"t'"'·'••;>.J
_: .,,...,"'···· ·- -~....cP·J r_~_-,v,., _---,·_.;.c,::_r_)_·
.1.
''-···''·~·-·
.......... c· vc>.
.C'.t
. •~- 6')
J•

•

dElpa:ctu:r-e from ·l-he poJ.1.c:tes of. Franklin Hoosevelt vrb:i.ch had
'I' he
policiE.~s

'l:v·ould be changed$ as those 'VI.'ho challeng0 the

t:cad.j:t;:i..onal v·:le-v-m ins:tst ~- to a

11

povverfu1 foreign pol:tcy

.35

Hsr.;iste:lnce

to

the Sov:let

Ur~ion t·Jt·):;

;,he more cr:ttical

pr·ob-~

lem of a post-war Soviet J.oan.
Sov:Lct su:c>p:i.cionR of Western motives,

aln~ady

aroused

by the Italian settlement, and tho restrictions placed on

st:cuctt on J.odn"

Americans had suggested

t;h;r\~

they we:r·e

opt~:trnist:l.G

about

strengthening commerc:tt31 tier:> vr1.tb. ·Hussi.a, and i.mpl:i.ed a

readiness to assist·the Soviets in dealing with post war
rec~onstruct1

on problems.

As early as 1943 Donald Ma

Nelson~

Chairman of the

War Production Board, had advocated a loan to Russia and
had sought a much greatel:''

goods.

po~:>t·. vln.r· Sov:i.E.~t

Nelson saw the loan as a

w~dge

Jna.rJwt for Ame!':i.can_

for the necessary

36
f;xpans:i.on of American

il]lJu~~t.ry

and the cont:tnrw d lwalth of

Soviet Union as a check on the depletion of strategic
rGsources su.ch as ma.ngatJ.e:s·;:: ., 6:)

posal and submitted a LUst c>f pr:Lo:d. t:i.es wh:ich could be
implr.?Jmt=mt;ed J.n such a

progJ~·,:.wn ,,

'l'be negotiations r;;erv-ed to

strengthen Stalin's confidence in his American allies and
:i.mproved Sov:l.et-~Am~):t"ican re1at:Lons f.dgn:Lf:l.cant.ly. 66

·twenty mJJ.11.cm de&.d had a debilitating effect on the <7nt.:t.ro

grams necE-HH.;ar.y to effect a.

J•oeon~rtruct:t em

of tho Soviet;

the war e.n.d eeonom:Lcal.ly pt"n1o:r.ful, could supply tho

p. 156~

:f\md~?
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', • .. • . d b·-·r
. "'' tk,.,OI.,.I.
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E~11(,()\J.J:D.ge
.) I·11-"-'

'"7·'
nJ..

tl1 - !'0
1\J . 'l..•,,:>011~

~.ltal:i.n

had made a genuine effort Dt T0hcrau to feel Roosevelt out

concerning the extent of

Ama~ics's

willingness to cooperate

in the Sovit;t post···vmr d.evelopn:m1t.

~rho

f>oviet lE)CJ.der was

anxious to como to <1 prompt tuJ.der'standing about post··War
eeonomJ.c

relations~

St;aJ5n nw_d(:? nbundant1Y' clear the

lems at the confereuce

~id

:tmp01"·~-

not permit

Hussia' r1 postvvar roeovE:H'Y ])'roblentf;S. 69

'l'he President. n.over

.
, -'
. ' - r·emH:U1lng
- . .
.
pursue d th
· _ e matt
· ;er ngn:u.1
CitU'J..tlg
\,J\0
s:txr.een
~

months of his life, nor· d:td he d.:L:cect the

Stat~~

Departrnen:t

or other advisors to prepare themselves to enter actual
negotiations on the lssueo70
Nelson. had bnen opposed by Harriman i.n those early

years.

Harriman was one of the m2ny financial leaders who

had b<Jcked fi'rankl:i.n Hoo;;cvelt and \-vlw held great in:fluenc.e

s:i.:on of the nopen docn""'? pol:i.cy to include the vrorld in

general and Europe :in pr.:r·ttcul;:rr,
Soviet.n

W8S

helghtened by· Ruas:Un1 r·e.fusal to perm:i.t a

cat;e Harr1.nl3.n represerrtt::d in tho
"'
S "pr·l·'Le>
~--t
J-1 • ,.:;,

of
H..

HiB ant,agon:i.:::;rn for the

19~?.0 1 s

t;o

dev~OJ.1op

synd:t~

Sovh-rt,

~"1c'·a·· n'""<'
?1
t;;: ,..> \_ . .

y.,
J.a CI.JI. t"-:1

Cl

Harriman was joined in his oppos:i.tion to Nelso:t! t. s

app:r"oach to 1{Uf3Dian r·olations by Jamos Bu

See rotary of

Navy~

and Berrw,rd BB.ruch..

For:ccDt~al

1 tho

Harriman also

rece:i vt:.:d sttpport from fYcute D<.:;partmc: nt experts mwh as

\'\far ered:i:t ar::; a basir3 fen." the de·1.re1opment of ~)ov:i.et-AmeJ."'iean

relations.

rrom his

(V~

an implication that the

Mo Molotov's)
develo~nent

statemox~

I sensed

of our friendly rela-

tions would depend upon agenerous c.:rodit.n73
71Wil1:tams, 2.1?.• £).:5~· ~. p ,, 15f~"

7 2:n)_tst ,

73uGs. Department of State, Forsign Relations. of the
Urdted. Statl)S ~ DiplomatJ_G Papo;r~3, 'l'he Conferenc:c~ at Malta
e.nd Yalta
{U S. Gol.rEJJ:'n.mont Pr·inting Off':i.ce, 1955) t .
9 J9~-5,
.,
p ,. .3]..) ..
&

app:r•oud1es continued in th::; Un:l.-t; .:-d
were alr:;o e;ngagcd in po1:!.c./

debt:ttc~:;

~~tates,

Sovir::t leaders

:cevolv:i.ng around the

loan issue.
The more moderate Soviet leadership desired a more.
gradual pace of reconstruction invo1 v:ing

the United States.

ass:i.~3tance-

from

They advocat8d a relaxation of the rigid

govern.mental cont.l"Ols e

1.1 he

m.oderc:rtt-~:::1

felt that the West.

would be stror1g enough industrially to avo:i.d the posst.bil:l._ty
o.f a d;;;presd.on and that the Sov:te'ts would

br~l

forced to

raise standards of ,living in order to compete ida9logicallyo

analysis of the vitality of
least pa:ctir-tlly c o:r:·rect ,,

capitalis~

'I' bey

in: the West was at

e:x.pr()~'l.SE~d

stJ:·ong y·e BEH'VEJ.~·

t1.ons ~ however, concerning tlt(J t'V'illingness · o:f . the Western

nations, particularly the United States, to aid the Soviet
Union in sol v:Lng the problem:3 . of reeo:nst;ruet::ton.

'l1he mon.::

conser·v·ntive v:Lew held that. :i.t. would be necesstrr'y for Hussia

to (3Dtnblish a basic securit;y perirneter and mtlke: the int,:n:>na1
sacrifices neeE~S~>ary to dE~al with the:'! problem~:l alone. ?L,. . .

that; the

so\)11Ell"

relations.

the

RuE•G:i~).n

people Gould develop a better

The Ambassador urged that the.Uniterl States

"in order that political advantage can be retained and
we w<:ty bo s<:rt:U:.f'ied that tho EHfLJ.:trmlent

purchas,~d

posos that me<::.t. our genc:r·n.l appr.cnrr3,l ~ n'75

th~t

i.:3 for pur·-

':ern1~; ~ Harr:iJnl.:.trl

could achieve a predominc:mt role :in r;haping the post.-w·a:c

worl.cL
~rho

.off:i.ee of StnJ.tegic Se:cy:Lees had warn(:!d :Ln

Septem.ber of 19hl:. that such t.aet:tcr.o; wou.ld. probably not,
work"

great

'fhe 0 ~ S ~ S" logieally eonelnd.ed. 'chat thG Sov:i.ets

inter~al

sacrifices and "could carry

th~ough

the

7SJJ~;p;:\~'·tment o:f St.c:tte ~ J.i'orc:dgn Rc~lat:i.ont3 of the
Un:i.t<:3d Dt.;>:tcr3, Diplomat:t.C P:J.perr::, ( 19h5) ~ (U.S. Government
Pd.nt:i.ng Office, l9h5) ~ VI) pp. 9~.2Q. 943o

reconstruct:Lon w:l.t;h its (:1o:mer·3t:iG

i">'i:thout foreign

r-o~wurces,

loans or r-epara.c:i.ons e "76

He could strive to obtain
for a:Ld with po:::rt;war

definit~

l'C!(:'~'V()Y'Y

'American commitments
'

o:c he could obtain by any

means available economic reparatioDs and the security
Soviets~

per:imeter sought by the ha.rd l:1.ne
overtures :for a loan the Tiuss:L:3.n

lc~a.d.er

When Harr·y S., •rruman became
tmp:repared
t{r.>.
I~

t~o

1
'N
.. '-'.,~) f:-OJ."CEY
~t,;J,
,lJ.

received only

P:n~Js:i.derrt

handle th(:: cornplE-)X iBsues of

to -,..e"Ly"
J•

••

1l~;.;..ct--~
'1'"'·'-'":r·i·'l'f
.,.l·,n~···
.. ·.. ·,)
1... ,- ... ~-.t

To Stalin's

he 1rm.s gei.!erally

forE~ign

policy.,

<:"'' 1 "''T''~·J"'•···I~··""·r:··'··
..t.l• . . .~·~··'t• .

~.~t..,(>v-....~,U--~ .

Fred V:lnson $ ad\d.t::H.H.i TrunwJJ th.at rr a ::wund and

adequat~e pro~·

gram of credits for fo:co:i.gn reconstrtwt:Lcm would benefit
the~

Ur:d ted St.at.es in both i tf>

domeE:~t.i

c and .for..:-d.gn policy., 11

V:i.i.1r.wn ft~Hl"'ed tr.te E:md of the wax· won1d .cause a serious

r·, ·"

I LaFe 1:_Je:c, .Q.E ,, .£1-:.!~", p •. 22 o
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'7c:~1'homi-1s G~ Pattex·son f 11 The Abortive American Loan
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'rhe Journa1 of American H:l.:story, Vol. LVI, No$ 1, (June
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developed Lf prosperity

He was enpeeiaJ.ly

:i.nte:r'(·;~::L.c•d

Europe and felt that Soviet
by.
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Secreta:cy of Con11nern'j fknry Wallc:tee took a more

mode rat(~ approach"
We know that much of the:: :c<:!CE:nt· SovJ.et behavior
v.,rh:J.ch har-; caused us (;oncern hru: been tlw r·esult of the:i.r
di:co eco:nom:lc nt~ed::> cmd thoir uirJturbed ;:;om;e of se<~U·~
:tty., Tbe events of the pr:u::;·t. . fevv mont.hs h<':J.VE~ thrmV'n
the Soviet0 back to their pre-1939 fears of capitalist
oncirclcnnent and. to th<::dr ery·cneouf~ belief 'that. the
WE!I'.rtt~rn -~~or1d, ineJ.-.y~iing_ Uhf; U ~E; ,,A. 9 j_D :l.nvariably

and unan1mously host1le. 13
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r1'he ori.gi.rw1 Hussian request. for credits was for
~Edx

the sum of
trJtMn:tng
cred:U~ ~

tha·~;

biJ.l.:ton d.olla:r.·s o
sum. t;o

one-~t..enth,

HarJ.:-ima:n had advised

stipulate that :U:; \"las a

noi:.; a loan, so t.hat the Un:tt. ed

~)tates

could exer . ··

ciso ext.ensi ve cont;rols over the use of the money. 82
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l~d

t.o the

gum:-a:.·:~~~oe:i.ng

capJ.~alistic American inveutments ~hereo 8 4 To obtain these
funds Stal:J.n lf'lculd have hD.d. to sm."rend.er his ha:cd \von

con~·

t.:r•ol over eastern gurope s as vre11 as permitting Arne:ciean.

ec:onom:!. c

pm\~or

to flovr int.o the area.

Stalin eould not

BUY"r·ender what. the Soviet lee.de:r-sbip considerod the Hfirst

Il.1. Sl"l()'r·t

essel'lt:l.nl of Sov:let

,..,

g3Baj_ley, QJ2.· cit.? p. ?79,
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latex·
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hit~tory ~ 1'
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Ahont t.h.e same t,:Lmc a:n. <U5t:\oc:late of Donald M o

Nchwn, the Cha:lrnH::m. of
the~

_____.r._l.-'<--)Y'

tht~

Vla:c Production Board and among

earliest advocateD of the Rttisian loin, observed,
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POLAND:

A CA~E IN POINT

Of all of the sc:,urcx:t:> o.L' f.r-:i ction wh:Lch s<:n'vod to
divide tLcJ Allies the

serious.

q'J.:~i).'J.'(d.. s

'l'he Went.orn alJJ.es

o'\rc":c PoJ.r:w.d wero

·w·(:J:t'':~

Sovi~3t;s dEm.iE~d

most

Gonv1n.eod that t;he H:u.ssians

were embm:-ked on a pol:ley to contl'Ol
the

thE~

the~

courrtry o

.

While

any ;mch :iJ.Itent.ionrJ ~ developmentE'> within

Poland clearly J.nd.:i.cat:.vJ such was U·w case~ 1

Charter

\IIJ'D.s

s:tgned

t~ha t

ovm form of· gove:cnment,
in that p:d.nciple

Q

~

the So·1.rlets had amendE-)d the original

to irwlv.de em

The Hussiann had

import~ant
inE~:iBted

loophole

that tb.cy

\vould suppor"'t freedom of choico only whel'C> it .was com3iBtEH1t

w·ith

tr

o

~ o. the

c:Lreurcmtances ~ needn 9 t:md rd.f;;to:c:i.c

1 Herbert Fei s > ) l~£'J!}::'~~~E ~'fa:t~- .~nsl E~s:.,.q£Q.$ ( P:cinceton:
Princeton Press, 19 6 0 , P~ 31.
2
-\(:Nalt(·Ell' LaFE!ber 1 Al!l,E!.!:LS"§l.,.

6
1:5?}2...:12=-~~

Nmv

York~

13.l3.~y~}.!:~ §12£ !J:~,)g=QJ~i ~L?}Z,,

tTohn Wiley and

f3ons~

196b , Po 1:>,.

had served notice that.; tboE:e

eont.rol

tc:cr~ttor:i.es

which had been

¢

Aside from the

mi1itary-st~ategic

considerations,

the Soviets had historical reasons for desiring considerable areas of Polish territory.

In 1919 Poland had beon

reeroated as a ne.tion e.nd imrned:l.atoly attacked a Hussj_a

H:Lg;a, s :tgned 1.11 1921, ext<:-mded Poli::.:h

bounda:c:tc~E;

rnorG than

part).t:ion of Poland :tn 1939"
UndE:n·~rt~i:mdabJy r

thH Po:U.Bh leaders in ex:i.le lool.\':e.d

:l.ng the Germrn invasion of HuGsia, however;

thE~

Polish

government in exile, then established in London, opened
')

..J~1art1nJ ~Ie-- :t:·z) ~ ]2s;g_:L4}.~:}2:!-Z~

6

ton, .I nd:t.<:tna, .. ) b , p.
.

gJ:.

11~q £L<il~~1 l'L~X:s (Blooming~

Smith~ p.nl(:L:1.9itll~ ~.tJ~~1mn~9Y. ~~!::1-..nJ?, .the_ §s;g.2l?si
(Nf. M York: John Wj_lcy and Sons, 196o), p~ 69.

t,·Gadd:l._s

W2.rJ~ Y{§~f:.,

v·J.::t.:t.~

·were coneerned. vdth the

security.

r.:r·,~Gsing

renl:i.ties of :mJlitary:

It KW:.> imper:i t:l. \to to tl1o Soviet.B that any· n(Hl

Polish government must, fHJppor.t

Hus~:;icll1

territorial

con~"

wi.de:t·a.t:i.ons.,

':Phe Btg; 'l'hree, Ei'tal:tn, Glnu·:;h:U.l and Hoosevelt. 1 had

agreed on the manner· i . n ·wh:Lch

thE~

Po1L;h Pr.ov:l.s1ona1

'Jlhe agreements by the Big ri'b:r•e.;;; ViC:f'(:. bc)th J.ncom111UtG
mnb:i.gu.ous,

Govern·~·

,.·;,{.jQ

llOV{E~ver ~ 6

At YHJt;a ·the th:con

le~,.de:r·s

had struggled over the

of the "Dec:l.a:cation of LJ.be1."a:t.ed En:copen and thu Atlantic

Ghartc:r.· relattv·e to Hfreo electtonB at the earliest

when Molotov f:iUc:ceedE'd :i.n getting Church:i.ll and

pos~-

RomH.nr~~lt~

prorni::>in~·~ th-::<1~.

to aecept a clause

xm.:rtual con mil tat ion

Q

.Sr~ch

if p:coblems arose the

(:oxwu} t<~tJ.orts would give the

Poland

Both Hoo.Bevelt and Gl:An·c.Jd..J.J had co:cre s pc:nded with
Stal:ln pr:i.o:r.' to the Yalta. Conferc'lnce in an effort to delay
Sov:iet recogu:i tion of' the: Polish c omm:l.tt;ee of Netional

L:.tboratic;m

~Afl

the National Provi::donal Government of the

Polish l1epub.lic e

Sta.lin had V¥:cit.tc·H1 both the Pr·en:Ldont

and the Pr:tm(:::: M:tnistt.::r that. it war:> :impml::dblo to fulfill

on thf.; subji:!Ct that :tt propoi:>ed to
Government of Poland

Hi3

recogn:l.~t.e

the P:r·ov·i.sionnl

::.:;oon. as the latte:r.· vvas foJ:'med. n R

Thus) tho Ru.ss:ia:rm had extendr:::d reeognit:tcrn to tho Cornmm1.:i.Eit
dornine.ted Lublin Poles, ViLllo tb.e \VEl stern nlliE'JS suppo:ctE::cl

at least a coalition

gover~ment

which would include mem-

bers ·o.f' the Pol:Lsh Govor:macnt i.n Exile
of the

Wc~;:;tern

p

It was the

lea.dt::rs that they might o:f':fect some

:tn the Sov:tot position on Pol:.:tw.L

hope~
chang(~

In fact tho problem

7LaFe her, .91?. ~ g,;L~. , p. 16 ~

.

wins ton chul'' eh 1.11 , ~tr.::\~.linJ?h .§E~\l !.r..?J?:.E2!1Y. ~ ( Bo s t; on :

8

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), pp. 332 ..·337 ~

h9
over tho PoJish queE;tion d t;i;rin::,

d Churchill' E>

dE~Edre

for

the Yalta Corrferencee9
·~alta

the eight plenary meet:i. nt;c: of t.
Church:i.ll

summar:Lt.~ed

the

:'1 c:bjet;:--'t. Df

Conferenca.lO

those meetings

a~3

follows~

Hovv to form a Ed.:uglo prov:LrJ:J.cnal governms:nt for
Poland"'
How and when to h·::ld fre'~ olectio:nf.> ~

How to settle Poli0h

and the hl'~1st ~
How to ~m:C'eguar'd

frm~iers,

tb.E; :t'C!fH'

both in the east

arecl;> and JJne~:; o:f conmm.n.:J.•."

cati6ns of the-advancing Soviet Armjes~ll

tions that some

eooo

Polish officers had

Hed Anny in the Katyn F'oreE;t. 12

operating in Poland.l3

b9QTI

slain

by

tbe

'rhc Hu::::D:UJ.ns aJ.::.w hud

Additionally, the London govern-

m0nt conta:Lned a ntm1ber of hnrd core

anti~·Soviot

leaders

trdth ~~. lengthy history ·of oppos:i.tion to the Husslans ~

11 J"l.){ d

:.:.}~:!.~ Go

'

'rhe

1) e 3 66.

12sm:Lth, .9..12· e:i.:.!.•, p. 70 and lJEL.
lJchurchill?

Tl~!.t.iJ:~.!2!2 E.:.nd :I:IT\.V:~L<tY.,

QE·

.9.1:\::,b ~ PQ 332.

. f!~el:lngs of the London

Fol~::H

h<d b;;·::ome bitter after the

abo:rti ve Wa::--saw upr:i.s ing in 19!);., v/non t.he He d. Army rofused

assistance to Poli:3h u:ndc:c·r3round. urd.ts loyal to the London
Gov·ernment.,

'I'h£;'!

Gcn·man~;

1vHt

mn~:.iJ:dJated

Any· inclus:i.on of the London e::d.1r::

resisted by Russian

tens of thcn.tsands

govED.'lllT!Gnt

vvas to be

leader~.

The fo:rmuJ.a whi.c:h the Wer::;tm··n leaders subscr·il;ed was

given in the Declaration of Polond:
Tl1f-) I->ro~v:i s:trJna.J. (}0<1TG~Cl1l'i10T!'t 1j\) }]~i,e 11 i u 110\q r·ctne·t~:J. ()11:trlg
in Poland should~" •• b<:: reo:.rga.n1~HHi on a hr·oader
::t•
....... (' .~. ·"' "'
7...o t·l·
.~. }~ .,
~· • ·~"L ····t·~i'
r~ ·.;~,,~~·.~·R·\ ·~·
·l~ ·~· ('\·
d. Gi'nO(,J:'
d•., :~ (, b<~)(.''~"~
c;,'?J.?,-f I'd,
, .1 ~_..,_,~;: "J..(h,. _v . ., . v-- ft ;_.u. \., ·.~; ,,·,J'..... rJ •• -~·" , ,•.
1
leado~rr~ :rrorn Poland J.trHU..l am1 from :)oi~:-:: .:::tbroad ,.)... ,
I')"

.....

l·""·J ..

w·h:tch vvould bar further atta.ck of the Soviet from thr:.:

VlE;13t

that

tht.~y ''rr~rG

~.:mco

in. t.he :t'e.organi.zecl Warsavi Government is coJJ.jectu.r-e ..

fears were·

assenting to I11oscovr having a dominant

f~at:;ed

:1.nflu·~

by the vmx·cUng of tho Declar-ation that

stipulated the Provisional Govcn:nmorrt nshall
to the holding of f:r·ee and unfettered

be~

E~lec:t:i.ons

.J~~j

pledged

as noon.. as
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war in 1939 :for• the spec:itic ptu··posc0 of insu:c:Lng a f:rc(:;
and

independer.rl~

Pole.nd o

It was for thlt:> thtit; v-re had· gone to wux· aga:i. nst
Germany .....,~, that PoJ..~::cJd should. be free and. sovere:lgnc·
E-ve:cyow:: J.nH:~w ·what a ·Lor:r.ibJ.e riflk we had taken when
He had gone to ,,rar. 5_n 19~39 <ll thou.gh so 'ill·<t.rmed,
It had nt::,:cr·ly cost un our l:Lfe ~ not only w:; an Emp:b"e
hut as a nation~ Great Britain had no matorial
interest of any kind in Poland. Honour was the s6le
:r~eason
~.ccept

t·Jhy

W"E:~

had dra'i'!n svmrd o

., ,

•

nc~ver

and we· could

any nettlernent Hhit:l1. did r.tot leave hc1·, fr·ee,

independent and sovdraign$1~
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one of

security~

'I'he So,JJ;:·;:.

lf~2\dcr·

history of eonfltct with Poland.,

end these eonflic:ts not o:nly
Russia but

becau::~e

po:i.nt<:'!d to the long

lie stated a def3:t.re to

bc~t;.~:J:;.S~l

Poland border<:!d on

th:CO\J.ghout b:l.E.tory

att.acked thrr.Yu.gh ·Pol:tsh tc:n::J:tnr·y·.,

Ru~>sia

had been

This was truo bec:8.use

Po1a.nd had boen wea.k t Stal:i.n obf3erv-ed ~

Russ:La

~>vanted

a

strong Polan.d ~ one which c:ould. close the corridor by her-

self e

H~:

th:ts as a 1:Lfe and death ma:tter :for the

v:jJlvved

Soviet Union.19

It was obvious that none of the Big Three

't'·rero in a po::d t:l. on to grant. majo:c concerssio:ns ~

Wh:U.e the

. could be de<1lt. wi.th ..

Yalta only part:ia.lly r-c.:;olved the diE:oputo over tho
Polish front:ters

0

'J'he Decla):at;:Lon on Poland

re;.ld~

J'he tl:rcoe hendt3 of gover:nrn.<~nt. corwider that the
Easte:::-n fr•oJ:rcler of Poland nhould follm-1 tht'l Curzon
..11 d'J.g)."'eSsl.ons
.
f·rom J.' t .J.n some reg:t.ons
.
f f'"
.
L ~ne
Wlt.
o·~
. ~ ve
to eight kilometers in favor of Poland~ They recognize tb.at. Poland munt r8c<7,l:i ve su.bst;antial aceE~s:::dons
t;o ter:rit.ory :i.n the .North and Wost
'rhey feE.ll that
1

&

the opinion of the new Polish provisional Government
of Nrd::.tonal Unity should oe fWught :in due course on
the extent of t.heso H.ect~s::-dons and that final deJJ.miu~
tat:!.. on of the?- \.Vestern Fr·ont.ier. of Po1and srwu1d there·~·
af'ten.·· avmJ.t the~ Poaee ConfE~:conce ~ 2.0
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frontiers to the Curzon

})_:'1(~.

,.I'b·

leader had

~:~ov-:i.et

pointed to the fac:t tl:u:tt h.:!. rrt:;cYi':l. c t::· -:_::_y the area had been

of Russia.

The Curzon l.ine had be2n recommended by former
and Clemenceau and

representatives of the United States in 1919
:ferenc(3 to wh1ch the

Hus~dans

--=

a con-

h.n.cl not been invited.

Curz;on l::Lne had baen ac:cepted l).gai.IJ.::rt;

t~he

Russians~ 2 1

Roosevelt had

~talin·now endorsed ita

.

The

w:J.l1 of the

armed forc;es sEn:··vi:ng i"lith '\1Je~1tern units" 2 3

Stalin felt that Poland could ba compensnted for
tc.n'Ti tor·ial losEJes in the east with Gc:Tman

t~errito:t."Y

:Ln

I prefer that the vra:c continue a lt'ctlt::. longer and
g:tve Poland componsati.. on. in t~he 1-·mst at th~) expense
of Ger·mc.my. I asked )lilikoln;jezyk 'l.vhat fror.tt:i.or he
VJant8d e J!IikolajG~:'iyk ltJaS delighted to hem• of a Weste:r•n.
fr'ontier on the r:.Lver· Nei::;:·}C '· I rm.'l.~~t say tL.at. I v.r:ill

5h
maintain this line trnd Hsk th:l_ :::: confer·ence to suppo:ct;
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Both Hooseve1t

felt the.t Poland

Eu16 Chun::h.LLt

vrould be ampJ:;r compens.s_\A.:d if

East Prussia south of tho

t.I!D.t

eountry were.:) g:i.ven

Konin~sberg

line, plus upper
2r.

Silesia and the territory adjacent to .the Oder Rivera-)
bE~

G:i.'\,·Gn thOf30 l>ou.mla:d.es 7 the nevr Poland "V-Wuld

as

1:.-u:>gc~ tEn~r:ttor:tally

line~

nearly

and 1tmuld have a longer· Baltic

coast~~

Thus composed tha new state would have a more plen-

tiful Dupply of natural n::ncn.trees~ espGci.a1ly coal,.26
At.

Ya.lt.a~

h<Ywever, both loD.ders i'rc:ce faced by strong

demandr::; fr·orrt t.b:a Prov:lB:Lonal. P(J.i:3h Govcx·rmi·:Jn.t :/"rye '(:.h;·::
'

Go"\HH"n~·

Stalin and Molot01r strong:t:y· FiUppoJ'tod the Prov::Ls:ional
m'::-n:t.t v s demands. 2 7

Several million Germans lived in the area desired
b5r the Poles .. ·

'rhos€~,

plu.s

thE~

2l_+I\rr•\+·.hc·•-'l'rc·
l!Jit·;nt•·J-:e~\
~,·r
1.0
J. . .,_l.c.
'-~

:rnore

Ge:cma.ns
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the ba1aneo o.f Germany...

'I'he ..,.,J,:>.;".{:ern leD.de:r·s immediately

saw that Germany would be particulDrly vulnerable if
Poland eamc v.nde:c Commun:J.r:.t cont~:·~:·d ~
it '1-\fas

.fo:r-e~Hwn

that, sooner· o:c

have to be de.fendod by f'cn·c<::,

J..;:;.t.<n~

?tMoBt signfficantly,

thif..'l fronti.er might

J:i'c::~' theEJe

:ceaso:o::; Church:i.11

and Roosevelt firmly refused to accede to this enlarged
c:L:d.m ~ !12f~

Churchill v.ras later to :cemark, Hin tb.ese general

.
. .
d l.SCUSSHmS

tho Eastern and Western Neis::;c did emerge as clEHl:cly o.s :it
should hav(~ done c

'T'his was hmft.!Ye:t soon to be madc::l c~l~H:lr, n29

Roosuvelt took a finn Dtand on the border to the

Silesia, and up to the line of :the Oder' hut the:r't"l V..'ou:Ld

appear to be little justification for extending it up to
'the Western NEd. sse. 1;30
v·ievT of bot.l.! Western

ThuB, Hoosev(C!lt

le<:~clers,

V·HH3

to e.xp:r·ess the

a v:i.ew that 'tV'CJ.s t.o be repeated

at; Potsda1n fi'V'O montht;; later ..

At the conclu$ion of the Yalta discussions very

litt.1e real progress had been madG on the most e:rucial

29

..

Church:r..Ll, T"r.il.!D.lJ~h ..gnct .Tl:£J~~§':..CtY.~ 1~1?!· .QJj:, .. , PP~ 37h

through 375.
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isnuer> rol:.:;,.tQd to Po1anr1 ~

ment of a

Tho

m.<;r~h.:l. ne::ry

for thf) establ.:tsh-

r~presentative

The frontJ.erD of the neot Polish

~'t:.:d-,e

were-; st1.11 a rnattGr

and Bul{?';a.:cin had been A:.·cU; f3at. e1:U.tE~s.

The British vvere

undc:;rt;tood t.o possesf3 vr:fot.ed i.nterest. in Greeee.

'l'ito

w<:us firmly entrenched in Yugc•r:;lav:l.a D.nd FeD cH.• vms

pov1er~

losn to e:C:f.\~ct changes the:ce e"~.r<:>n l.f he so desired~ 1

Prasident felt little
in the B2,lka:ns ~

don~stic

'J:ho

political pressure t.o act

Unl:tko Poldncl $ t.h.o :ce had been fe-vl

:r'elatod to t.hr:d.r strategic value.

immi·~

'l'h.t;'i b:r'oad.e:r.· issues of

Poland and. Ge:rmany ove:cr-;hadov..red the Balkan prob1(3lYJ.B, and

it vva::) presmnod thclt :i.f the

larg~:n~

issues cou.1d be sat:l.s=

faet.or:lly worked out y trw mnaller j_ssues could also bo
""'es
~ J·,.,..,cl "''·
"lr·~
c·"•1"'] ·(r 3
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._ U •• vi3
Ll. ·<"- ··' ",l ~

'I,h<> R·t.,.,...,,.J,.• an""'1 however, wer'(::! dotEH'minod to E>trengthen
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of subservient satellits nation3 o]ong the entire Soviet

the

11

:i.ron cu:r·tain" arour<d

'~her;;c

r:t~~t.c11:i.t.e

nat:Lons directed

of the Soviet menacee4

·to deal with. lluBs:.i.an. objcctivet> on an
chos{~

'l'hey

ideal:t~:;tic

levHl ..

to lgnore the very real fears of t.he ,Smriets

:lng need fo:r" the Soviett3 t.o rap:tcU·y reeonstrue.t thE; horm;:
0conomy- in order to p:c,:'\vent. fl:lrtbc r :tndesc~c:lbably hard.,

the

bHSJ.C
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rep:r•esent.ntion on the kc:y 1.: ontro}

comnd.s~'lion

Dppoarecl to·

the Russ:i.ans to conftrm ·t;hc· :3e f'"~l~'!··'.:l.cion.s. 7

relevant to joint a11:Lec1 ::;dml ni.r: r..r·::rr-~_:i.on in
Declaration of Libe:cated

Eu:~~·Gpe

:t.mplenent~ing

the

'L'ho President and· Prime~

,.

Minister believed that an equitable settlement had been
reached~

Hov.rc:ve:r, in

EJ ::moner:::,

t~hE;

West; had tb..:.; p:eoroise s;

'the SoviE)ts ht:td much of tb(.; tG:r: :r.'lt.ory in quest:i on.

West also hD.d a p:rev:lew of the di:r·6ction of
.
"l,•
8
po.t:.tcy.

late

conferenceo

evenin~

interpreters.lO
question~

M~jor

Birss

~1d

'I'he

Sov:i.c:~t pos't'h'<U"

Pavlov acted as

Following discussion centered on the Polish

Churchill percei.v·ed th,nt
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apt fo:c
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I pwsh(~:()._ thJ.f.4 ac:r'OHf:> to Stalin~ vlho had 'by then
heard thG ·t;:~:.~anslat:l.oii o '11 he:r·e. v..ras a sl:tght pause
'rhen
he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it,
and passed it back to us. It w~s settled in no more
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~}~c~;

LlOthing, and that Stal:tn

bovv thB ag:coemcmt cori.l.d bo tu:rned

l ,:)

.... ~

·:rhE! Rcwsian pol:l.cy towa:r:d tho East European go-vern···
Ruman :Las
1
'•lh.
··.'.·_.·c·,c~
C(··.:L·'r:
.t ..l1··,
. \ k"·'.\Y
.)
Y'i
w•

'

,

'r''~''OOl·Jc·
d "'-.
~
'~

former t:ll.ly of H:i.tle:r and a

rJ.

1·1··Co,1 (·1.

~c··~-1'1'11'1·,1·
~.I i.A. t .. , ... ..., .. • T

(",,

.l'

J•'"<J"-'dPCl
l'),.,..,_.c;-r"
.~ l. J
~A.
__.
.\..
.!., CA. ~
i..{, \J , ...

r·rll"' . . .
.

'

.-:d··'..·,nr•·!'····''·'-'CI

fA.tlt\..> .. t,..l . ._,.._.._."

.;I.Jl.. u- J~\, .. TJ.lE-'
....... ,

·t1'J.,
f.l .. L..,CJ1''''h
...lt_l .. J.

.~:•
'""

"'C>'i····:·lJ·"'''lJ,'d(.\T;·'-lr

t!_)-~}~ ••. J.....~.,· ....

.,,,,.·,,.,,~,
.... ,.,
~.t-., .. 1,.\,.

wldcb d:l.d not Dr:.t'Glsfy tht.l United St<::ttos but

':l,

-::; J. -~ '

':··;.:>
lt .. ~.·

,,.,
•.><,
H CJ.
~..

J •

a ppare :o. t, 1y

('n·'•>t•·;-;-!·.n·:.
'>'1'
-·~--!II.. L.,._.,,,..,,.. /

'\rJ'h:i. ch vJ'Gr'<-)

acee ptable t.o the B:r.:Lti sh ( per•htotps becEmBe of the earlier

The Soviets also agreod to a nonGc·mmun:i.st but.

11

fr•:1.cndJ.y 1\ government in F:inland} an old

r

J-- 0 ,<=\i·"'
___ .....
1·1·ma n
,.~

] . ,..7

. r· ., }i' c. l') '·" J-,
.J C.t.

,..,_. . '\.. • )

~

() 't)

"'"q,·L:,.,."

c· .; -'·

..,,.,._~~-. . -~~-=:- ~

'f)
'

.1:

t;.

1'/,

62
enemy of Huss:i.a ..

.r{O''((-"\T'"'f'
1
vi-, 1.....

the German invasions, 1ecl
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~3tal:I.n.

swne category as Polnnd, not
k..~<-cis

In ·the former

pax;ticularly

to p1aee Rumania :Ln the

Finla10ol8

.se:.tellit.es of Bulgaria and·

v~rHr'(:J

Rumania, the Communists

e~rr:>t)~c•
v '-·• .\,.::>
1

for(~€:d

to proceed a little

more cautiously than in Albania and Yugoslavia.,

~'he

Western powers were vr:i.thholding diplomatic recognition
unt:11 more r.epresentatj_ve government waf;

est~ablished_

howeve~t~

':Phe :Lssue of leade:c:ship i.n the Balkans v-m·;.'>,
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In Alban :La, Er1vex· Hoxh<:J.

:::;c-::L~;ecl

control of a eourrt.ry

vvldc:h had ne1rer developed a tr<").r1:i.t:Lon of liberal polit:i.cs,

Hoxha ruthle ::mly suppre:;;;:;e.d the · 'rovincial tendencies of
the country and by 191+7 he had drJven the Br1t.:l.r3h and
Ame:d.enn miJ.ita:cy rep:r.or:;::nt,8:t.ivcs from the countryo23
Cornnmni~'>t
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governmer:rt undf:.H' the Ya1tt:l dr;;lc1arat:i.on on Liberated
o
We have invob;d thi~:~ doclar·ati:on for Humania
(a minority government imposod by intimidation) and
Bulgar:.la (in. anth:ipation of tmfa:i.r· elections). The
Soviet Government rejectGd the first~ but 't'Ve are :renE;ivr~~
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cited ar; b(:>.:l.ng Fasel:3t or :reuctiona.ry ..

Tht:1 ca.se of Nikola Petkov in Bulgaria ts t.yp:teal of
the tc:tct.:i.cs used t:.o abride;o :ceproesent<:rt:tve gov-ernment. in
the Balkans.,

Petkov was leader of the
Union Pm:t:y.

He::~

non-Con~unist

Agrarian

hfl.d waged a eon.t:i.nual battle :Ln the

6 {')

In

t}J·~~

sum~

u:::ual publ:ic: t:r;•ial and l:no-..r:i.t.abli::; publ:i.e eonf'E:t5B:lcm of
thG peor)Jo ~

hm•.gcd. 2 '7

11

FlD:ttern had

6

bE~c:n

••

fo1l.ovred in .Y.'ugoslav:i.a

vrit,h tb.e trial o.f 'I':tto v s old Emcmy D:caza Mihe:dJ..ov:l.c: vv-ho

had been executed on July 17, 1946. 2 g
G~_;eehoslovak:Lo.
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On March 10 Jan Masarvk
in the court.
. was found dead
.

of the Foreign Office.

n~sign
_.

'\:'J':ith:i.n three nwnt.hs.

It was widely believed he had

With:Ln another thrc::;o n.wnt.hs

he would be deade29
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The actual technique of Communist take-over varied
:i.n oach country based ttpol:-:\ Hus::dan.
ticular condi tiom~.

By

ever.

'I' he re:::rultE;

1947-194~,

assessment~

~vC'I'e

of the

par~·

always the Game, hm.,r-

Communist control in the Balkans and

in all East-Central Europe had

b0come virtually completcc30

Amer:i..can and Dr:i.t:1.sh :l. nt.orcsts had presumed t.hat the
Soviets would be
hfH'

ret~sonable

vri t1h the foreJ.gn :i.nver:>t.rnc::nts of

allies :i.n the countr:i.EHl under her control o

Such -v·.raB

not to be the case.

tal equipment; from H.umn.nia and Hungary"

the Hussians had
c:md

tr·ansfor:cm~d

tE~.kon

lV.loscovv was particuM·

over contrt.<l of many enterprises

them into st;atE! monopolies.

'I'ho .Soviets

dornand<:-:d thE:: shares :i.n bankL) and o:.i.l compani.e s wh:tch had

bf~en owned pr'evi.ou:::dy by Gernw.ns ~32

Tho Russians had also

d0manded tb.at Western owned companies pPcnrid.e reparations
for· the

f3ovi(~t

31r~'E·.. •"'
.~, "-)c:· $'

Union out of current pl'Odu.ct.:i_on.

cw. .

.s:.t~.· ~ p.

19h •

'I'he U:ni tc-)d
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States urged that this policy bn terminated and that equip-

The major American abjections were directed against

had grantod vir.·tunl eontrol ove:r- the:i.r eeonorn:l.GG to tho

Soviet Union.

The two countrieG ceded control of the pro-

duct:i.on of' :cHw mater:la1f3 ~~nd ag;:';-:;Gd to f:Jhip mofit o.f' tho:i.l"

exports to Russ:i.El. <

'l'he Sov:i. E!t

Govl~rrnnen.t

$

hDd l"eaJ. rwed for su.pplie s and resmn·cGs.

throt1.gl1 a so:r.i.es

Ho\'rever ~ it; was

felt. tba t mJ.c:h :i.mpos:!.tJmw and pol:i.d.. CH3 Nould
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Our pr·:i.nwxy 0 bjr: ctJ.v(;; :1.:::: n'.': i.thOl:" ,;c:f;.'v':iHp; the nr~l:ti sh
Emph•e nor purch<i.~3l1~n: o:U. :\ n thf! Near F;c;u:rt,;" " •• h'O mu~:;t
im;:i.~>t on t\fJ open ck,1xc fen' l;.n:!(te tln'O\l.dwut the vw:c.l.d
•••• Wo c:annot perm:U.~ t}lP- door· to be:; c1c;l:>ed agrdnBt mn·.,_

r

trade in Eastern Europe nny more thnn we can in China.3J

on. the

,

..

Gl·IAP'I'ETl V
'fHE: POLICY OF' COW?HON'rA1'ION,
POTSDAl\T Al\ID ATCWiiC JHPLOJ·!JACY

On Apd.l 2t,)? l9h\ Ar:ner:ic::m ancl Rur>l:.)ic.m troopr-; ·,joined
forcos em the wer->tern bu.n.kt; of' ·th.e Elbe ncar t.he tol'm of
'l'orgnu"

MD.sf:wlin:L met b.:Ls fate. at the handB of Connmmist,

partisanE> t and Adolf Hitler eonrod.ttcd suicide :i.n h:ts Berlin
Bunker·"

l~,

On :May

the United

St~atc:-:s

F:i.fth

Anny~

sw-eeping

frc>m Italy, met the! Seventh Army a:cching southward .from

in Hheimt:E> ~ CoJ.onel Ckmer·al Alf:n:::cl. t.lodl signed tho 1 ong"·

:e {J::-~ t:' 7"; ::s

'I

<!'

~\.

guropean. \•.ra.r· vm.s ended.

April 12, 19lt-5 ~ in Warm Sp:r·ingE> ~ Georg:i..a, a t:Lrod and
maturely old I•,ranklin Rocmevelt had compl<d.r.H:::d of
r:Lf:tc headache"..

'I'l.'lo hours

late!~,

11

pre·~

a ter·"

he vmf; dead f:rom a

massive cm:e bral ht-;rnor:dwgc~. 2
Frankl:i.n D.. Roo.sovelt 's nud.den death vras to b:d.ng

to the presidency a man quite different in background,
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Heritage,
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Amer:i..can
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oxper:i.ence and

tcrnpf~ramcnt
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T:lo!JGevelt h.ad not been able

to spare the time nor energy to brief his Vice-President,

r-Ic'"T'l~vJ
:-l.

,c.:>.' •.

r;,,n·""'l''l'l
J.". ~.c\o n.

1

en
lli''',,
I.
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i"<"'''
f.J .... ou,_, .•.
·-'·

rrruman sha'rod the common o)Yln:i..on

Britain.

·rJr"'t-•,rar
po·l~cv
.J.-:>,
11c
•
.J • h

J:

t}H:!.t;

.!.

tho ma:i.r.t antagonism:;:)

He had .felt t'!·v:{ t. the lfni.ted States would

p:r·ob~·

ably be called upon as the chief mediator of those disputes.,

It was to be rnany months bcfo:r.·e the mnr President;

"\'JOuld come to· l"eal:t;;:e that American leadership Hou.ld be
necessa.t·y to

ment ~

r:~t.avo

In that

off' the threat of Communist

i.ntei~im

encroach~

t.he strongest· bargaining elements

of the United States had been seriously

jec:t to error; he eould be sma.ll; and he

appHared equnl to the challenge.

r.:

diminished~)

o.fton }Jr.l.::.·t.:i."·

vlB.i.'

Truman vtas :interested :i.n

history and had definite idr;;;as concer·ning ·the great. Pres:t-·
dents..
mt~ ~. ~ ~"

He wa.s frequently quoted 1:1.s saying,

H:tstory taught

'J.'ruman t s :i.nterpJ."'etat:Lons of history molcled his

publ:1.c ph:i..loGophy.

·.

11

3E. David

The f.~(~ :Lnterpretat:Lons also tended to

Cronin~ 1'l~~r!~.if:.tb~ 9.S:!l..t1.l.ty Ari!QI'.!:i~.§., Vol. II;

(Hommvood~ Ill:ino:i...r:i~ Dorsey Pt·oss, 19()6}, p. 3.15.

4 D•F ~ F'lem:i.ng, 11!.~. _g.2.1!.L r££!1:. Q~Q. li:;_~ 9}. .:1E]Jlf?_, Vol o I,
(Garden City, Ne1..,r York: Dou.b1eday &. Co., 1956) ~ p. 265.

make Hoosevelt' s f:mecessor a 1118n capable of nchiev:tng a
degree of ereatness on the basis of his convictions rather
t1e111
1
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Both Roosevelt <:.1.:nd HuJ.J hnd bElen committod to a
policy of p:ceser.·v:i..ng good relR.t:l.;:•ns vtith Huss:LH.

'I'hoy both

felt that maintaining good relations with the Soviets was
essential for a sound

~1gre(~me.nt

vd th the

U.S~ S .H.

in t.he

proposed United Nations organization.?
1,Hg GENESIS OF CONFRON'I'A'riON

Whon tl:-1e st:r·ong :influence o.f troth Roosevelt and H,ull

\"las removed in a short Spflcc of time others 1 advocating a
change in policy toward the Soviets 1 cruna to occupv key
pos:t tions o.f j_nfluence.

1'\lhile l'O'curninr-; J'r·cm Eoor:f.:vel t.'1r;.;

funeral the new Pres:i.dent

'\tV(?,.~:;

briefed on "the

stat.n~.

of

many serious problems in ou:(' foreign and domestic relat:i. ons 1t
by James F. Byrnes o 8

The day follovling th~; brj_Ed'ing by

Byrnes, Truman v;ras to receive h:i.B regt11ar daily briefing

from Fleet Admiral Willam D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the
Presid(-;nt and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff'.

6Paul Y. Hammm:1d, 'rl~;e~ 9.21.S. Y.{.~:£. ]3_~-.r..e.: AF~SJ1:i9~7.!.
F2J:~.l::E!!. Ls~±i.c._y: ~Jns:_~ :H2.45l {)San Francisco: Harcourt~

Brace and World, Inc., 19u9 , p. 8.
7li'lem:i.ng, 21?.• gi,!.; P~ ~65"

8J·ames F' ~ Byrne).s, -~-T?S::.~lJS;.:tDE E.l:~22lSLY~ (New York:

Harper and Sons, 194'7-; p.

h9~
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wa~3

one of the mo::>t infl:J.cnt:l<:d. of the Pre::ddent vs cJ.relo
E;:ich mor:nir:tr.; at 9: !+ 1) he ::·n1.mmari zod t be 18.test

of D.dvisorB ~

:lnt(:<L1 igGn~e reports in the miJ:i. t<P"Y 1

political~

social,

and economie spheres; nnyt.h:i.ng that had a ''bearing on
American sccuri.ty and the shaping of policyn.9
wa~1

The Admiral

thus :i.n a unique po!::d c:i. on to influEHJ.ce thE-} Pre in. dent.

It '\.lfas he v;ho appraif>ed T.:ruman on the

Big Pour conferences and

tt coached

cour~~e

0

of the p::cev:tous

Hoosevt~lt ~ s

:l.nexper:lenced

successor on the signi.f:i.f.::ance o:f' Russta f s emorgenee as .a
major

pOW(H..

at the end of

Wo:i~ld

War rrn

~nd

mHde I.eahy Hone

of the principal architBcts of the 'tough poJ.ic.;y' toward
Ru ,....c·-t a ulO
.\,")'-..\·'·(

f'

ment and the military shared the view that :1.t.
to ma::Lntain JX.wcefu1 relat:i.onn "'rith the

VJI:J.G OS30i.:t.tiaJ.

u.s~s.a.

This· vie11

was held not because of any disposition to favor the .Soviets
but rather becmwe it was expected that the United StateB
could not ma1ntain enough powr-:lr in Europe to counter Soviet
The State Department and vlar Depa:rtrnent

miJ.:i.ta:cy might.

had posed an e8rJ.y bulwa:cl<: aga:i.:nst hard line approaches

wJ.th Hus::1i<.~. in the spring and summer of 1945.11

·9FJ
) ' · ')'
•
. .UYtlllg, .9]2;. f.lt • ) p

.

lOCJji

.~01.) •

r /.. t'
&

Frank Gervas:i, nwa.tchdog in the White House, 71

Cs;~LU. ~£..~, Oct~

9,

1955, p. 7'7, by D. F. Fl<::~ming, 2-2_9~~ £J.:.·.~."

11Hammond, .QJ2.· ,S?_~_t., p .. 12.

7'-:There vJerq othern, howeve:c'l who felt a lack of eon·,
fidt:HlCe in Soviet moti vc·s and vrho ttrged 8 harder line

toward

Rus~;:La.

in Moscow,

h~d

Averell Hi:-\rriman ~ the Ame:r·ican Ambassador

returned to Washington following Roosevelt 1 s

death in order to seek a stiffening of

U~S.

policy, especi-

ally in relation to Poland.
I had talked to Mr. Truman for only a fevv m:i.nutef3
when I began to realize that th(:3 man had a real grasp
of the situation ••• * He had read all the cables and
reportG that had pasEJed bet.1rmen me and the S·tate
Department, going back for many months. He knevv the
facts and the sequence of events, and he had a keen
underst,anding of what they meant ).2
Lt::ahy and Harri.man l'lere not; alone in their

of th.e ttsoft.H. pol:i.cles o:f the Roosevelt or·a.

critic:L~>r;:

Thf;,rt::i

VI0I'C:

McCloy, Assistant Secretary in the 1tl.ar Depart;men.t were.
qu:i.ck to po:i.nt out American military and economic

interest~;

"I?

in Europe •.L...J
'fhesl'?. well articulated views were supported by

almost every important advisor consulted by the President..
Bes:i.des Averell Hard. man, the An1ba::;sador to the Soviet
Un:lon, vmre Ac·ting Secretary of r::>tate Joseph C. Grew,

J,~eahy"

12cabel1 Phill:l.p8, TI2.~:v T.J:itm?:Jl Pr~e..:i1?E£Y! !.h~~
~Li~~t?.TI £1: §:. :K.?::h'~!r.!!I?.!l<1;D.~. £ll9.£El1?.s.L9Jl, (New York:· Macmillan~
J.. 9o6) , p. 79
G

1

3Hammond, l-..9c.•

£tt."

7 j£:
~3timson, Jnmos V,, li'or:cPnU,lf;''·'~~~;(;t.~:.:I;:J.ry of tho Na.vy ~ and
the ~1ecretary of State h:l.:fiS<:)lf, Echvard Stottin:i:us .14

Harriman found tbe at,mo!>phe.r"<'j in War:>hington much
moro sympathetic toward his
· dE~ath.

ActJ.ng Secretary of

v:iJHID

f0llowing F .,D ~H.• t s

St:;.:.:rLE~

Grew, Viho regularly

brie:.fed the nevv- Presiclerrt, on dipJ.omat.:Lc developwents, was

pa:rt.j_(:u1ar1y favorable

t(:1

Harriman r s strategy for dealing

Ni.th the Russians on a hardu.J..i:ne- basis,;

With this f.mppol"'t,

Harriman pursued his round of policy di8c1.ws:i.ons with con-

fidenceo

With vigor and logic he advocated that only a

firm line could establlsh a workable :r·elat:i.onsh:tp with th<-:!
Russians.

And, while :t t is not felt that the

Arnbns~·-;J.do:c'

on the Soviet problem and developed a predisposition toward
a hard-line approach.

lt:'
J

While ali of th8 President 1 s chief adv:lsors supported
the principal of confrontation with Russia, only

Secr(~tary

of War Stimson and General Marshall urged restraint.

Both

the General and the Secretary vrere exponents of what

bec~m1e

known as tho "strategy of a delayed showdownn.
main

obj<:.~c:tion

Stimf:'lon.i s

to an :i.mmediato showdown was based primarily

upon the tloose language' of the Yalta agreement as it
14Gar Alperovi tz, P~t;..?_rr!J£. E;1:J?~L9Elfl<lY: lU::.!~O§.}''lg~~~
Q!Jd .P«.!:.Q.g.§..nl, (New York: S:Lmon :;~nd Schuster 1 19o5 f, p. 26~

15·11:
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20
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related to Poland,
~i'hr~

involved.
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SGcreta.ry felt ntrongly that Poland, whj_lo

a symbolic issue for the United States, was much more to
the Sov·iot Uri:i. on.

He J'o1t

~-~trongly·

that

th(~

Husn:Lan leado:r>-·

uhip Nou.ld not yield on thr:\ Pol:L':;h issue .16
Stimson t ::> eonsel'VA.'c.1 v·e f:tJ:.l1H'oa.ch was not

~~xperJ..~n1ced

h:i.mself m.> an

<1.

produet of

lcade:c who basod policy dec1alons

Stimson was pr(::parecl

on :reali.sm a:;,; opposed to Sf;rrtinH:mt.

to acknO\'vledge the Soviet ttclaim that, in the l-Ight o:f:' her

bi tt.er expEn::·ience with Ger'll!C:.my, her Oi'm. self de:f<::mse ., • e
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the HuBsians were being more realistic than the United
States$

He accepted the 'sphere of influeuce 1 principle

and also

exprt~ssed

the belief that :l.t would b(:'.! necessar•y-

.for the United States to aeknowledge the r\:)aJ.iti.es of' the
postwar· strtwturc1 of Europe if a

~modus

be est,ab1iehed Hlth the Soviets~ J.F.~

I6Alperov:i.tz~ 2J2.• s::i:..'t~t
l7c:F

vivendi t were to

The Secretary ce.st;lgrJ,ted

Po lt9n

Henry L. St:i.mBon, pn ArttYt §_~:..f_'Disg_~ P~ 601~~,
£.i!~· 1 p. 50..
· ·· ·

by Alperovitz, .2.'2•
lf5HEm.ry

L~ Stimson, g,J:.~E.Y., Aprll 26, 19h5"-

.??

'

exaggerated >triews of the r,kmroe Doctrine and at the same

time but~t. into every quo~;tion that eonK~s up in Central
Europe" n19
'fruman

11

go

For these .:1nd othor :r-ea~wns [)timson urged that
~~lowly

and avoid an open breakRn

Gene:•(•al Marshc:tl1 1 :::

obj~'Jct5.on

to the :i.mmedia te con·..

front.at:i.on tr\YctJ.c v,rus based upon his belief that Sov:tet
fnrees · m:J.ght he .a deci.~:;iv::~ factor in the '\V'ar vdth Japan.,
'l'ruman 1 s mtlit,ary adviBors had estimated that at. least sixty

Red Army di.vi.sions i'Vere needed t.o pj.n down strong Japanese
units in Nam~huria and North Chir1a.20

op:ln:i.o.n in

th<~

tdnter of 19h5 had

bfJOn

While a minority of

that only

t:u~ough

The plans Ht tba t t:lme called for amphibious landing w:i.th:i.n
. eighteen mo.uths of the German surrender~.

losses

wer"'f..~

placed as high as one million Amerj.can casualties.

Japanese l.oss estimates ran much higher.
Japanese

'.l'he estimated

dE~fe::nse

'fhE:~

suic:tdal

on Okinavva and Tt--:o ,Jima appeared to sttb-

stant~ate such estimates. 21
1 9w.a.lt.•c-)r Millis,

:!~.11.£ FqJ.:r~St~~l. D:ii?J:~.es"~

Vik1ng Press 3 1951), p. 49.
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Roosevelt had heeB

that early Soviet entry

into the war wr:ts the only v1ay to roduco such attrttion.

Wh:lle later

:i.nte11igenct.~

J:'(~port:s

\H.:H. . e to clearly indicat.E.1

the estimates of 1945 had failed to take into consideration

the devastation of Japan wrought by American air and naval
povrer~

the Ame:rico.n del"3gates at, Yalta. he:Jd no wa"l of

anti.e~

ipating that large-scale Russian help would not be needed.
Addi ti ona11y, no consideration vrt-J.s given to

thE~

possible

use of the atomic bomb.22
With this pessimistic view,

Roosev~lt

t.he secret agreen1t:Hits on the Far E:ast.
seemed highly

a.dvantageouf:~

Chi~a

to

negotiated

At the time these

and

sible to separate the American policies toward Russin in
"'u... ope fron• t·l1e Arne.''').
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Roosevelt. had felt at Yalta that the United S1;;at.es

needed Russia in the East. . ~rruman was to be :i.n possess:top
of a vveapon wh:Lch tmuld make cooperat:i.on w.i t:h the Red A';cmy· ·

unnecessary, even

undesirable~

THE MOLOTOV CONFERENCE
Armed with the experienc:e of

el(~Ven

days, PresidEmt

Truman prer)ared for. h:i.s first meeting with a

QP.. _2). t..

p. i62.

'

p. 161 ~

representat~i.ve
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the President was scheduled to m0et Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov.

Molotov was on,. his way.. to the San Francisco Con-

ference.

Originally StallD had r2fused to send Molotov to

the conf'Hre nee~ but ht-:J.d

l:'E! com:dd~.n·'od,

following Hoor;eyelt t

~>

death, as <1 gesturE~ of good w:L:U t.ov,r.-:u·d 'J~r·uman., 2l,.

The mAeting between the President and the Soviet

Foreign Minister v;as preced(::d by a h:Lgh level White House
conference that was to presage
in United StHtes Sov:i.et

~

sudden and dramatic shift

relations~
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pre~Hmt
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retary of State Stettinius, Secretary of War Stimson, Navy

Secretary Forrestal,
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At that

meeting t.he President asked each his opinion of "laying it
on th~?-l line t"lith Molotov~ n26
The basic issue before the War Cabinet was the
approach to be taken with Molotov on the Polish

2

question~

4-Flem:i.ng~ OJ2,. s:L~·' p. 266,.

~~5M:L1lis,

'I' h.~ )f2£!:£.;?..t §lJ.

D:i.:i.0:iSJ=~~ ·21?.· £t~. ·, P. h9.
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At the cor<-) of the nroblcm
.

~

v.r~:H>

whether . the Sovi(·)ts were

clearly and deliberately breaking the Yalta

It

accords~

was recognized thc:rt. tho. Red Army had ac:tur:d. control in
Poland.

The Hus::dans

v;e:,:·.~:

now commited to GC"rtain actions

:celevant. to establishing ropresent.ati ve governmont and
work:tng tO\'-iard mut,ually

clg:n~e able

boundar·:l.es f(n: the Po1:1.sh

state through the council of Foreign Ministers.

If the

Russians honored these accords, the Western Pm,rers, lack··

ing any pmr!er to effect their ovv-n endf3 in the area, would
take the Soviet action as a definite sign of gobd faith»

•

U.s.s.R.

If tha

abridged the agreements, strong United

States ob;jections would pln.c:e. 'th() Sov1&t Un.:i..::>.n or1 no1'.;j.·c•r:\
.

that close adherence to

tlH3

Ya1ta

i.nterprc~ted them~

ments as tl'v..::y

and a.

Such an accusation, if unfounded,

u0s.s.n.28

Truman f:l.rst turned to
that

11
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Sc~cretar·y

Stimson who repli.ed

in my optnion we ought. to be very car<:)ful and see

whether we couldntt get ironed out on the situation without
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Soviet~·

could be interpreted as an American attempt to impose its

will on the

1""'!

c~onfrontatton i}Gve1~

oped over the issue, a serious breach might occur :i.n

American relatio:nso
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that the P:cerddent
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to Forc(~stala n30
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Major General Deano 1 ::tnd nwt:.:t

of t:.hc dt.hers p:r.'esent advocated t.hat a f:lrm stand. b(~ t.?-ktnJ, ·
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ment had behaved any differently than what it had.

Leahy~

who had been

noosevelt~B

ChiPf of Staff

ce.ut.:i.oned the President that. the agy:eed fox·mula gav<'; the

2 9Hem7 L. Stimson, £2:-2-.:f:x.~ April

3 oJ=bJ~§.
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31M·1·1·
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2.J2.

_2)-· t~ ~ ,

l9h5.

way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically
') ')

breaking 1t. t1 :.>J

Hoos(~IT{.<Lt

had ag1:;G(!d w:tt.h his Chief of

The President had fel~ the language of the agree-

Stafr.34

rnent.s was sufficiently .f;'::JVOJ"ablc· to the Soviet objoct:Lves

that he J.at.er cautioned Chureh.:i. l.J.. against attempting tO
evade the fact that ttwe pJ.aG(.:d 1

a:·~

eJ.Cc~arly

::;hcn'Jri i.n the

agreement, som(.. n-vhat more emphasi:3 11 on the Warsav>I ( Lubl:i.n)
government than orJ. the We::rtern ori.cntt-:d political leaders.35
Genera.1 Ma:cshall also had major
pol:tcy of :i.nnnedia te confront;at:i.on e

The

res~n'va.ti.ons

GE~neral

for Soviet part:i.cipation in the vrar against
fe]_t. st:.rongly that the

.HnrH5:1.<.H1~3

on the

b.&.d hoped

J'apHn~

Marshall

mi.§;ht;. c1e.lay tbr:d r (-mtry

br·~~ak .36
~?,nro

approach,

majo:c argumentr.; blurrt.ed Marshall's caut.ious
however~

Harriman had noted that the Russians

had agreed to start collaboration in the Far East but had
frdl<:Jd to meet t.hose comm:l:t.mEmts ~
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- vvl.L. .lam ·D. ~ I .ea h. y

House~

say

352~
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th8t no reF-~1 dependc~ne(? siwuJ.d be devoloped on Hed Army
part:i.e:i.pat~i on~

General

DG.tUle

l1 <~;d argued thnt the Soviets

would enter the Pacific war in any event because of their
national intGrests
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planners werE-1 even then

p:c8p~tring

the next

~~ich

day~

Staff that

11

April 24 5

Also, the Joint Staff
a

rE~port,

to be relt:)aBed.

advised the Joint Chiefs of

Early Hussinn entry into the w.s.r agaim:rt Japan

is no longer necessary to make :l.rnrasion feasible •. tt3f5

'l'hus,

tt appeared that a· poliey of immediate shmidovm "Vmuld risk
very lit tl~!.
'l'he President sided deci::-,d Vf:)ly vd th tihe

members present at the meE1t:i.ng.
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hard line"

Truman ;:'3tl.1.t.Ed:

'That he felt ou:!' ag:c·eemeiJ.t:~' \'v:i.th the Sc.nr.ffd:, Ur:J.. on
so far had been a one='N<:ly frt·.n::H.:;t t::J.nd i;hr}J:;; ho co·ctLl
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on \'i:i.th the plat1s for ~ian F'rc-md:seo and i.:f' t·hG I1uss:l.t~.m:.
did not vr:i.sh to join us th<:.~y cou1d go to hs11~39 .
·

One hour after the departure of hLs

ad:v:i.~3orr~,

· President met \vlth the Sov:tet Foreign Minister@

the

Admiral

Leahy and Charles Bohlen had remained for the meeting$40

'rhe President. nlost no time in making very plain to Molotov

3 7Harry S. Tr·uman, 1:.§":.2:£ ?f De.st£i.9l!L~ (Ne-t¥" York:
'I':i.me Inc ~ ~ 19 59 ) , p • '79 •

J8cF' Department of Defense, "Entry of tbe Soviet
··Union into the Wai"' Against Japan, 11 PPe 60-61, by A1perov~tz,
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p5~.,

p. 32.

39"'11'
FiL lS,
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f!..~-.o,

p. ~o
) •

4-0Flem:i.ng, .2J2.~ £.~~-, p. 268.

our

displea~:'iu.re

at the StYv.iot failure to cttrry through the

agreements rnade at

YaJ.t>:~

about the character of

tl:H:~

nev·T

Pol:i.sh Gove-rnment. nhl
The President told the Foreign Minister that American
economic assistance could not

b~

expected by Russia unless

tho Polish problem was nettled on the basis of American
pro1;0~1als

&

Truman igno1·ed the

vaguc~r18SB.

of the Yalta

agree~·

ment. and told Iv'lolotov that the American interpretation was
~r All

the only on<::; ;possible o

we viero asking is t.hat the

Soviet Gov~2!rnment carr·y out the Crimea decision, ttl+- 2 t;he
President ::\3.id.

IVIoloto;;r

statE~d

that the Sovi.et Government;

felt that tr1e problems could be oas:\.l.y overcome.

As. the

.~ore1gn
...
.
l'fl'
. t
'.
d 1nto
.
~lll).s;er a1~resse
-

t

..

an agreemm1t had been r·eached on PoJ.and aHd tl'J.at:. nt,ht=:re

waB only one thing to

do~

and that 'tTas for Marshall Stalin

to carry out. that agreement. nh3
decl~,..red

Truman

After fu:ether exchange,

that thfJ Foreign Minister f3hou.1d clearly

understand that Amertcan eooperation could be obtained
only upon the basis of the AmericB.n proposals and not 11 on
the basis of a one-way street.n44
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'41Leahy 1 .9.~· c1.t., pp. :351=352.
Edvrar·d Re Stittin:ius, Eo2£.2.Y~l~ _?.ns!_ ~.hfl.
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Trumc:w.' s HbJ.unt

una.dornr~~d

verb:i.age of diplomacy .. ul.;.)

by the pol:l te

Boh1el·l later roport.ed that

11

hc

had nev-er heard a top off:i.d ::d. get. l::~uch a sc olcUng., n h6

like that. :ln my life" n

'l'rwmJ.Yl :r·epl1.ed, "Car:ry out. yo\u'

agreements and you won't get tal.ked to like thnt.n47
Vlithin tVv€.m_ty •• .fonr hours both 1'rmnan a:nd Churchill
received a reply· from Stalin doclo.r:i.ng that he considered
American and B1·it:Lsh effortD to dictate t'to th.H Soviet mrer
Poland,

11

a country :Ln w·hi.ch the UQS.S .. H.. io int.erested fi.rs1;

of Hll, D.nd

ffiCISt

of all, 11 hi:~ :intolerable e

ther statHd that it ·wcw

j_mp~~:r-:Lt:.i.ve

by Stettinius at San Francisco to

'.I'he IVfa.l:'Shetll fur-

that, Pol.and hEt'lG n.

~lter

the Soviet posi-

tion Here unsuccessful~ 1+9

Thus 7 the strong v:Lm1 prevailed and the nlj.nos of
the 'awful Bchism', i'lhich Churchill feared were ra.p:Ld1y
being dravm. 11 50
t. n\...

-~k·p
.n.tc.~
.. d.:.

t~1a~
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The advent of tr1e o.tom:l.c bomb would s.erve
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ATOMIC DIPLOMACY
Only twelve days after Franklin Delano Roosevelt's

death Secretary of War Henry

L~

Stimson sent an urgent

request to Presi.de11t Truman,.

Dear Mr. Presj_dent:

I think it is very important

1
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'•·r·'·l·r'
yon
'·'"...o ..poon
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a htgh1y secret mat·vn.·. J ro.ent.:i.oned it to you shortly
after you took office, but have not urged it since
on account of the pressure you have been undero It~
however, hafj such a bearing on our pres.ent foreign
relations and has su.ch m1 :i.mportant effect upon all
my th:tn'king in this field that I think yo11,. ought to
know about it without much further delay.51
'fhe f.'ollo11fing day the President was advised by

Stimson on the effect of the atomic 1t1eapon upon Arrwr:i.ean
foreign relations and 1..1.pon th.e de c:lsi v·e

have in shaping postwar policy.52
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By the time of' the Potsdam ConfEn·enc:e the President

had been ad'id. sed on the political potent:i. al of the atomic;

bomb by both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
Both of the cabinet members urged

State.

they cltff'ered i.n their

approach~

f."]

Stim~1on

:>--Tru.man, Year of Decis:lons, Q.P..·
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hard l:tne

advocated a "
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53Henry Lo Stimson, f}i~l_;,t:y_, May 16, 19h5.
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t.<J dictate our own. terms

at the end of the war."54

At the Quebec confHI'Gnce

\:>D
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p·u ··t

.tl'- 1'I..1•
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t

19, l9h3)

Hoof.\evelt and Clmreht11 h.arl agreed not to u::3e t.he new
weapon or share its secrets without the other's consent.
Memberrs of the sc:i.entif:ic community objeet.ed to this

British veto on American

f1c~x:i.b:U.:i.ty

because o.f what t.hey

viewed as Cl:m:r-chill f s dangerous pred:Llectton for ·developing
a new balance of power agCJ.inst H.ussi<-1.

rrhey hoped for

t5_on in the j.:nternattonal control of at:cm:i.c

":m~tponn

means or preventing a disasterous arms race.

es a··

They feared

being harnessed to a British anti-Soviet policy after the
\•.tar. 55

1.'he swift conclu.s:ion of' the vmr in Europe~, and the

subsequent decision to use the
'\'m.r against

~Japan del~-\yed,

l'lE~apon

to q'l1i.ckly e:nd the

more thorough consideration of

the bomb's role in international politics.56
It was obvim.is from the

V(:ll:'Y

beginning that any

policy decisions relative to Europe or the F'ar East \•rere
inevitably conn.E)Cted to S-~1, the eode name fo:c the' atomic

54'.Prurnan, X~:...~r .2.~: I~t£.t~~:...9Jl.~, !?J?.· .£.t.~·, p. 137 •

.55smith, .2..£· £i~.. , pp. 165~·166.
56·[1
. :)
;;....2.~S~:. • ? p. 166.

bomb pro:jeet..

Secretar7 Stimson pondered tb.e qt:tent:tons of

Russian entry into the wAr against Japan and the growing
impaBs in Europe

In his di.ary

hE'~

aga:Ln~:;t

th\:;

pot(~nt:l.aJ

of such a weapon.,.

cornment8d,

Over any sttc h trtn;::·;led we.vc~ of problem::: thE~ S~·l
sec::t"'et 11'Jould be dom:J . :n.D.nt and vet we vvill not knm"l
u.nt.il after that time~ (the T'o·b:;dam ConfE1rence) proh~·

ably ••• ~whether this new weapon is in our hands
or not0 We think it ~.11 be shortly afterwards,
bu.t it se(~ms a t,err:ible thing tr> gr:.lmb1e with such
b:i.g stakes :tn d:Lp1)?.J,nacy w'i.thout hav1ng your master

eard in your hanct0::>1
It was finally

DISt

d(~cided t~hat

the

~Tapane:::;e

surrer1der·

be speeded to affect victory prior to Russia's entry

into the Far East; war on August 8. 58

.

The decision created great

~

ll .. .lflWOf.i

Dr .. Phl.1 J:l.p r·bT'J.:":i..non,

where the bomb was being fabr:i.e<.ttecL

later to note:

ri'hat a date near August tenth '.>~Tas a mysterious
final date which ·vre, who had the daily tec;hnieal job
of readying the bomb, lw.d to meet at whateve~ cost
in risk or money or good development policy~?9
It lrvas obvious thnt the date set for testing the
l1.€H1

device had more

m.ilttarily.

The

slgntfic~ance

sucCE!SS

pol:J.tically 'thc:u1 it d:i.d

of the bomb would. pn:;c1ude

Ru[~sian

57 Henry L. Stimsony l~~li!::£::, Nay 13 and 15, 1945.
t:f'5
J

Flem:i.ng, 212,• s:iJ~~~ p" )02~

59cF Phillip Morrison, The Bulletin
of .Atomic
r:-•
........
·Feb. 1949, p. l~O ..
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do~ination

of Manchuria and Soviet inability to directly

An abrupt
t.ion of the

\diU"'

term:Lna·~

aga:Lnst .J G.yxm vwu1d aJ.t.o;o perm:i.t America

and Great Britain to ret.s.:l.n largo eoncentration.':; of

in Europe to reinforce Western strategy during the

force:~·;
postwa~

nogot:Lat,ions,. 60
The

P:c,~!(';;ident

had placed. groHt pol:U.·,Jcal :i.mp<)rtancc;

on tlw neces:::;.i ty of counter·J.ng the Red Array's supe:rio:r:Lty
On Ju~i.e 6, one month a.fter the Naz:i. surrendf;i'

i.n rnanpov-mr.,

he, statc::d he, "vmuld v.rithdra1tl only the troops
spare from Europe for our

rlHr

i.n the Pacific tt6J.
6

the political solutions to European probleme

to the war :ln Asia.

v1e

could
'l'hus.,

be~ame i~ex-

A v:lctory V·<h:Lc:b would }Y.cec:Juc1.e t.l)f::

necessity of.massive transfers of troops, armor,

a~d a~r

po\'n~r to the Pacific v.ras judged :i.mper:l ti ve o 62
If the bomb did not
enlist Red Army support.

~vork ~

it~

waB felt. ossent:Lal to

If the atomic 'deapon worked sue> .

cessfully, Truman d:id not desl.J."·G Stalin t s ··proposed ManchlJ.:t ·
.
.
63·
J.an
o ff'
... ens:t;,re.

60AlpHrovitz ~ !::1> g:U;;_. ~ P~ 11'7 •

.61 'l'ruman, l.EL~l: gf De.2_:L~. t(~n12.~
62Alperovitz, lQ_£ • .£i't!~
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.July 7, 1945, Pr0s:i.dcnt

On

r11ruman boardt~d the

cruiser "Augusta iT for h:1. t-~ journey to Europe and the

dam Confercnce.64

Pot.r:~-~

The President was to meet Churchill and

Stalin in the war-ravaged Berlin suburb during the latter

haJf of July, 1945.

It was to be the last meeting between

the three heads of state.65
of War Henry Stimson had hoped that

~1c~cretary

Hession of the super bomb vlould make
··'x1d woulcJ
~ . '"'
~:t.'' ;::,
c:·t ·'J. 11
•. !.. c., \J

t:<
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Sov1r~t
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He felt thB.t. ·t,he bomb \1/0l.J.ld forco
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•:.:> 11 ··'" .,,
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Szilard and Harold Urey, that the bomb 1;i•;ould J.nake Ihwsi..::l.
.. c~'":

more manageable in I~~UJ·"ope. "u'

It; was with the expocta.tion t.hat:. t.he t&:r.'·rible 1-\Teapo:n
would '\'lO:rk that rr:r·unmn had

boardE:~d

'thH

1

Augusta r.

The

Looked for~.~rd with ~reat optimism as he considered
the 1evorfl.ge th8 July lo atomic test might. give to
t:,•m f.'aees of his diplomacy --~·· now the Manchurian

p. 610.
/.t.:.
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···J~~~be1''
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would br:: c: omplctud only c:.tfter the 'mauter·

card' had been demonstrated; and, with luck, the war
m:i.g;ht be dram<1tically cmdecl I·Jith the Hed Army sti1J5
stalled on the far .s:Lds '-1f tlv~; Manchurian border. of>

iously awaiting word on

th~

resultR" of the test explosion

at Almago3:'do, New Mexico.69

On t.he eve of r.tis :first meet·~

1
·t·)"tp
l)'t)<"f''.l
"r\"'
J•.• nrr
lc:> ''']'
H • V·1"
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1 , :~
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e."'-c't.).
.r. I r,.ect··c"-'D·
•
Ct .. ·t·J.v~,
_ .J

11 .I..·f ·.l·.·:··,
•~

explodes, as I think it wills Itll certainly have a hammer
on those boys ! 1 70
On the day before the

Pc~tsdarn

Conference formD.11y

met, Monday, J'uly 16, at 5:30a.m •. , Amertcan scientists.

finally r;xploded the first atomic bomb in 1:-.tist;ory.t '71
Clm.rehi11 wa.s t;o rE:n-:alJ.,
On. (July 17 vmrld=·shald ng nm•rs lv-·:..d arr·J:\r!::d" ··In th0
afternoon ~3t:i.mr..-wn called at my abode and 1t:d.d l:{;'~fot'~}
TlK~ P... sheet. of pap(~r· on '\vh:i.ch vras wrj.tt.en 'I\:thio-s

satisfactorily bornt.e •• Tl~ atomic bomb is a realitv
€'

t:"·.c. o

.... <=>... '1v-l1e·.. '1
''·'a·
S'
I...·1E·,.,
·-1.'<"
J.
v,

''

~.t

"'~'·':··~··c·l.,r

•Jr..lv~ ....J

,., ..

\"_,.._, lc1"'

i·o·
,•

..,.;.,~.,
ln.ll;,.

Wa.r, and perhaps to much else besldes~'?2

('

.,,.'C)'·'u'
Ut;_,..,.
lJ.

"'',.···r--·1· d::
V~\J

On. July 17, the Pre~ddent had h:i.s first met~t:Lng
w:i.th the Soviet Premier armed vlith ttan

entil~ely ne·N

feeling

68Alperovitz, .2.P.· £):!:.<-, p., 125~
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the estab1i.shm.e:rrt of i:;ov(:rmrLontt3 Dmenable to U.S. trade

and coJ.nmerc:.:l.£11 5.nterest:.s . .
• • ,. AmeJC'ic;an lendurt: init:l.alJy assumod th<lt the
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3) Amc::rican 1.ntorestn :ln th8 Jntn!.TJational:izntion of s1.wh

Italy, Hung<n"'y, Bu1gar:i.<>~ HumC:t't1.J.<:l, and F:i.nland, 5) the
·• ..
} cJlCI.
A ·'
, t 10
C.on

•
1(·-.m

('B]. <:.C.:..•I.•
''·,I·'·].E.ffi8l!.t.•
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.0 }'t···
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r
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6) the pro b.-.

· •.c ,~ 7) the settlement of the PoJ.:i.:::>h border
:r~ep~r.rt·i
. •.\ . d ,_.. on

o.f

i::lsue ~ ' 1'1

There was

so~e

:i.rnportant matters.

superficial agreement on several

It \vas acknowledged that supreme

authority J:n Germany should be placed with tho commanders

of the four occupying armies acting together in Berlin
as a Control Council· j_n matter·s affecting Germany
\"lhole.
+·
I .v

w,,_~·s·
:1.

GE~rmany

ar~ El

war; to be dcm:UJ tarj.z.ed and dernoc:c•Rti:zed.
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econom:tc: unit wit.h common policJ(;·n? in all

i

i

~:'>ph~n:c;::

,'.":2.. >.:'~ .,

D.n

of

eco~·

nomic activityg78
~~ruman

and Churchj_ll r·ecognized. as

Y

faits acc·ompl:i.s v

the dect f>ion of the Sovtet High Command to commit t<Y the
Warsaw Government the control of the entire zone to the
Westel~n

Neisse H.:i. ver.

At the time the Sov:l.et Un:i.on had

argued that ::m.ch a tran:.::ft:.n"'

wn.~;

not in conflict 1t-r:i.th pre.-.

W. Pratt A J-fistorv of United Stat1es .
( Englev~o~d-c li.f. f."s;-~N(;w ·Yoi-:ftt''p'l::enfice
/+56.
PP. h-56M~l~57 ~

9/r.
nne:i.ther' in the a.forcmenU.oned n.g;cr.>ementf; nor in the deci""

sions of the Crimean

Confer~nce

js the question of admin-

i.stration o.f oceupj.ed Ck;:r."'fnan tnrr:i tory touched upon., tt
While some felt such a contention violated the principle
action~:;

that all

would b8 tihrottgh mutua]. consent of the

Big Three powers, the President and Prime Minister chose
to aect:.:pt the Hussir:m f-tct.1.on as legitimate c '79.
'fhe Pot.sdam agreements a1so authorized
ing pm·.rer t.o r-emove capital

assets~

E!El.Ch

oceupy...

arid an effort was made

to balance 't.he predominantly agr1cu1tural Soviet zone with
indtmtr:lal equipment of the We:3tern zones.

Thus, ten per

cent of the :i.ndustrial equipment of the We ~:;ter·n zone 'V'.ras

fiftE~en

pex. . ce.nt. of such eqv.iprnent was e a:t'IJ!::rr+:ed tG

exchanged for raw materials and foodstuffs
the gast.,

Add~tt:tonally,

the German navy

produ~0d

WfW

Df:~

1n

to be d,ivided

equally among the Big rrhree powers.• 80
'I'he task of dravrlng up trE..,atiE1S lvith Italy and the
Axis satelli t.e s, Finland, Rurrmn:i.a, Bulgad,a, and .Hungary, ·
was

assign(~d

to the Council of Foreign

to meet j_n London..

Some of the key

Min:i.Bt<:~rs

:t::)StH=:i.S ~

which was

such as Huss:Lan

des ires for control of the Da:rdane1J.es, t:cuErt.eesh:t.p over

__

...,.......,...,_._,..
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.,_._..,.. ........

----....

707!"'Cl::3,
•

~

C>P._.

9)t'"
former Italian coloniN; in the Jvfr:-;di.terraneany and the

internationalization of key waterways were left unre-1vec1 Rl
so ..
$

'I'he lack of clar:i. ty :Ln the Po>csdam agreements
't:i.ve to Germany later Al1.o>V'C-Jd

t~iKl

rela~,

Soviets to obstruct,

ful·~

fillment of several of the key items of that accord.

The

Russians appeared to rejAct all endeavors to establish
German unity; she would ·not collaborate in handling Gf~rma:ny

as an economic unit; she blocked stabilization of the
German currency, to increase production, or to assist ·1.n

developing a flow of goodt.' throughout Germany c 82
It is now generally conceded that one major reason

for the laek of clarity in th<-') Potsdam
''S

<.':tl.

~c':l1e
.

lack c)f eagev'l18"qc• ,.,.,,J tl1e
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bomb.
The Amarican delegation at Potsdam was generally
pleased that the final dispooition of several key issues

had been successfully delayed.

The President had desired

to. post pone the Big Three rneet:Lng in the first place .and

had adopted a position of holding f:i.rrn, apparently

1

relying

81 Pratt, QE· .9..t!!.· ~ p. h5 6~
B2Eugene N., · Anderson, J:'fod~_!1l l\!}.!£.912~. iP~ Yl£!:1.9-. PED.:snectivo 19lh. to the Present, ll\Jo'"' York: Holt. Rineha:t'to
~d -w:rr1~~·ton-,-J9"Dl 1,--·PP ~-cnr.:-619.
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greatly' upon information rEdati V(-l' to the bomb.

After

the initial Almagordo test, the President remarked candidly
that, he wished to end the

ton~ 8 3

and l:'<-)turn to Washing·$

Ghurch:llls who hHd been nervous about abridging

his Balkan ::;pheres of
"irresistibh~

l end

Confer.:-~nee

ac·~
t

influerw~~

agreement with Stalin, saw

po\firersn :tn the nev; iiiJeapon and felt free to

i ve an d

po~Arer

lr
1i.mer~can
'
po::n' t.:ton$ E~l}·
f u ..
1 supporc' t -O t ,ne

'rhe Br1.tish now felt that the Western povv-ers nm-v had sufficient strength-to redress the balance of the Russians

and to enter- a new wedge i.n the Balkans. 85
'rhe point is not that American ,policy ch;:inged with

the advent of the rrruman .admirlistration but that the atomic
bomb -v;as a sign:i.f:i.cant factor ln t.he .deve1opmont of An-,e:cic<.:JJ)
ati.iitudes, strategy$ and objectives

EJ.t

Pot.c_-;dam r.-.md in

sequent diplomatic meetings with the .Soviets.

GUi?-

It iA also

felt tha·c the bomb strongly i.nfluenced much of the Presi=
dent's predisposition toward a policy of confrontation
directed at forcing S.talin' s acquiescence to AmHrican plans
for the postwar set.t.lement of Europe" 156
'rruman nwas · sure that Russia would understand firm,

decisive language and action much better than

B3Al.perovitz, .9.£~

£.ll·, P~

p. 153.

pp. 153-154.

152.

d~.:plomatic
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lJeto::-Td.nc:d

agreement but tl.nc::tbJ..o

t~o

do

HO

t()

v.ndo the Ch1J.J:-·ch111.~·StaLln

vr:1 th har.sh word;.:; during tho

dent vvas fo:cc.ed to watt unt-5.1 tl!f:j ·nucloar

WEHipon

lwd boen

..:i ,
•
,
·• • ,
8 (l->
testect, to auct
weJ.ght
to •n:Ls
QJ.'[)"tomacy"'

'l'he Pot.sdara conference E.mded on August :2) 19h5, .:md
the President \11/8.8 anx:l.ot:u3 to return
h~~

learned of the

awe~>ome

homE.~

G

In m:td···Atlant:i.c

pr'opor'tions of th.e first. use of

atomie pm·mr in '\lmrfa.re. 39
At 9:15 on the tnorning of August 61' 19h5 raore t.h.;!.n
h.:1l.f of the c:t ty of Hiroshima was obli.t.En."'a:ted.

language and. act:i.on t

On Augu$t 9?

•

Potsdam was little more than a 'holding action'
for the three povrers.

"rore settled..
c:lnshes

ov~:;:r

No

quest.~Lons

~>:ig:n:i.f:i.cance

of great.

The Conference possibly forestalled direct
conf11eting int.ere1:rt during a t:i.rne when such

confrontations might ·have evolved into military actions.9 1

87•.r rum em , Year 2K }!.~~s:.t~~.i.?IL~l. ,. 9..12 • .9...;l~. •
88·rhomas, 1~<2£• c:tt,
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Soviet conduct at the Conferene:::; did much to st.if:fen
Truman r s at:.ti tude aga:i.n.st Hun::d..::t.

'rlH:.~ P:c(~s:Ld(·~nt

was later

to :cef1ect:
The personal met~tiny~ \.V:i.'Lh Elt.alin and the Huf.>s:Lans
had more significan~e for me, because it enabled me
to see at fi:t~st hartd -v·rhat, we and tho Vvest hac~ to face
in the fu.tur.e ••• o I hr:td alre:'o/ly seen .that the Husf,ians
'-'.. re l en tl. <::><:''
.....•'""...,. c- .c•~
~~, r' ·• 1-l
') "0"'<''•
.p
~ A'
P. • ..,.
We:te
.... s \a'·~
Q ... gcJ.,,(;;.r..:.,
~l•.!lc;\er
~,,.,.__,.1ng J.Ol
:-V:-..1.y
advantage. for themselves •• ~ .. the Husslans were not in
ernest ~bout peace •.•• the expe~ience at Potsda~ made
mE:~ determined that I would not allow thEl Russians
any part in the control of' lJ a pan. o • • Force is the
only thing the Rus~3:Lans understand •••.• ~ What; Stalin
wanted was control of the Black Sea straits and the
Danube e The Russians were planning vWJ:"ld conquet')t. 02
7

It '1!\l'as

apparent,~

been formulated in
that. the

pol:5.c:ieE~

though, that Amer:i.can po1iey he.d

advanc~e

of. the Potsdarrt Oonfel'ence and

which were to

culrni'datr:~

in .t.he T·r'•.nn:.m

the ambiguous language of the Yalta Conference to rei.n.force

his prior agreement \vi th Church:U.J.. 93
'l'he fact that the bomb did not force Hussian ac:qui-

esence to American policies is clearly pointed out by the

subsequent tightening of the Soviet hold over the entire
territory under her control.

1'he atom:Lc weapon may well

have been the causE; of Russi. a's sudden deGire to extend
)
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ous that a.fte:r Potsdam tboro wa::;
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It was equally

obvi~

growing awart?;ness on

the part of the American ptilll:l.c ;cmd the Ameriean lerctdership

that the Soviet Union was an enorny of American interests~95
One man, perhaps more so

tl:L~n

any o·thor lndivJ.dual, vms to

assist in shaping American attittides to the
man vJas

Georg~~ Kennan~

94.ri'homaB,

.2.P..· .2.?:!~.· ~ p. 195.

9 5Hammond, .212..
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'rhe firm Amor:ic<-Jn pos:i.t:i.on taken at Potsdam v-ms a
r·eflect:i.on of many
nation~

of the

di.ve:c~4e

fact.ur:::> in t.he domestic politics

Within a short time following the conclu-

t:don of host:tl:l. ties against tY a pan on Augm·>t 15, l9l.r5, 1

four major c;onsidere..tiona <'lmerged to :i.nf'J.uence f'ore:Lgn
policy.

Foremost of these considerations was the fear of

a depression caused by the sudden slash in productiono
rrhe problems created by the devastatod European

was a secortd consideration, and

''lVl-"'ne<i
c'-'·'
.,

n1··tf·~l1'·"
...:, v

s:idf~ration:J
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.1..
1 ....
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'1<·~
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~ont~ol
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E~conornies

of the Middle East
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n)L•<:·\ .•.

1

,,__,·~··.~.c.'-:l
I.• .. J>;;.v'.::·
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J.\.lt.!.l.
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\vere to be major factors :'tn the formulation of'

policy lc-:lading to the declax"ation of the •rruman

Doctrine~

THE DOWIES'l'IC ECONOMY
As early as 1942 President Franklin Roosevelt had
said "There will.be rehabilitition abroad •••
human:!. tar-inn

~·Bas one

~not

only for

but from the Gtandpo:i.nt of America'::;

~~2E1<i ~f!r. II.~

(New York: Amer:i.can
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~1rchasing

capacity

. 1 f or 1~m0~r1.c:an
.
'
a 1:.rcoao.
proottcts
,, ''\ .,•· ·
HEmry \1Ja11ace had

!:~xhor)lt~d ~

In the criticai.days of reconversion and demobilizat:i.on ~ the mainten8J~ct:::. of fu11 produeti ve employment
l'l'i1l be a matter of Pd. marv· nntionnl con.CE!rn. If
expor•tfj can be mai nt;a:tned ~3t. ;i_n annual rate of
~~10,000)000,000 OP mo:ce~_. • • 'thray vv:i.ll provide work
for 5~000,000 Americans.3

that ''We

nE-H:~cl

ElXports to

m?-intaj_ n jobs, to

ab~::;or·b

the 0\:rt put of AmE:)r·ican fact or:t<.:~s and farms eo.

o

part of

After the

war \<Ve wi11 hr.:..\1-E.! even more reason for exporting .. nh,.

'l'he

Secretary also expressed the belief that the Bretton Woods
agreements were for t.he pu.rposG of p:toviding:

t·h'::~

ox·do:r·:Ly

ttexpansion of foreign trnde upon -v;h:i.(!h 'tht\

per·ity of our agriculture nnd otn• industry
'l'he fHsY· that America vs economic sys·tem would s·uffer

a serious

if Jt d:Ld not continue to expand its

dep)>~:~s::>ion

markets was a key factor in Truman's foreign policy conOne Ne\l.r Deal senc"ltor warned in 19h3 thati the

siderati on::;~

2No\'m Item in 'l,t~. ~.~~.

I<?.?-:ls.

J'i£r~E?_§., November 2!5 ~
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!Jn<l Helmut. Schoech Forei_gn
l95f~),
Ai.d Reexam:l.ned, {VV'Bshington: Publ:Lc Affairs'
JJ·a"nec0 'hl
li

:p::---9:-·'"·

'1

•

.

-~---·-,--~.~---'

hib:tcL
..........__
l:..

.

.

~.

.)2: b ):0 • '

p. 10

p• 9'

q

u •. •

Press-;

102
danger of another depression should not be minimized.

The Senator emphasized that nearly nine million had been
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Morg<mthau' s assist<J.nt, Ht.r:cy D. White dcelax'ed that

a necessity nnd a compelliDg reason
establi~;hrnent

for t.he

of

tl1r-~

'World Banlt and the Interna·•·
"UnJ.esG the::;e

feet

financ:i..~·

ally, thc~y lf.r:i.ll not. be :::l'd.e to bt('f goods from us on 7
I~'r"c~d

lVL. Vinson pointed out to the Senate Comm:LttN;

on Banking in 1945 that:
1Wcirc3 tho.n 50 per C~F1n:\~. of oT~r cot.ton and 30 per cent
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production must be exportod,,i)

.

· 'J'hun, l't can be surmise. d. thett Amer:i.can protHsts over·
the

n t>ph-<n•eg

of :tnterest,u agreement w:i.th the

~1oviet

were not. prompted by fear o.f Russian political
'.l'be

l:'(1a1

Un1on

dorrdn~J.'tion~

con.cern wa.s t.he 8trong poss:i.bili ty that Soviet

pol:i.eies \l.rou1d resu.lt i.n the 1oss of the Em.'itern European

ry

t\r.fig:g:in~3.

and

Schoc~ch,

.

op.• g,it.• , p. l.Oc

~~U.S. Senate, Com.mi ttee on Bankh1g and Currency,
79th Con.gre~3s, First Session~ H*?£Y':i_]J~, 19ll.5, 1YJ3ri tton.
Woods Agreemer1ts 11 , pp. 159~160.

10.3

nw.rket. 9

R.uss:Lan encro·jc:hment int.c th:t::s area came at a

th(~

need for

United Stntc;:; t.o bc:<::ome n Hm:Ls::.lionary of

capitalism and democracy 11
country 11 must set. the

p~lec

r:U:l~'>orting

[U1d l'l0.TC

8.s~::.1.nne

<:tnd

that t.he

the reopom.dbilitiy

of the mnjor stockholder of th:L:::: corporation

kt1014n

as the

-wor1d6ulO
The President exposed the real toot of American constat<~d

cern when he

in an

to Congress in 191,.. '7:

add:CElSS

A d.evelopmen.t wh:i.eh Wf:) cannot yet eva1uate :i.s the
growth of the policy of state control of foreign trade
:'l.n many countries. · For some commod:i t:Le::.; vve must have
for<:d.gn m.:rr·ket.s or undGrtako a serious task of shift·~
A. f"'~'lO~~·~"~·'·
~~·~"" ti
~·'
'("'r·~rd·.
~· ,.v·l-""1. t·~~--,·1 +··,Jl~'"·~ 1
:t'l10" ( ,:~ ....... -v'le,e:·o,,.
.L<-<I "Ce~
. ._, •
o.I(>Wn.J
.• ..... <·;
•.)..
,.1'.:1..1. •..· \-J
t;,~.,.;. •··'' ,\, ..... ~ .. '-•• c.
••

1.:.)

~-~.
Ql,

.J

),_,.,,,

....\.(."..

O::J\ ..

in:h, . . .·tr:i-~1 employn:t(·'nt-

r-~nd
. .

'

(_. -.

;~

~ <.

.

•

.

.· .·

-. . .: :,

(~

i'~

-~n

.

).:

....

fo.,.,

E~"~>n ...~!'·
.
..
,:~ :~ ..... ,:, :~ .' ;· ·:tt.. .
I en .u•t:-''-;.t ,,,;::· ). '- •-'}'t:·""'··:.<.,....,,_:y

:;~

l'"'f'")l1 rct.·i',..,~1

,\

;!~~ :,, ·: -~:.;.l :.

t

the 0d1er. hand our 11~. ~-.d
raw mate:r:La1 ~ATilJ. incrc8.130 ~ :notvr.l.tl:tr:\~~a:'lding on::· ::;rc_:.,
g,) rass in the uroduction of substituteso••· The '-~reat
...enlargement of national p:roduc:t.i on ••• ~ :.-··ecp:t.:'i..:cE; f1 a
corresponding increar;c: :i.n ti'F:'lSE-~ ra•rt roateJ.•ial~.~ whii~}l
come from abroad •• o" 'I'he b.E:avy drain of \l>rar produc~
tion. ,, o .must be remedi<:Jd by a c onservat.ion policy
fort.tfiod by stockpi}f!S of st.r'ategic materia.1s we do
not produce at horne~ll

,, "

J~

'fhe President further noted that in t.he first half
o.f 191+'7 abot1.t half of the j_ncrease :i.n the money value of
total national- produ.cti on vw.s invoJ.vr:.ld Hi.th exports.
Expox~s

in nonagricultural conunodities accounted for

9VJ:Lll:t.ams,

,
-lOib·'
·--L~~·' p. 166.

p. 165

p

nearly 2. 5 m:i.llion

job~:;

f

or nee:.2.·l.y :?0 per. cent of the

total·~ 12

Labor leader Williron Green felt that the issue of
foreign
ence.

marke~s

should be dealt with at the peace confer-

Undersecretary of

there might

·~vo11

be

economic and social

"f(.H'

~)tate Dc<:~n

X"eaching

sy~'tc:mr:; 11

Ache son commente.d that

~onsequenees

upon ou.r

if product:i.on wusn r t

ma:i.n·~

tained at a high level through foreign markets. 1 3
rrhe State Department was alert. to America, s

f1.nan~·

cial interests, and pursued policies directed at avert. ing pressure::; on home economy.

It recommended in the

Balkans that diplomatic recognition should not be extended

tunity for U.So Business

interE"o~;t,~

American property

11

owners~

and

:prot:t:~.ctd.cn

.fop

tain pending agreements with the Soviet Union would have

the effect of making these countries "dependent on the
UoS.,S.R .. , without economic:

side eastern Europe.

Undc~r

contact. vdth other countries outthese conditions it. wtll

f.Yrob~..

ably be impossible for American interests to engage in,
trade •••• or to carry on businesso ••. ull+

p$ 167 • 12'J'h§;. ll!.2_<?.D..9.IDi.£.

!.t:f::P~~:r_:ts. 2f. 1.b§_ fresj.d~l1:h,

J· 3vr··
• . s p. .167
•.v:t.·LJ.J_ams,
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'I'his kind

of excltwiv-e economic pnnet.rat:Lon :1.::> at varianc..:c) with t.he

general commercial polie:v· of thL-, government, whi.ch

1ook~3

tovm.rd the e:X:pansion of' tr·ade nnd. investment on a multi-

':Phis same report

lateral, non ..·discr:Lm:Lnatory basil') .. !!
emphas:i.2'.c~d

the Balkans W81'i::' <.l.lr.::o :tn1por·tant to the

because of' the

pt)Si ti

U~

S~

on of othe:r countr:l.es which· we:r.'e

importers and exporters from. Ea1:1tE:rn Europe 015

1'he State DepartmGnt and Amer.·:i.can leadex·s were advom•
eating an

'~Open

Doorn policy for·

Henry Wallac;e called 'for
type It

th(:~

n American

European continr.:mt ~

1'1:i.ssionar:ieB of a ne'I.'V

and, appeal:i.ng to a· rome.nt.i e attachment to the f:ron"'

find its lost frontier and wnew horizons" beyund tho

seaso16
EUROPEAN HECONSTRUC'fiON

The deterrdnation to apply the Open Door Policy to
Europe coincided, then, with concern over domestic condit:i.ons and alarm over a limited t:r·ade picture in Western

Europe.

The Soviet Union refused t.o grant foro:i.gn inte::cests

th(-; same advantages as they enjoyed. bE.d'ore the war,

spEH;;i·~

f:i.cally "free entry into the Danube Valley and .Eastern

and Scrwech, 2.P..•

.. ' -·---

.C:it·'

p. 12 ..
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Europe for the goods and

Cll)):i:t.Dl

of the Vh)fltern eountr•:i.;::n • 1t1? ·

The President saw that the war

dev~~tated

cou1d not finance importr.: en a

~:>C('J.1e

European economies

suffich~nt

to nraintaJ.n

the volume of tre.de requ:b':?d to .::u:?sure ArnEn'iG8.' s
i ty.

prosper·~

Trwnan wrote:

nerious t:;.ooublc.; l1.~11t.;:ss vre reaLi.ze that our
cmd trwt of t;.he r·ef:rt of t:he vror.<l..d depends
upon the con:3tant and clynam:Lc expansion of the \o/orld 7 B
resources~ ••• with'the theory that prosperity of all
parts of~ the world meanB proe pe:d.ty fox' the v.thole
world.1b
vle fnee

OI'Vn

'V1(~1far·e

~Phe

PJ.~esidont

ccmti:crued by saying that th(:1 United

States should help people everywhere and, that by

pro~iding

u. .s~

them with modern goods to m.ake tht:d.r lives easier, bhe

got a clJ.ancc to earn someth.:i.ng so th:xt, t.hf.y

From these and

othf~r

l:;_~.n

pay

i.'oJ~

s·tatements it became clear that

qapi tal~ oxports had come to be considered as fm important

remedy for the ills of the nation's economic systema

The

arguments ,...,ere philanthropic but the true objectives werH
.
.~ . ·'
~ ?0
pecun:uu:-y
and. .pG·].. .J.t.tcal
~

Tr·1J.man vms using the expans1on

of trade and associated domestic proposals as a political

'

7
1
1
- ' W'l"
·1 .,• a· rno::o
••
.

.J. --

,..{..

.

l-)'

££. 2.i!.. 1 p. 172.
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~
. c· . .
n J'],yrlall
.. .LL
'
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. ~~ .....:~.::~:.:.:..~;d:.:...~ 1 { Ne\'l York: li'arra:r,
Straus and Young, 1952)) p. 249.
··
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19Ibido
20Wiggins and Schoech, QE• ~::t.t•, p.. 12.
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base for ree leet:i. on,, 21

Cer'i·.ain1y nny· major· decline :i.n
:t."t~i::ulted

American prosperity wov.Jd hD.ve
pol.i t :teal

COJJ~5equences.

In any

t~ vent,

in significant.
both the President

and the Amer:.i.Gan public came to ·. .r:1.ev.r both foro:i.gn aid and

foreign trade as essentj_al to not onJ.y the prosperity of
the nation htlt its securit;y as

')2.

weLL'~--

OIL POLITICS IN A WORLD SETTING
Certainly one of the pr:tme considerationG in the
evolvement of the Tr'Uman. Doctrine was the growing need :for

raw materials..

'fhe Prc·H:>.ident was acutely a-vmre that the

war had seriouf.:1ly drained America's resources.

Projec-

strategic and cr:ltica1 material};; came from so-called under-

developed countr:ies ~ 23

both J.n

cludged o:f. ·most strategic v-alue

tEJrms of miJ.i ta:cy needs and the 'h•elfal~e of the

European EH!onomy was the 1VIi.ddle East oil reserves.

21Pnu1 Y. Hammond

The Cold War Years: Amcclric;:m

,

F'orei1!~n Polie-...r Sinc:e l9h5 ~·T:sai1"-1rr7ancTscOT'""lTarc·ou:C't~·-·-grace
an.cr·w~5rJ.!r~-·-·:r71~· ~-,-r<T69T;·:P·: 17 ~
t
22Har:cy S. 'l;rumnn, !:1~~ 1:..~~-~~- ~.2..:tl?:. QX~£ E~:~. ~J::.ad_~"'
{Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 19631~
P~

11.

23Wiggins and Schoech,

OI?_.

cito
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'

P~
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13.

Nego'!~:Lations

for

ArJlt~ricHn

oil firms dat,ed back to

Aramcots 1939 ag~eements with King Ibn Saud. 2 4
Aramco executive J'ames !3., T·1of.fc:tt

YI8.S

suppo:ct foP Saud f s regim·s'

\~hat 'fJ'O~l.ld

tige in the area.

Ickes,

l~ruld

By 1941

seeld. ng active

u.s.

eounter British pres-

Petrolet~

Administrator

for War, supported lVloffott hy presenting evic'ltmce that the

British

t'li:Jr'E!

undercutting Arne ri.cc:m holdings. 2.5

I ekes later

said:
My mind mov-ed to the corwlur:don •••• that our economy
and. om. . own ability to fE-md .for otu•sEdves i.n time of
war. would. b~~ greatly increased if we had an interest in
this big o:i.l pool, and so we moved in right av.ray to try
to acquire some interest.2b

Aside from America's domestic and military oil
·~dderation~J t.he:ce vrere c omma.nding :i.ntern.at:i. c1n.sJ.

involv-ed in the oil prob1em.

can~

r:;ta};:,3~5

Socretary of tJavy .Jam8r::

may shift from a coal to an oil economy and therefore '"'hoever si t.B on thG valve of

r;7

destiny of Europe. 11 '~

'l'hf:~

~'liddle

East oil may control thE)

struggle for control of oil

re::;<:'r.ves v.ras not a new dev-elopment but the stakes were
now considerably greater.

21+Gardner, 21?.• 2.L~·, p. 232.
2

5IJ2ist~-' P~ 233

o

26Ibi.d.

1947.

27vvalt.er JVIillis, TJ1e. P'orx:<ff?.g_t?J. D~.;,§.rtQ§,, lVray 2 ~.
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Per~~ia

over a period of tirnc fen' c:oncest:>ions e

World \tJnr II Iran had beer.

of suppJJ.es to the

Sov:Let~

"~ nw.;)oT

Union.

2Ft
· ·,

eorrido1' for shipment
Rusd.an troops had
prot~ect

oceu.picd Northern Iran by· mut:u.;Jl 1-'l.ll:ted conse:n.t to

this life-line.

Under praLecticn of the Red Army the

Iranian Communist~:: or 'l'udeh ( latf.:H' Democratic) Party had
been establ:l.c;hed :i.n Azerbai.jan o

What the Soviets sought.

1-ras not territoricll aggrandi.zement but rat.her
in t.he l\1:Lddlc~ Ea~>t • 2 9

Teheran

'rhe HusBians sought a government at

sufficic~nt.1y orientE-~d

to Sovlet.

interE~sts

oil concessions equivalent to those enjoyert by
U'nl.·~"""6.d •.~+~·t·~~
) ~,,;,. ,l:.o

tl .1r_>..-

·•

foothold

B.

to grant

D~itxin

and

30

of 19h2, desplte withdrm·'l.9.1 of American and Br:i.tish forcos.
'l'he H.ed Army ref'ust.::!d to permit Iranian troops

'''i thin

tb.eir

perimeter to deal with •rudch :i.nE;pired trj_bal revolts and

obstructed techn:l.c:al a:td to the no:cthern prov:lnees.
2 8George D~ H. Cole, wol::ls1

Oxford
University Press, l9h9 1s p.
.....
"

2 9Ro bo rt D • Wart. h

2:n !:.r.£!2. f:..tt1:i~D. 1
1}.05~

~ .~~~L~~l.£1 !3-.'!::l.~~!.:l Q;

(New York: Twayne Inc~, )9o3 1., _p~ 323.

30I.2.t~l·

.tn.

n1f3

(New Yo:ck:

~2.!.:lQ.. E.215 !:b~.!l,
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C-lovi.r=Jts also d:i. vorted J nr·ge supplies of \'lheat. to Hussla,
there by _tnt~m ~:d.fying :farn:Ln•:: conditions. 31
In January 1946 Iran lodgod a complaint with the
Secu:c:ity Cot1.nc:..l.l of the Hnj tE~d N.:J.tions and

power prevcn"''..1..8 d__ ,. ·'32
from Iran..

Russja, bitte!0.y resentful, withdrew

It;, should

b~~

oil production reduced by

pointed. out that th.e Soviet;, :i.ts
5~000,000

tons yearly by the war,

had seriouD need to increase its imports o
precarious~y
11

pro~Vvest,ern

Also, Iran 'I:V'as

close 1 ozw hour's flight, from the Baku fields,

Russ:i.ats jv.g;1ar vein.,33
In

f;~lirness

to the Smri.ets it should also be noted

JC aJ.-v-::vs:L.on
]' ~ '
f'
·1·1
a :;!').'~F)
o f' pro:.:t.tn
on a ....

'
conces~.n.ons,

an

. ] . t }1an f 1ng ..
•t o~·lHner:u.:an
•
" '
men t I,.., ar more tl-uene.f'.J.CJ.a

which wore pegged at 20 pe:c cent ) 1}·
r.rhe Russian challenge to American and British dom:i.··

nance of th.is key oil l'ef;ou.rce f.n"'ea and gateway to
more bourri:i::i.f'u.l Arabj_an fields, had been met.,
tht"! SoYiet ·posj_tton were never

considered~

t~he

even

The mfH'i ts of

The nopen Door"

apparently was reserved for American interests only despite

32 n •

'-J? • F'J
.. . em1' 1"1'"
t :> '
(Garden C:\.t y, Nev.,r York:

3 ~1!?.!:~-~ '

p•

34.6.

lll

a pol:lcy statement to

thr~

effect t'i\a't ttD:i.Gci'im:l.nation and

•••• oil monopolies are harmful not only to our nations but
•

])t•

to the nationals of a1J. couri.tr:Les, 1,_

'fhe real objecti vc of fr•:;(: ~d,ng out Soviet

t:l.on in the oil fields of tho rknr' Ea.s't was

e:~:presscd

HerbfH''\1 Fei.G, who had participc::rcod i.n the London

American pact talks of, October, 1943
to guess -v1hat types of proposals the

participa·~

by

Anglo-~

"It vms impossible

&

u.s.s.n.

might make;.

they might bring the whole pattGrn of ovmE:r.ship :i.n the region
into

question~

It seemed fooli~h to take this risk~··"3 6

Eventually, the question of the oil reserves became
inv·oJ.yed w'i th the security i1ot only of the area itself but

nrust

be adequate strategic bases in the

Eas~e~n

and in the Near East, not so much to keep

open as a highway

a~

tht~

Mediterranean

Mediterrarwan

to the Soviet Union from descending on

the oil reserveso37

Later policies of the British Labor Govo:cnment' in

Greece and the American assumption of that responsibility

35Gardner, .9.£· ci.~.~, p. 235o

36r.b··.1_ d

---:-·~~-

0
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under the rrrmnan Doctr:Lno ·'
t ·
tl.lE~. same Doc·:cJ.ne,

a~;

WG1J as aid to 'l'urkey under

··~ ····:r~J
,.,, .......·.·to''l o f. .
t}···
· ·o ncE.rn.·
·~
3~
xe .. cv
usc

are~-

The maintenance of Ariglo-American control over the
pet.ro1eum

ro~:-;ources

not only to thn

of' t.he c:u:ea

pm1EH"

w:~.s

of great Jmport.ance

c onf).:l.ct ·w:1.th the

Sov:i.c~t

also to the economic recovery of EuropeQ39
r;mce of thi.s

objc~cti ve

Union bu.t

In the further-

.1 Britain and the United States made

a great effort to guard against Sov:i.et intrusion into the
area by res:tst:i.ng Soviet prPssur·e on the pe:ciphery and by
refusing to pe:r.mi t ef.fect:i. ve Sovlet :lnfluc:mc.:e :tn such

co'untries as Iran, 'furkey, Greec:e, Hnd Ita1y .. h0

Truman, in

t:lons:
'J.lhere isn tt a doubt in my m:i.nd. that }(t:t~>sia J.nt.c:;nd.:i
an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea
St.raits o • • ., We shou.ld let our position. o • be known c:md
·we should continue to :i.nsist 6n th e internat:i.ona.JJ.~.
zation of the Black Sea Straits.4-1
6

The President had earlier stated he felt that Soviet delay
in

~lithdrawing

from I:cnn, coup1f3d with the threat of a

38colE1, .91!.·

Q.t!:."~

p.

h07~

39staff, The International Studies Group of the
I r(1 ;3:t it ut e , ~:.§~t<?J:: f..ro.'!?I (3 r0~,. 9.}~ Q. Q. ~ F 9£~:tm !'.2.-li.S:.Y.:
:.::.9...1r2_~l_2Q, ·Na.sl:;d.ngton, D.C., J.9h9 1 1 p. 2?.
IJ3 ro

gid. 9ng s

hOr~~L9. e.
, ~ 1 HaJ1~:cy S .- 'I'rum) an, .I~§£ £f.
·York: •'I lme .ne., 1959 , p . .?5le

f!.~£J.J2....i_<?!I.~., Vol. 1, (New
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Communist coup ::Ln
eera

mov<:~Jm

Greec!:':~

nli against

5

t}i;:;

nbeg,an "~.. o look l:i.ke a g:l.ant

pin~·

o:i.l·rol':i c.h areas of t.be Near East

and the warm watt!'Jr parts of the; j:-,;ed:i.terram~an. nh2

At Potsdam the Soviets had also sought a colony on
the African shore of

the_Mediterrar~an~

probably Libya,

under the gu:Lse of a tn;.s·b:.eship of the former Italian
eolony.,ll-3' 'l'he efforts of the Sov:Le·t :l.n this direction t-vas

:i.nterpretecl by Byrnes as a clN1.r t.hX'E:"lat of ·the Soviet to
obta:i.n strat(:!gic advantage-:.
reprE~sentation

'U1e

SoviE~ts

ha.ve also sought

on the cont;rol comm:tr:>sions for 'l'ang1.<n' and

the Straits of GilbraltE'J:r'.

Such Eussian attempts to eneroach

dominating the· Br·:i.t:i.r.;h 1ifc:: 1i:n.r">; to the: Etwt.

::~n.d.

t.h2> oil

'rhus the struggle for oil came to br::: tr·1e dnm.:i.nr:mt
factor in the economic and political confrontation through-

out the m:·e,!l that stretched from the Eastern Mediterranean
to Persia.

1:he oil of that region \'Vas indispensable to

the plans of military parity and eeonomic reconstruction
visualiz~d by the United Stateso45
I

4 Trt.lma:n, 2.P..• 9:i:..t.• ~ p. 52:3.
2

43Herbe:ct Fein~ Q..hl!·r:s;h:iJJ.:., }l2,2.?J2.Vf?. :1:.:'0., f[!~~fJ..n,
(Princeton: Pr:i.n ceton Un:i.ve:rs:i ty Press, 19:->7) , p. 304 ~

h4I£t£., p. 309 ~
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THE DETERIORATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY CAPABILITY
un<:~xp;:;::ted

Wi.th the early .<:1nd

surrender· of Japan,

plans for a controlled demobilization, adjusted to thci
estj_mated J.'(?Jqui:cements of the :tntor:na.tional ::>:i.t.uat:Lon a.nd

of national
VJ•..

~'>'Ad
- ,,

poli-tj_cs~

of
•

Cl1'"'J'1"'r·'··'L·lno·
,l
u l C\ j(_," -'- t:>

br.;cr:twe

rapid, and impro-

lnJ'Ht··J)"·y
rc'··?')Y,
•·• •. _.._
<0, .
£)
l yd; . .L ~ h6
J

Americ:<?.ns ·in gener-al
post~·v:<3.1'

tic:ipation :.Ln the

t:;.::-;;·~.fused,

2.

~)ntic:i.pated

par~

year·s than was to be the case,

bas(~d

President Hoosevelt h<:l.d

a much 'smaller

wueh of his i'Vartiml':! d:iplomeccy

on the pren.d.se that thE; AmEH'icnn public ·would not bE:

aym~

pa.thetic tm,Tt-J.rd a.ny effo:r·t.s to rnc-dntain forces in Europe
beyond a tv.ro year period 1·\tt.cl"

the 1abc-)

SUffil1H3J:' OJ."

u,,~

vnn-t ;e_;

] 0/
!'
••
_-_+/,

challengod.48
:Military expedj.ency notvv:i. thstand:tng:
'I'he fight:i.ng

j_n.

Europq had hardly ended "t-·;hen pressure

began to build up for the release of' men in the armed
forceso With the end of the hostilities in the Pacific,
the public ·demand for the d:Lr..wharge of tl:w ndlJ.tons of
men in the service became i.nsistEmt •. h9 · ·

Secretary of War· Pntterson told the Pr.es:i.dE-mt at an Auguf;t 31
1+6WLL1:i.am Reitzel, Mcn•ton. J.L Kaplan, Constance Ge

Co~1lenz, Un_?J~~<\. f)~ at,~_@,.
D.Cc~

f..RX2.1-g:Q_ f:_q.Jj~_.y J:.2lt~-::).2.22, (Wash~,

'I'he Rcook:1..ngs Int::>t:.Ltute, l9h9J, Pe 4cso

h7Hammond) 2Jl• .£.t~.~, Po 10.
~ t·l1,
. /,.Be•
· •Jl11J.,

h9'11 ~"'1'1':'1l1·
.l. l.t 1 <'J..

.
't·
OJ?..
£:'!:...::.•,
p •..]· '71') o
)

QIT"'

....:-_t_:._t~

~.

CJ' ... '*. '}
~

p e 506 •
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n1EH~tfng of tlHCJ

Cabinet t.J1nt ·the A·r"·iny had· plarw for the

rc-;·turn of f:i.-vt:) and a half m:i.1J::i.on · m~::n back to tho United
l9h6~

States by .'July 1,

Under· St~C:ci::•ta:cy of tho N·avy Gates

expressed the belief that naval forc8s could be reduced

by 260) 000 per month durinf; the ::-,s\mc pc~riod ~50
In J.esrc; than. one mont.h after "tho surrender of' JD.pan

more than 15,200 men per day were processed for discharge.
By_.Janu.ary of 19Ly6 it vtas t-m.tieipc:ltf:Jd this number would be

:increased to 25 5 000

and

Pat.tc~rson,

pe~ day~

By ·Qctober 26, both.

Ji'orres~;al

the Secr·eta:c·:Les of Navy and War, v·mrned

that the acceJ.erated demobilization was threatening· to
jeop::J.rdiz; c

the~

, _,
..,
t}
' 1e lTIJ..o.St f')f

strategic position of t.he Un:Lted

1J\A.:L. .."! _(iJ_T.lf£
. •

•

'

,~

(JJ:.,(.111X10. t~IlE'~

tel1S:t()I1E?

.,· '

~a·, ate~

in

r\]

~;;; . t.() ()r~~ o .·.•·

pite tho .fact that by January, 19h6~ over fm.tr and. thrcH:.~
quarter mil.lio:n men had been dernob5.J.iZ(3d.

Over onr:: and- a

quarter million of 'the t.hret? and a half mi11:i.ori man :nr.t1YY
From the Ly~6,000 man Marine force,

had been repatriated.

more than 1A3,000 had been discharged.
in tho !dr Force, Coast Guard, and other·
equivalent proportions.
was to Rrmou.nce that

C:">:>
•.
~··-:"·-~

,.

.

\

'

cit.

~

branchc~s

vvere :i.n

Apr·il 17 ~ 1911-6 the Pres:ident

bn

d:i.schargc~s

,,,...,.....,..., ""'

Manpower releases

·o ..
.l

.fr·om the Army had reached

c:.) f)'7·
1..
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nearly seven million.

The President referred to his

figures as trthe most rema:ckable demobilization in the
tory of the vvorld, or
call :i.t that

Q

n

:Lf you vmnt to

52

appropriations.
by a d:ll<:;mma.

'cli~,)~Lntr~rr,ration',

h:Ls~.

'rhus U ~ S" pol:tc:y mttkers were confronted

The Amer·ican people expected the government

to take positive action as a major force in world politics
but they -vmuld not recognize the responsibilities or

sac·~

rifices that such leadership required in the ways of military comm:tt,ment~ 53

less than 50 per cent of the wartime needs.

The effectire-

ness of the air force in particular had been drastically
Of 218 ct,mbat. a:i.r groups, only t.wo Ed'fect].ve

reduced.

groups remained by 1947.

The Air Force Chief of Staff

reported to the Secretary of the Air Force:
One prefe:r.. . s not to r-Jpeculato on Vlhtrt might have
happened only one year after V-J Day ••.• if our Air
Force had been called upon to resist a new aggression
or to suppress a recurrence of combat activity from
52'I'ruman, QJ~· s;:}-t.~, p. 509.
REntze.t
.
- ~ KH.p l .an~ a:n d COtJ.tf-m~~
•1
1

r.: ':I
".Jj.

S~·

t , p

•
£.~:"·~··

6

1·}O.
n.
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an uncontrolled
r"}

elemen~

or in one of the occupied

eountd.N~.) -1-

rnar:U.y because of j_ts f11r..:.:t.lon :i.n T'fjt.u:rning

overseas.

However,

ity to maintain
tions

testif:iE~d

·despit~

overs~as

forct.~s

from

the Navy's more successful abil-

forces, the Chief of Naval Opera-

before th8 House

f:iubcorom:i.tte_E'~

on J\.ppropr·:1a·"'

tions on March 13, 1946:
I would do 1es~> thnn my duty if I did not point out
l\ro:rld conditions are suc:h as to necessitate
keeping the Navy and Marine Corps in the highest state
of combat efficiency; and fu.Tthermore~ that our :rapid
demobilization has seriously impaired the readiness
of thecflects to accomplish tasks which may confront

•. 6. that

them.?::>

had been pared from 3'7,000 to 8,000 ..
Br:i.e:f'1y, except for the atom:Lc bomb, ,the United

States i'm.s

l<'Ji thout

the m.ilit,ary capabilJ.ty to pursue· a hard .

line diplomatic course.

General Marshall, then Secretary

of State 1 recalled:
I remember~.o.l was being pressed constantly, particularly when in Moscow, b~ radio message after radio

5lrcF ·John C. Span·o·w, A 1i=L~.~--2..t1. ~2-:f. E£.r~2ml~:.1 !?~Jllol.:i.:..
~i2!l t!!. :th.~. :Q_[ljJ~_e..£ St~-:..~ ArJ!l.Y.,, 1951, p0 370~ by 11-eit,ZEJl,
h.aplan~ and Coblenz, .J-o2_• ~it~

55u.s. Hou~:;e of }tepr•esentatives, li€2.~r:tn_g:g;_, House
Committee on Appropriations, Navy Department Kppropriations
Bill for 1947, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 32o

11."
message~

to give tho Hu:"lf:dat1r:-: }TeLL ••.. at that. t:l.me ., •...
the fac:ll:L·L:Le~3 for g:J ving tholr: hello •• ,. was 1 1/3
dJ.vin:i.on~'' over the ent:.i.r<~ Urdtr.:d State.s.
Th.::tt is qu:l t·
a pl:~oposJ.t;ion when you dr:~al vt:lth somebody with over

260 and you have 1 i/3.56
'rhesr:) r·educt:tons, the

effect~;

pounded by the r:peed wit;b Hb.i.ch. th0:y
result.od in. a mil:Lta:cy

er.;tablishnrc~nt

com~·

of which were
·~·v-ere

carried out)

v;hich vm.s unable· to

perf'onn at hw·(.:,ls Hpp:coaching coh1bat effc~cti veness.

Tb.e~Jc

I

forces vmre not in a coildi t:i.on of roadiner:;s to support the
purpo~:Jes

'.Phe.r<~

and comrrd tments of United States forcdgn

policy~

is strong support for the belie:f that lack· of

mil:L~·

tary preparedness was a significant factor in limiting
United States action in

th~

6
. .
: cF' John C. Sp~n··row, A J-L~:t~r.Y. o:[ P~.t~.2QE.£.l:. 12.~}~J.c~."~
.J,:.;!:l_lO..£l!l :l!.JY:. !Jnit.~c! §J~§..t~.!:! A!:i!!X' 1951, Po 282, by H.oj_t:-:;c;
Kaplan, and Coblenz 5 p. 91.
57r~.EJ:ttz~l, Kaplan, and. Coblenz, on •.£i~·, p. 50.

GHAP'I'EH VII
'.WHKEY Ltm 'l'HE ~1THAITS

One of the areas v;hc:ce

th(~

Uni t.ed States was unable

to respond ifr:i.th a tnilitar'Y' d.:L::>pJ::r.v of force wcw Jn

CapablE-) only of d:l.sp1aying c;:ccat
·~ \1'''1
11 0.
'-I..

P('''rl'(>
J.'
. .J\:t, .......

'

~:;tn7;ngth

Ttn"k(~y.

in the form of

the United States would sf;ek to employ power

of anothe :r· sort.,
As (?.arly as 1?36, the Htlss:Lan Empress Ann had
attempted a partit:loning agreement with Austria which v..rould
have given Ru.ssia Constantinople and the

Straits~

~gain

in 1786, the Russian Empres:::1 Cr.i.thor:i..rw II negotiate-d vJ5.t.h.

for Husr·:iia ~

..LS:J.t
'
• .] .r)
rlc·..i'1
Ul
At. 'r. :.L
l''apo.-L eon
·~r.

same concoss:i.on from Napoleon.,

oirs:

"Russia asked for Constantinople.

it to her.

That is too valuable

a Vlhole state~

~

~

\H'00e

• ...
:tn
ru.s

I could not give

key; it alone is worth

He who controls it can rule the -vrorld. rrl

The St:.l"'Edts are a natur·al ser:i.es of canals and
vrays far supe:r.:tor to .Suez ox· Pan<:1.ma..
channel na:crovvs to

~~00

more t.l:wn five m:i.les.

yards.

water~·

At some points the.

The wi.dest point spans no

The DardcUH~lJ..es, lcc:J.dtng out oi' the

Aegean, flow into the Sea of Mamara; then comes the

lncmaree Bess, nup to Our Nr.:~eks :tn 'l'urkey, n 'l'he
~a:t~ll:r.:dC:Y.. f2.xel!.JJ.lli J?"£:c;t, (Sanuary 25, 19h7), p. 99o

]20
BospO"!'U.S' eo:rmecting to

generally

ste~;:r>

tli.E.t

Blaek

:.::~H'. a

The shores are

rocky, ;:1nd hnmri.ly, v.roodecl.

9

'l'hE;! wholE:l of

th:L::> natural pasBnge :i.s th1.u; oasily do.fendecL 2
In mo1'e modern

tin·1.0f~

the Br:tt.:t.r-;h governnKmt had

traditionally blocked Russian efforts to achieve dominance

mrer the Strui.t::;

0

'!''111r-<,
A
~

this eoncEH3f.don from

·•..... 't'1• ·.·"··('·~\'Y'r\Prl
J
/r.;_·~
/
• ·-

Britain~

C'7."r
·~"' >::>
"'o"a·ht
•'-' u
...N··tcc)]
,• ,
.• <::.>:.>
• t-<o

Lord Palmerst.on smnmar:i.zod

the Br:i.tish attitude in a letter to Lord Clarendon
May 22 of that

clatr~d

y(~ar:

1'h(~ po1 i.c:y e.ncl practtce of th.e Russi. an governr11ent
have al\·rays be~;::n to pu.sh forward. its eneroachmer.rt.;s a~:;
faBt and as far as tb.e apathy or "rant of f:i.rmneEif.', of
otht9r governmEmt s \1ould allow it to go~ but aJ.w·aye to
r:rt.op and :cetir8 Vlhen it met w:i.t.h dHcidEld 1:"EH;d.::1ta.nce,
a:n.d tl·H~n t:.o lvai t for the next fe. '<lon;;.bJ.e o<Y;;o:r·t·~:.n~:L::;v·
<''"r··1'
~< 'r.!t.,.,
;,.,+- -1 ) '1 _'$
t .0 rttal"~ "''"'JO",·- h•:''T'
v
"-)!:-'
.. ·~, P' n'1 ::t' 1" <• J' \''i·f'.r"
v-.. .... .1.1'0.
.... 1:;:'·'l..4
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CJ"A"'
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1

'Moscow in Octc;ber ~ 1941+ e
r~~rontn:mx

that the

\...IJ

* .~ ..~

...•

1

f

..

,.,J.~'~)

u

At that. t:Lme StaJtn had nu.ggnr.ted

Convent:i.ony wh:lch regulated tre.ns:i.t and

naY:l.gation th:C'ough the Straits 1 should "Qe modified. 4.
Under A:rt~:l.elc 2 of the 1936 1'-~ontreux Convc·mt:Lon all

merchant ves-Bels vmre to enjoy frr.:::e passage :in t;i.roe of
peace,

1. ht~y
1

alBo enjoyed. th:is pr1.v1lege j_n

2Be s s , 1.<?.9.~. .~.t't. ~

v~ar~

under
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Article h, if Turkey vras

not~

a

be11Jgeren'l;~.

vc~:-;:::;sls

'rurkey were at. '1-v-ar, mercharit

In the event

belonging to countries

not at war with Turkey retained rights of free passage
w'i th the restrict:!. on :i.n

Art:Lcl~:~

:;

tf

on condition that they

do not :tn any 'ft•TaY assh;t ths oncm(y·e 11

F'urt;hor rest:cic:tj.ons

:required such passage d u:r·J'.. ng the day only, and only along
a proscribed rout-,e.

Add:i. t:Lonally ~ in tht':) event Turkey

"considered. herself

threatc-me:~d

she could apply the

restrj~etj.

-vr:i.th imminent danger of wartt
A:rti.·~

ons permitted under

cle 5~5
'rurkey \'Vas further auth.or:Lzed und0r Artiel(H:l 10 ·and
Y• 4 ct·'t
- :\ ..C!)•t, ........
' .. 0'1q
}, ·19 t () Place' re

..... Y.'
,

o·t""'l
}.,

,.,Y,":j

s

~rl"'.)
('.!'..;:'.) 1
.......~_,.J.........

(,.,;. .~:'. >'.l·-:;:~
--•. ~·.•,,•_·
. . '>.,1_,, _

.~·~·".··.'l.·.i.
-· --'•'·"·•>C. .',

t\vo destroyer's for eseort;. 6
exposed capitnl ships of the EJ.;:f_ck Sea na.ti.onr:j to

de:::Jt~:cue-~

tion at the hands of Med:it<:Jrranean fleets of the other
pov-rer~1.

world

Art:lcles 20 anc1. 21

l(~ft

passage of w·ai·

vessels entirely up to the Turkish gove:cnment at any
1

J.1Urkey Was at \!far or felt t.hr'E-H.l.'t-t·mod by

'VJHI' ~ 7

Stalin felt the Soviet fleet should have the
lute :r•ight. of passap;e at:. all

t:i.mer~.

~d.me

Churchill~

abso·~

w:i.fJhing to

all?.,y Russ:i.an fears of Briti:.:>h :i.ntentions, told tht:) Marshall
~

-----·. ..

.....

·-~,....,.,..

"

5F~~.J.·
\;; ~!
_, • .2.E.

0
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no •

.,~

I personally \'muld suppcw·t. a.n nmr:mdment to the I·f!ontreu.x

Convention.

o ••

giving Russ:i.J1 ncGesc to the JVIeditc:cranean. uS

The Marshall had fu:cth0r pu:t·suod the subjEJCt at
Yalta~

Stali.n repented that he

Convention be rf.::JV:i.sed.,

f~;J.t

tk? :::rt.ated Ihlnsia could no longer

tolGratEl the fact that Tu:ckey had
throat .. "

it only just that the

~;a.

hand on. Russia t s

Churchill had agreed that Russiats use of the

Straits should i1ot be subject to the v·1him oJ' TurkHy but;
he felt the Turks should be told the subject was under discussion.

'I'he Prime Minister also stated t.hat :tf the

vent:t on :vms changed, Turkey should be

giv<~n

Con~·

a jo:int guar-

• '
.d
.
Q.
an tee o:·[••J.t s :uw.epEm
enc:e D.nd tuu:ty
.. ;·

S'J?RA'J.'EGIC LOCATION OF T'UH.KEY

·rurkey shared a coiT11110n bcmn.da:c:r with t.h'-9 So·viot.
Unj.on..

It wa.s sensitive to Soviet

p:cessur.·es~

'rho 'l'urks

. depended upon mutual assistance treaties v;ith G:.t:eat B:e:i.ta:tn
and Franee for fmpport o

Add:i.tiona.l ·3.ssurances

vver~;

eagerly.

sought by the country~lO
The United St.ates beJJ.eved that Turkey posod an
alternative

t~o

the strategic probl(·nns of the Middle

East~

8winston Churchill, ~£.?;j~~Pr.~ .~.!2.~11'-riill.ecty~, (Boston:
Houghton M:i.ffl:i.n Company, 1953', P~ 635 ..

9Fe:i.s, 5?.2..· 9J.:t.

t

P~ 291 e

lOvJill:i.a.m Reitzel, 1V1orton A. K<:tplan, Constance G.
Cob 1 en z , !L~!.Lt~rl ~:~,§}~ s E2I::£i.gl}. ~2JLc)Jl. 12..1±2.-125.2~, (Wash • ,
D.Co: The Brookings Institute, ~949 , Po 214.
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rl'he U.S. felt that 'rtn:--ke:sr !it.ight.

W<~.LL

repla,ce Egypt

the

.!-3.S

focal point of strength :'Lu that t,eg5.on .11
The dof0m:::;e of Turb:·y

~'mE;

Lherefore deelared v:i tal

to the defense of the United States as early as 1941.12
In a i.-Jorlcl do:m:Lnated by b:lg powers, '.Purkey had managed to
survive as an :independent

rrt<~l.te

'because of :i.ts loc<:l.t:i..on

at the 6rossroads of three continents, in an area where
")

the influences of the great pov.rers offset one another. J--J

It

Waf.;

felt that :lf rrurkey should fall to Sov:i.et

power, the twilight of t.he B:clt:i.sh Emp:l.r·e v'muld set :l.n.
That demise would have led inevitably to Russian domination
of the :immense material and hunw.il
A~~a
-l~> ...\.. (- 'J

c.rtnd
... 1,1..

A~:r·1'c•a
.•L ... ~

rosmJ.x'ce;~;:

<::..f

Europr~;

1

~

.America as woll, itrhose onJ.y choict;: ·Nas e:Lther to bnck
'l'urkish :independenee and t.he pordt.i on of Grt?.Dt Br:1.ta:1.n

which made :i.t. possible, or· to back H.ussiaTs territorial
as pi:r.at:i.on.s 61h
n~ VJ'afi

further felt that control of the Dardanelles

would cede the Soviet Union eventual control of the

11H.eitzel, .Kaplan, and Coblenz, J~-.52.~:..· £~t.~
12n:tchB:r-d W VanAlstyne s tt~Ch(~ Quest :ton of the 1,urk:tsh
G

Stra:it, tt 9J1tr~~~-:t HisJ~.QL,Y, (August, 194:7) ·, pp. 65~70 o
(Sept e

13 Alexander Ba1.rd,
.
14, 19h5), p. 519.
11+Ib . ..J
. ~·----1:.~~. ' p •' 523
v

Q

12h

Middle

East~

The Western countries, their distn1st height-

Soviet should obtaln

cont.~·"\)J

of th0

be in a pos:Udon to extend t.h<.-')

B<3Ji\e

~)t:cr.dtr:>,

they v.,rould

p:r·oc:ess t.o T'urkey and ·

the IVI:i.ddle F:ar:.c.torn countri.e::; to the Bout.h.

R:ns::1ian control

of the vi tH1 waterway would bG but BJ."i.other· step toward

dividing the world into two distinct and potentially hos' •~

.

'l ;:;

~1Le camps.-~

'

Additional~y,

if the Soviets pursue4

simi~

lar po1ieies :i.n the Strni'GH as :tn the Ba1kan coun.tr:i.es,

Hput. in a. f:i.na1 ri.VElt 11 in

t.rH~

iY•on

ct1.:rtn:i.r1~

ccc;lj:::).etu1y

sealing East from West.l6
The struggle

dE~Vt3l.oped

vmx·ld ordo:r', for it was notE:d

to

deviate~

as a test case for the neN·
t~hat

possension of natural

Many felt: that the \\[e nte:cn Powers would

h0,Vt'5!

to. be~ ros:i.gued to Ru.ssla.n dom:i.nanee in thG nrea.

In the long run, with the

inev~tabi~i~y

of the sun-

:c:.i. g(~ ~ Constantinople and t.hf.:'! St;rc-nts vn.J.l. pass

completely under. her ~~'1'1<1Y o And Gree c:e, tho rightful
inheritor of Constantinople, will be a helpless onlooker,
deprivod perhaps of. :::o:110 l1lD:tG Of her territor-y to. {.[IHke
the adjoining terrain. of the St:t"aits more r;eeure "17

SOVIET DEMAND ON TURKEY
Russian

preBSUl:'('\f~

i:n

1,rere l'egarded as a prelude

Irt~n

to their efforts to outflank 'l\·rr·key·.

The

concessicm~;

demanded of Turkey unmistakably marked the beginning of a
Russian' political offensiveol$
RusE>ia had a complex 1.nte:r·est; :i.n Turkey that v.ras not

There existed a traditional antipathy

altogether strategic.
bet-v~Teen

the pe·oples of the two ::r:egions, refleetod in

Stalin's "inherited Georgian trait
'rur''"l..
'1''"'"'1~"'1 t-:.>~·l.,.... tob'"'-~c···,
n.l9
.
... '-sl1 e~x:c••t'l)~.
,.
,., ...
o.t....
~h

1,.,1

l.ot.L

.'\. ..._..

t

J

.

t •. l

-

and Ardahan had been annexed by Huss:i.D. a.ftcn:.· t..b.e

Treaty of

11:~78.

In 1921} \veakened by

tht~

t:ton, the new Soviet Govf.n•nment ceded the

back to 'l'urkey ~

Bm~J:l.n

Communist
t\•W

revolu·~

provinces

'I'he t\vo tu·eHs had been detached from

Soviet Armenia and Sov:i.et Geo:cgi.a, the latter Stalin's

home state.

!hC?.

In actuality the area was traditionally

l?'.rhomas Anthem~ 11 Hus~3:i.a and the Dardanelles s t\
Qor;r!:,9.!ll£~?.!'.~-~:Y. !1.~Y j:-~.Y!. 1 ( 0 c t 1 91+) ) ~ p p • 2 2 2 -· 2 2 6 •
$

JRB
· l , .2.J2.·
· · a:trc

.,

.9.:L~~ 1

p. .5'"!0
r... c

19~valter LaFeber Amer:i.ca Hurwia, and the Cold
~a!.., ,~19 ]!:5..-12§..§, (New· Yo{. k :~··Jolin·· ·v~r i ley-[.'tn'd Soi1 s-;~i'9 '6-8)~-.

p. 2o.
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'I'urkish and b.ad been a pnrt of

Hu.B~3:ia

for only forty

yearsQ20
In the early posti····J:'mrolutionar·y period
relations improved

consid(n~ably.

Husso~.'rurkisl)

When "the gene:cal .orienta-

tion of Ru[->sia' s foreign pc<U.cy bogan to revert back to
th~

prerevQlutionary patt.Grn, Turkey grew more

::"'i ve.

apprehen~·

VJhile the ideological accents on Russian diplomatic

phraseology kept changing, the real issues remained the
sameo21
In March of 1945, the Soviet Government df.mouneed

its

t1rJ<:mty-yea1~

treaty of fri(;mdship vr:lt.h Turkey and began

employing the classic st:t"ategy of a.

Sov·L'e.t
n····ice··
fo'"
a
tl,,";:;
J.v
•....
•
.
.t:l""~
.....
J.
.1

""),....

.

vrA.J:~"

11-f.•'•f
·tp;:>n+,;·
•·r"•<·
. ._.lf;
1.~ .~.~-\);y
nt...o~. .._>

()f)

T:~(:;r~t.r~:::::.~·w ;~.t:..· ·

nE·,v~·'~"
··~·~~._t.:;.~._:.._

V.'}.r:t1.n

1
'')'~}>··l·'"'
·~·-,r1
-}·L·~-~
•.L....i,-t-..t).l.--...

,
-...-;r. .r::.r

.

·

dor Sergei. Ao Vinog:cadoff j_n Ju.ne, 19J+5, is b0lieved to con-·

tain the major concessions demanded.
exclusion of all
the Dardanelles.

the area of the

~mrsh:i.ps

The Soviets sought

except:; Russ:ian and 'I'urki.sh fr;om

'l'hree Russian naval bases '!trere asked in
c~trait;s,

and a strongl-y worded request was

presented for the cession of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet
Arrnenia. 2 3

.

20Malcolm Burr~ 1'The Threat to rrurkey, 11 y_2Lfl!.l10.f!~ma~.,
(April, 1946), pp. 156-157.
21J3aird, 2.12.· .£~~~·, p. 522.
22
nsqueeze on Turkey,n .Tb.~. .N?. . t~_9_11 (Janu~

ary 19, l~J~:bT;·-p: 61."

2J·r·b· :\.(
· :l e
--~---

----- --·- -·-

of these demands while l}tt-ind.ing f3:Lmilar retorts in the

patronage of Armenians

'h't>~3

vicvr(~d

w:i.t.h alarm since :i.t · vm~;;
i.~o

feared tho Sov:tetf:> V.Jere attmnpt::i.ug

vdth an

thc~mselves

p:t·ov:i.de

r,J

ex(~u;,~e

for :l.rrte:r·v(nrt:Lon,, "- +

The Russl.ans ma:i.nt.ained that the 1921
Turkey~

ceded Kars and Ardahan to

t1B.s

treaty~

vvhic>

s:i.gned at a tj_me wb::

the weak Communist regime ·l'ras anxiou.s to make f:d.encl:3 :i.r1·'
spective of what the cost. might be,

According to the

Russ tans s the treaty vms f:dgned under duress, and

there~

fore inval:i.d~25

from being signed nu.nder:t·egimf~

Bolshevik

What is

more~

f.lu.ggesr;(:~d

by th.'::

gains ():(' the czarist empire."

the Turks argued, the cess:i.on of the two

inces would perpebuate tho
rr:r.·c~aty \~hich

,,ms

wb:i.d1 pr-oudly pur·sued a policy of "diB·~

ill~· gotten

gorgiri.g the

dtU'0SS 11

in~just.:i.ce

i):' .

of the 1878 Berlin

the Turks themselves signed under duress aft

their defeat in the v.rar vdth H.ussia .. 26

2h. _·-·--·~~·~~'

11

Squeeze on 'l'u:ck.ey,'' 9J?..· £~t~.

s

p. 62.

25~·z-~··-·' "'l'urkey; 'l'.he Blow) 11 N\?~".L.~~.Q.~, {July 9,
5o~

19lt-5)' Po

4

~

-

-

-

26Ihid~
___,

wore rebuffed by the Turko on t.h.:::! basis of the Hontreux

Convention.

The

S~viet~

replied tersely that two sovereign

countries could enter into any bilateral agreemerrt they
vr:i.sh. 27

In addition to demands already made, the Soviets
also ar:Jked that, 'l'urkey renounce cJ.11 polit:tcal j_nterests

in the Balkans.

Moreover, i.n discussions v.rith American and

British officials, the Russians made it clear that they
folt that 'I\-trkey lay wj_thin th<:"i Soviet zone of sec:ur:i.ty
and must therefore have a govermnent Hperpetunlly f:r··iendly"

to Russiao 2 S

area had re1at.j_ vely valuable salt. mines s and r:i.gorous win ...

ters.

Strategically, howeve1:·, Kars vvas a fort.resf? dominat-

ing the path from Turkey into

Hussia.~

1:he ·Russians

main~

tained that HKars :is a Bri tj_ E>h dagger pointed at Hussia r s

heart., BD.ku. 112 9
Kars dominates the valleys leading to Batum,
Russia's rail and pipeline terminal.on the Black Sea, and

129
the transcaucasian roads to Russia's largest oilfiolds.

However, the province al::to is a

rr d:Jr,ger 11

po:tn.t.ing from

Russia through Turkey at tho oiJ. arteries of Britain and
the \r.festern Powers.

'J:he

'f'urk~>

'fhe

8J' 17~a

f1 ;.!nl(£'> tho Ir·anJan province

rc::lgardE:)d Kars ar-; the key to their eountry' s

eastern defense perimeter.

If Kars fell under Soviet

influence, it was a certainty that the balance of Turkey
would soon follov-r. 31

Stalin at Potsdam denied Russian threats agai.nst

of large rnunbers of Rums:i. a.n ·troopr:; in BuJg.s.;·:i.:J
Turkish border )2
Marshall

a~3kt;d

nH;:1.:r·

tt:8

At the Plenary Se;sfiion en ,] u1y ;;..;;z the

jo:int approval of tHo

points~

first that

the Montreux Conventi.on shou.ld be voided and (3Xclusi ve con-

trol of that water·-v·ray should revert to joint So1riet·-'rurkish
control; secondly, that the Soviet Un:i.on should have m:l.litary basE1S in the St.raits to assist

~rurkey

in defending

t~hem against any enemy of t;he Black. Sea powern .33

(July 23,

130

to mod:Lfy the JVTontx·eux Conv<'mt:i on hut he w:i.. slv.:;d to impress

on

l\~arshall

Stalin tho :Lrnportar1C\i?. of not alarming the

RuseianA to consider the matter of the Straits as

sive t.o Rw:mia and
treat:l.ef:.~

had existed in

of 1f>.05 and 1833 a
vre:e'e

~l'urkey.

}~tot prr~pa:ced

exclu~

J'.llo1ot;ov repl:i.ed that similar

U·.tt! pa~:t,

and he cited the treaties

Churchill countered that the British
to force 'l'urkoy to ac;cept the Soviet

propo;:;als e 3 h
P:cesident Truman interjected a moderating tone t;o

be

d.:U.:>(~1.J.Sf3t:d

reJ..at.:i.ve to othe1:' te:c:eit.o:rial 1ssu.es at the

futu:r-o pe:.:we conference.

The <Joint Chiefs favored possible

revi::;:!.on of the Convent.ion ttaJ.ong lines of inter·nationalt-

za.tion and. free useu and complet,e demilitarization of the
Stra.1ts.

rrr.tey opposed. any plan -vvh:b:h would grant military

t~oncem~:lons t.o any nation other than 'rurkey" 3 5
Stal:tn <;md. Churchl.ll age:dn exch<::tnged f>harp words on

the follmvin[!, day, J\lly 23.

'fhe Prime

J·Uni.ste:r:~

spoke

f:lr~rt,

3hHan.·y S. •rruman 1 X.~-~!:. 91. Dg__<:).~i~r!_~, (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Company, 19551, p. 375.
r..·
3 )Ji'eis,
~~J~·

£i.t.·, p." 297 ~
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re.::lf'fi.rm:Lng his

pof:~ttj_on

establ:i.shment of Sov:i.ot.

that hn eould not confJi·mt to the
ba.Gf.:ll'3

:Ln th(3 Stra:tts, and

adele~ d.

that he d:icl not feel the '.i'u:c·ks v;ou1d ilcqu.iesc:o to the

posa1.36

pro·~

Tho Marshall mad~ a genuine attempt to convince

the President and the

P:r;j.Jllf.::

M:t:n:L1:;te r that Russ:i.a was lntont

on a peaceful solution a:nd that che Sovj_et desi.1:-e;::; were
reasonable . 3 7
Marshall Stalin pointed out. that the Turks were

not reallx being threatened into meeting the Soviet demands.
He ste.ted that., afte:ra11, the H.ed Army had fevmr tr·oops in
Bulgaria than the }ki tish had in Grceee.

Great Brita:Ln

Soviet leader said that the rectification of thG frontier
would not have been brought np at all i.f the· Turki::;h govern ...

ment had not broached the subject of a new

alli.ancf~

\'\fith

the Soviet Union~39
American policy at Potsdam was to refrain from
directly supporting the ·ru.rk:i.sh goveJ."'nment but to oppose
any th:reat to the r::wvoreJgnty of 'I'urkey.

Americans 't'll'ere

•
£~~,

p,,

"'76
.:J

3E~Trmnan, Y~al: 2K P-~-~-:..Lri.t.2I;~~-) .2J?..· ctt~ ~

p.

376.

36'1 ruman, ·y.ear
1

• •
Oj_!' 1') eclSJ.onsj

2.'2•

·t

o

37l"eis; .2J~s pit_. 1 p. 29?.,
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to rtstriv·e to maintain

dc::taehcd. o.nd. vmtchful att:itude

g

toward both ~3ovj_et and Br-itish r·ol'ie:Les. n40
'rhe President

hedgc~d

becauBe he hoped to use tho

a plan to

both the War

~nd

Str~:~:t t;;; t~o

gain aeeept.ance for

the Hh:i.ne $ Da.nube, and several

interrHJ.t:i.ona11:t:,(~

other major vvatervra·ys ~ lr.l

Jn hi:'3 support of the'! 'rurks

'rhe President had the nupport of

State DepartniDnts in these proposals.

Truman proponecl that the:

K:i.el Canal in Germany~ the Rh:i.ne·~DanubE! '\Jitaterway
from the North Sea to the Black Sea, the Black Sea
Straits~ the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal be
made free \vaterways for the pasrage of freight and
passengers of all c.~ ount.r:tes. ,, o L,.2

that there was little 1:1.ke1:thood of e.greemcmt.
positions

n d:LI:"fered

f:d.nc~e

t.h~:;

so widely. 11 43

Churchill hoped the Soviet would accept the Presiw·

dentts proposals as a substitute for Russian
tion of the Straito

fortific~-

Molotov asked if the proposal of

internationalization applied to Suez in like-terms as for
the Black Sea. Stra.its.

/tOI~G"i.
~.
~. ·~ ,.

4ld:bJ.d.·'

01n

-:...C:.&

Churchill st..=ttod that the

p.,

quost~ton

295.

p. 297

h 2 Truman~ X.~a~:. 2.£ .!2s:.~:;1,:~>..l£!:!Q, £E· Eit~. ~ p. 3?7.
43l!~i.9.·' p. 3~~5 ~

-.~·-·
1. ...-)

had not been ra:tsed.

If the

p1~.posa1·was

11

:Pm rai:3].ng it," Molotov :t"'etort.ed.,

such a good rule, why not apply it to

The Forei~n MinJster had a good poir~, and the

Suez?44

~:nroided

. subsequent eonversHtion

confrol'1t.at:l.on~

It also

left the problem of the Straits unsettled.
1~hE.~

British had kept t.he Turks informed on the Pots-

dam discussions and had advised moderate
'furkish Prime

lVIini~-;ter,

'fr·uman' s proposals..

reactions~

The

Sarajoglu, vras not pl.eaBed by

He af.f:i.rmed that the 'rurk:s would not.

agree to abandon its defensive positions on the Straits
unlens the Sm.riet Union gave f:Lrm guar.:mtees to Turkinh

issue cou1cl be settled vdth mut:ua1 a.ccorcL.

'l'!".i(:,: d:l.p1om~:.t5.c

,,

""·c··l1''"""In·e.;,·
e·''-•
<"..>.!.t.:>"·•·'

for a

11

t""ll'')l'"e
.
,.,

do•·r11
J.~tt<··
r1 "19/!·'-'
~:,
• vv.
c
:;. l' ......

b\:·>ca·cJ'""'
~:·<,..•J
.......
J· ·;,.,1··
·, . _,:;.,:: •.'
.• ,...

'J')'J"'(~1··n,
....,·;........~l.
.......1 •.. -.;,c~

eommon defenE>e" of the Straits by H.ttssia and 'Yurkey

were unacceptable to the other powers concerned~46
'UH~

Soviet had real justification for their demands

relative to the Straits.

Cf;rtninly they had e. greater

dir<.~ct stake in that area than d:i..d the Brit.:ish or Ameri-

cans.

rrheir claim

l~h'I'ruman,

~<vas basc-~d

X.€.EJ:

upon the need for security.

2f. 12!L<Lt.~.:!:2D!:~., .Q_£.

45r~l eJ..s'
· 2.E· SL·
't

~

p.

3C>C)

gJ&.., ,

p o 3 8 5 ..

Q

1+6staff, tnt.ernational Studies Group o:f the Brook·~
ings Institutes Maior Problems of D~S. Foreiqn Policy
1:2Ik9."'·.122.Q, ( wash ·:··;·'"..F:-c·~:--ni~oo'E i 1:1·,fEf) ~-·:G1stTt ut·ec;··. . -191:91~·"'·
p. 151.

13h
Tho 'J.'urldsh Streit,;::; bN(.l bcc:;:t used t;hrou[>;hout. history
by host:LLe c:ount:t:·ics to nH>.ke Btt,..r,:;ck::; on Huss:i.a.
rE:~cent.ly~

More

Brit:i.f;h and French vv<·lr::;f.d.ps steamed thro1.tgh the

Strait!:; :LmmecU.ately foJJ.,yw:i.ng the Bolshevik revolution to

att2ck the R.t.msian Black .Sea po:i'ts :i.n an effort to overthrow
the

Bo1BhE~v1ks ~

Allied w·arships again Uf:lod the Str·aitB

tvhen thEiY su.pportE!d the PoleB in ti1.eir war· aga:i.nst the Red
Army in

1920.47 Stalin had pointed out:

·~vhat. commotion thr.:n"e would be :i.n England :tf a
similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez
Canal or "That a commotion therE: would be in the United
States if such a regime existed in regard to the
Panama Canal),.8
·

CJ -1. el n..
..,·t~ .·1 . y·

~

precedence over Soviet

~~URKISH

sacurity_p~jor~tiea.

The isnuG was

MILI'rAR.Y PHEPARA'riONS

'rhe sharpening of i t,s d:tf:fe:rences with the Soviet
Union made it imperitive for Turkey to allocate large proportions of its annual budget to the upkeep of :its armed

forceso

Even so, most

mil~tary

observers agreed that the

Rm.1s:i.an c:u'mh·:s could. overwhe.lm the 'rurks i.n a f'evi mo:rrt.h~;. J:-9
.

The 'I'urk:i.sh Army had remainr:d fully moh:L1tzod from
the outbreak of the war in Europe j_n 1939.

471..,)0 t..J0'
"''('
h9B(""''"'
... \..

L.J '

?J?.. £.1.. t. ' p • 9'7.

D0spi te g:r·eat
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economic hardsb:ip, the Tt:LHcish'' d(i:Vf:~:enment kept t:;ome 600,000
men occupied with this bc.:cing and unproducti vc form of
]j_fe.

Unfortunately the :::_upport fo:c these g:cound forces

vms only thx·ee hundred p1anes and. vory little modern armor
or mechanized equipment.

a ted 1 t as

Secretary of War Patterson evalut·(l

1910 army. tt .,.,.

n D.

-

th.c~

lJlany of the conser:i.pts in
ha~

served for periods of time

Turkish armed :foi'ces

raz~ing

up to ten years,

·and army· l:i.fe for them t-rat:; mor·e bleak than for most.

sol·~

diers e

'l'heb·· pay was thG equi vaJ.eni.; of twenty cents

month"

'fhe:!~r rations ci:i.d not :i.ncJ.ud.e even coffee or tea,

·con"'"l11"'d
~"')\..{.,
41+ l'lE'J:'
,- :. .
f

•

.,.;.

-

C'"'l1t·
\? • J

,

of' tt"<
),J,~
•••I...
'l''·1r'P"
1'\,.J_\.;',
"'h b'··do'"'·t
t.l. !,.~,')\,.-:.:4o

It

...

1··1
R

.,{

•

.,J..,
~o
.,.1

"':.
·L

t.~

•.••

1
}!,
•·
(

PE~:r~

$

.,.•

While tho Tu:ck:i.sh ar·my wan t.hus ill'"""·GC.IUipped. and
poorly paid 1

H.u~1sia

still has

l~eason

to be concerned over

the probable cost involved wi.th an attack on Turkish forces.,
rrhe

~~urks W€1"..0

noted for

H!1

and devotion to sacrificeo
t\ITO

mill:i.on men.

un.bel:iovable fight:i.ng spirit

The Turks could mobilize up to

They J-t:,J.d been knovm. to throw roek:::; :r·ather

tbt.HJ. retr.-eH.t v.rhen out of armnun:L t:i.on, and they \"lere knov.rn
to posBess a lmac:k fo:r· guorrila VJ"e.trfare

Q

50vla1t(H"' Millis) :£.0!:. liiC:l:~·:g~:~.!-~~1 Rj&:l:?Ji:?.' (New York:
1951)~ p. 257.

Viking Press,

51Wi 11 i am A• Brovm , h-1.11e 1:.t~:.~'!IL F S?.r:?J:E.!_~ As ~;i§..t.~l..ll.~~,
{Wash.~ D~C~: The Brookings 1nst.itute, 1953), p. /+43. J.
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for endurance on very

hell.
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And he is prepared to go on making it a hell

for as long Hs h:Ls enelni!:''S ,~al'(~ to put, up w:J.th it~
The Soviet armies wi11 f:i.nd in 1\ve.tol:i.a rwrw of the
spoils of occu-pation that;. they PJl.thGred :i.n. the Balkan.s;

their l:Lfe, even if und:iBtur1J,;d s 'lt·r:ill be hard and gJ•:i.:m.
Such a campaign would deplete Russian resources of
- a c;angc-::ccm::Ly
l
1
.
t::"''
arms anc1 rnen to
.] ovt po:cnt
~.Jr.
CONDI'l'J.ON~>

rifE 1:'UHKISH ECONOMY' AND NATICJl\Tlt:L

1

held back by the threat of

Sov~et

economy was subverte:;d to ma:\..ntaJn her· nrrny.
tures could be pared, enough could

·.r.. ·.r.•
] C1 r,,ral'
WOl" ...
v,

bE: ~;;;:nrcd t:r.1

finance

53

At the time of the

Sultan~

exp~:l.nc1.:t.·~

If t.ho

'Jlu:r.~1d. sh

his satellites, the Moslem c(m:cc.h~ and r:i.eh <;brien-

tee landlords.

Land reforms had f'r·eed n bout

of this for division amoi1g the

ptH-J.san·i.~G

Q

t·tvo·¥t;hird~3

Land lavvtl limi'Gt::ld

plots of land hE:1ld by one proprietor to 1250 ac:r-os and pJ.m.1s
vvere developed to distr:tbute some 20, 000·, 000
acre parceln to the landleBfl ~51,.
thE~ Turk :ish

aerc~El

:ln 2.0

Ej.ghty···f'ive por cent of

people 9 about. 17;, 000,000 of its 19 s 000, 00(),

lived on the land in some 4.0,000 towns and

villages~

of

13'7
which 32,000 bad a populrttion of

't
J]., 0'()()
as ].,CJ3 5 , more -crwn
..

r.J ..p

};::c.:;B

than hOO.

Ar:.1 reeently

th
.VJ•.....
'] J ages .h aci no .sc1oo
1 J.. s,
··.cse

and g9 per cent of the r1.n•u.l por-uJ.n:tion wer('! :i.lliterat.<~~. 55
Prior to World vhn:.' JT th0 1\\:ckD had exported goods
to produce

t:J.

large shar":1 o.f t.ho

(~c_:.untry- 1

s incom.e e

Germ.any

for 4-0 pHr cerl.t of Tnrh:.ryi s exports. but aJ.no

account<~d

r:o per cent o:i. J1er 1mports./
•
''6

J , ·l
supp_le~)

During the v-rar the reu.rk::; f1our:lshed exce::.>si vely as

they sold strategic materials to both sidesv

had paid premium

pr:Lcc~s

The British

to prev(·n:tt sale to the Germans 9

and the drop in postwar prices had a demoralizing impact
on an already stagnating econ(tl'D:V . r7
)

possessed manganese, copper,

nsphalt~

meerschaum, lignite,

and salt as well a::; her forests v1hich ·cover·ed

of her land mass.

t<.:')ll

per cent

She had made some progress in thEl de v-el ...

opment of steel, paper, and flour

mills~

canneries,

tanner~

ies, refineries for sugRr and ol:i v-e oil, and factoriElS for

manufacturing glass, soap, cellophane, and

cement~

How-

ever, because of the meager amounts of capital available

...

55·r, -· d
~)]

56 Ben j ami n A • .J [,wits , ?.~?.£l: 2~l P...Y.. I n_y~~.~!~ll~P t., ( NeN
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950)~ p. 194.

57Ibid.

-.-:

.for development

purposes~

.-.

,,,

th~

.-.:,

-'

govc Pnm.cmt :ln:L ti<:rted and

controlled the majoi industries.5g
Turkey had receiVf!d 100 rn:lll:Lon d()J.lars for variom?
purpose~:>
2~

from the United St.at,es ( 90 million as 1Emd·Mlease,

million from the Export-Import Lnnk, 10 million from

the F'orf?.:i.gn L1quidat ::i.on C,::Jnmission ~ and three mill:Lon :from

the Ha.ritime Gomm:i.ssion).

'l'h.E~

o:rig1nal request from the

Export-Impor-t Bank was for 500 m:i1l:Lon dollars but most
experts felt that at least one billion dollars would be

necesr;ary to initiate viable economic programf; .. 59
Modernization and industriaJJ.zat:ton would necessi-

modi.fy:i.ng rruricey 1 s one pa:ct.y r:ry-stem.

Such modern:lzntion

would also entail abandoning the complex and contradictory
j.nvestment and trade lavfs which \vent under the title of
t'Etatismtt ~ 60

The Turkish political system was a one party dietatorship under Ismet Inoni:i..

Inoni:L waB a competent

diplorn::xt who boasted a, successful military career as K(jlnt-11

Ataturk 1 s Chief of Staff.

58J· a VJ.· t

,)o ,

1.:..<?_£.

•
f~l.t.

Wh:l.le he patr·onized

educat~ion

59rt
· ct , p. .19'7
-.-1...~.

60wiJ.lard H.• Esby, ~.~1.\i g~-1~ E!:<?..l!.t}..~r.~.,
Harpex· and Brothers, 1950), p. 138~.

$
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York:
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and social services, he

Ataturk 1 s dynamism and

l~ck~d

reforming zoal961
Inonii had

incurr"~d

initiating and later

:t'<::~scntrnent

the

ab~ndoning

known as the; Varlik Vergisio

o.f rnc-Jny by first

stringent property taxes

Under his administration the

cost of living had risen 500 per cent from 1939 to 1947.62

Soviet propagandist took full advantage or this
brand the goyernment as incurably Fascif>t~ 63
the 'furkish g;overnment rema:i.ned a
try lacked

1Hpf;H3

to

In truth,

dictatorshi.p~

~:h.e

coun ...

free speech, free press, or a free parliamont. 64.

It was di:ff:'Lcul t to project hovr 'I'urkey could become a. bul=

wark of democracy when 'l'urke-y hex·self conJ.d nc:c JmpJ(;;)w;,nt
democracy~

'l'h(~

latter point was of small

con~:JE.::q'\,i.E~.'l)Ge

President. 'I'ruman' s cour·se of action, hovmve·:-.

).n Bho.r·:tng

'fhe

rre~Ji··

dent savv a much larger p:lcture.
If Rusr-;ian troops entered 'l'urkey ~e.,. it would be a
short ti.me before these troops would be tlSGd for the
control of all Tm."key ~ 'J'o alloN· Russia to sei~ up
bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into
'fu.rkey, ostensible for the defense of the St;ra:5.ts,
would, in the natt1.ral course of events, result :i.n.

61'1' om.l..tn,
-~

62

. .

Q."P.~

·~

c~~:f.•,

~0
p. or_.

wrurkey· Outpost of the Cold War, tt Q.§..

l~i!.!L~. £.1£!!~ .i<Lr!Eif!~E..c: r:t:,, Lr ~l y 16 , 19 4.1:n , :r • 2 5 •
6J'romlin, 2P" c:i.t., p. 82.
6hJav·j
' .. tc•0' 212· _p:ito, Po 19f~.

lhO

ThEl

noi~e

t>ent to Hu.;.H:l:la \·ms \mmistakably clear that

j_f the Stra.its should

b<~corn.e

the

objc~ct

of

Ru~:~s:Lan agg1~os--

s:lon the 11resulting sJ.ttlC:tt.ion v.mnJ.d constitute

<'J.

threat to

:Lnternationa1 secur:i.ty and vrou1d c1ea:cly b(:J a matte:t' :for
twtion on tho part of' the Sec:u.r·:U:,y Counc:Ll. ?!66
The

h~~esident. f

s conc:ern vlas heightened by a r·eport

from General Bedell Smith, our Ambassador to Russia,

~10

reported on lTanuary 9, 191./7 that lw believed 1'u.rkey had
no hope of survlval unler:-;s long ..·term aid was fm. . thcoming

from the United States and Eng1and.67

65Harry 3 ~ '.Pruman? I~~E!. £.[ .:rr.:1:.~ll
York: Doubleday and Co., l94ut, Pe 97.

66rt:i.d.
6?rbld.
-··--... ' P~ 98
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GREECE: . PRELUDE 'TO THF. 'l'FWlVIAN DOC'rRINE

While the plight of Turke>y v/.:1.s pri.mad.ly due to
:i.ncrea~d.ng

Russian pressux·e and :1.n.t.l'anr::dgt".lnee, the eond:i.....

tJ.on of Greece had its origins l.n the GGrman and, J.ator,
British oecupnt:i.on of that country'"l

The problems of

Greece t=md Turkey i.ver.e :i.n.separably bound together a.nd could
not be considered apart by the Western allies.
In G:r·eece the problem of Huss:Lan relations w:l th the
United States and Great Brita.in was posed in

sharpest

forms~

A Commun:i.mt controllorl

one~

G:r';::<-~Cf~

of its

<:.ronJd

:f'1~?J:nk

the Straits and would provide a fnvorable ppsition fromwhich to extend Soviet influence over 'l'urke:y an6.
The fall of

Gree~e

lta~t'.'/,

thus would have been a disaster that

would have materially weakened Turkey's strategic position
as a stabilizing factor tn the Near and. Middle East.

It

was felt that control of the Dardanf..jlles w.ould be BUbject

to control of Moscow and that the Anatol:i.an Plateau, strategic key to the Middle East, w·ould ev-ent:ually be· lost to
West<~rn :tnfluerwe .2

. .lHarry S. Truman, Yec::n~s oi 'frial and Hope. ( Nev.r
York: Doubleday and Co$, l.91;0T, p~··~·97f-:- ·----. ~~·-'
2--··-~~·-·--··'-' "'l'he Story Behind a Po1icy, Versa ahd
Reasons Why, 11 L~~w~k, (March 31, 19h7), pp. 2ly-25.

,::,•

1:he HtrategJe locr:ttion of Greece, therefore, had

placed it in the front rank of Western security interest.
lr'rom the standpoint of 'i';JJr:: secur·5 i;y of thei:c several stra-·

tegic--econornic

intt~rest~5

viewed Greece and rrurkc-:y

ments to each

:J. n. the
t'l3

are~:t,

the VVesteJ::on pow-ors

comrt~;:;-n···balaneos

and supple-

")

other.~

Pres:i.dE-mt 'Jlruman sav-v oth.er impl:Lcat:Lons in the

situation.

'l'he Presj_den.t felt

th~~ t

Gre~;l<:

Greece "occupied a

hi.ghly sEms:i.ti ve poaition ~It inasmuch as all :i.ts neighbors

to the north had fallen under the sway of Communisn:t.u
that the Greek Con1muni.sts
"'l"' the
ev
'
'<>

S ••
J'·t"tH>
t-i On
<<:-~. -'·

Wt~re

alert to seize power ttwhen·M

(3l. 8 c-_,C.!o;r.:, ~l'" .,., ,.,~. <•d f·~•r"l)1 ·'ll"·l <' f· •-•1·· l ') ~ ·l'· '<'
•.'~' .c n.v ....... '- .) • . . • . o ·''·'· '·" ..~·'· ' ..v

ing the sit.u.ation :i.n Greece.,

Aware

·i~·'·''•"1

C' .,r..._1 c.
•.:, ('•, •.
''l i!
'

'I'.he report labt=..:led the Greek

problem as one of "severe :tnflat5.on, high governmental
e.xper1ditures and lov-r reYenue, disrupted Civil Service,
stagnant indunt.ry and trade, and widespread unemployrnen"t. n 1l·

After the vmr in Europe, the British had assumed
the major bln'den of

of Greece.

rt:-~sponsibiJ:i.ty

for the rehabilitation

Strategically, Br:l.tc-1.:i.n had a critical j.nte:rest

3Benjarnin A. J av:i:ts, }~.Q££ £Y..);..ll:Y£.§!!.!lent_, (New
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950;, p. lo2.
·

1+Harry S. Truman, Je§£ 2.£ Qec:i.s:iJ?_r~, (Garden City,
Ne\1" York: Doubleday and Company, 1955 f, p. 522.
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left Greece proat.ra'te and
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demot~n:t:i·~.'.<:d"
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Co;nnw.n:Lc~>.t·5 . ·:J:n:3 had.

1·,-! ..., 1'~··..1
'"'t''[r
.. :,:)l-l-t~.-::
•. ~\:.· .:·'>
1

locomotives and less than 100 freJ.pht

Port

faci.li'tir:~s

v'fere a

shamblcJ~>,

c:md 90 pt:r c:EnY\; o.f ::dJ..

Greek merchant vessels he1.cl been sunk,

/\cJdj:t:i.;,Yno:n.~r,

f'i.

preventing purchase c>f
the

avE~rap;e

Greeko6

ev~C~n

the THJu:Le fare of' life for

'I.'bt:! p:r:i ce o.f' food had soa.red to

3f~O,OOO

times the 193~ level~7
The

a~erage

annual iricome per employed person in
'J1' h"i..... '-~~

1 ()'•'

l' ''ll''l"''"'Cl··l
.• ~J.• 1r
J ... - .. \.....
"' • J
l..)'
..Y

• ... . ~ v

1

c~· c...
'='l'J(laJ:Y)
.
-.

t,.} .... ,

had been eut 70 per cent a:;l a result. of the
patlon~

By

1947 malnutrition

rampant.o

HfW

(1·!·'
... • -

•) • J'- '<YJ..'
v ~ r1rt
t:>

Har and ocGtl.··"

Some two t:J.nd

a half million persons, about 35 per cent of the population, had fallen vietim to tuberculosis, typhus} or rnala:c:i.a.

Eighty ... f:l.v(::: per cent of Gr<EH::!k c:hildX'tHl werEl estimated to
be in grave danger of contracting tubercular and other
debilitating diseases.g

had lost thcdr stores, 5, 000 schools had been de::>troyed,

and the timber supply materially depleted~9
Since 50 per cent of the people of Greece had been
engaged in agriculture prior to the war, the effecta of
vvar were particularly di;:;<:wterous to that industry.

23 per cent of the soil could be

·

cultivated~

Only

Only the

6-T~··--·-·' "'l'he Story Behind a Pol:i.cy, Versa and

Reasons \\hy, 11 QE~

.£ll· ~

pp.

24--~25.

7J·av:l:t~s, OJl. c~t~ ~- P~ V~9,.

8Il
·. d , p. lorJ. 3.
· .-.. 2..?~-.
9J)i0_.

1h5
"'e J.~-·"'c·I
(18, \.)-

.,. ·oi·'
1.)

)

.

~,
J'~-I, .• 0,

bJ.·~ a

Sl

oJ··1. t l1
l '"!
\,.

1
t-, (.··1. \... .J.~

"'·i

<.;
l-

of units of <ll"'ahJ.e land

per unit. of population, of fur a smn1ler base fo:c agr1cu1···
ture.

About 27 per cent of Gre8k acreage

scraggy pine forests and of sparse grazing areas.
CJ.nce iL~ arid rnountair·l nnot fit 1.'\n man nor
~;conom:i.c

A team wh:i.ch sux'w:yod the

bEWBt •

The bal-

11 10

problems of Grooce

in 19h7 reported that Greece had but. 1.31
crop land per' farm person.

of

consist~d

ae:cE-~s

of arablf.l

Tho average Greek .faPm .family

earned $200 a year, or well under $SO pe:r· eap:l.ta ~ 11

Even

before the German occupation, the cerc:al yield per acre was
one Of the lm,.rest in the

"]~v~~
1,.1. ·• ;.<.
""' '

peas.

0
c·u~Mar1+
••• !. • w .._) ~

world~

only 575 poundB ~ nJrnost, as

·ai~d
' - ~~1~-·c··
1.1 0 '"'i:l\) '() •

Add:tt:Lc.naJ.ly ~ the GreE.~k 'inve::.:tment. for machinery vms

only 60 cor~s as compared to $1000 for tlm United States.l2
B6sides ap obviously disasterous balance of payments deficit due to her tragic agricultural situation,
Greek

comme:cce

addod ·still further

Before the war Europe,

espE:~ctally

1°Savits, 2.£• 9. ~L~·

9

cw..tB,~;

for pessi.mif;m.

Q,::.:cm.:my and the

p. 183 ~

llwLtlard n. Esby, )n.s:.Lg_ .li*~ l~!:£n~J?:.rE.~ ( Ncm
Harper and Brothers, 1950 , p. ln5.
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::>ov:i.nt; Un:ton, purchased
·r~e

subsequent postwar

markets clecr<.::ased G.r·et'lk exports to seven

1939 level.

pEJX'

By early 1947 the disproportion

of Greece's fore1gn trade had renched disasterous proportions o

She exporced le;:n t.han e:i.ght m:i.1.1J.on dollars \vor.th

of goods and imported less than $,;,316 ,000 worth of goods~
Blaek market.s and corrupt:lon further compounded an already

bleak pi~ture~l4
The grave economic situation in Greece was alffiost
totally a product of the small clJ.que of 'pr:l.v:l.leged

incltw~

trial banking and commercial :i.nteres·b:; vrl'dch corrt.:co::1(;ci tlH3

for economi.c or political

ntabilL~!1.t:ton

of tho count.ry i'fith·,

out dest;roying themselves in the process. J·:>r
While G:eeece stoocl :i.n grave need. of inveBtment

capi-~

tal, the government made no effort to ec:tl} in an estimated
$330,000,000 held by Greek subjects abroad,-the majority of
them in Egypt, Bl'.'i tt1:Ln r and· t.he Un:l ted Stc:ttos .16

p ,.

~ (").r7
.Lo

o

15constantine Poulos' YIH_eport fr·om Athens' n 'I'll§~
~~~B~~LE.~.lblj..~-' (March 17, 19ft.?), PP~ 26 ... 27~

16Prli11ip Jo,rdan ~ 11 Greec<~ in Purgatory, 11 lJEt~.Q!b

{Dec. A, 1945),

PP~

624-626o

Thus it appeared t:.he Gree: k Government vvas willing
to bur-dEH1 the people and tk.\e n::tt.:.:L\n1. with foreign debts and
plead for assistance progx·J:tms

'bt~.t

v-ras unwi1J5ng to force

the ruling clique to asnist in the recovery of their own
country.

11

Nearly all

Gr•~r,l<·

fortunes are held abroad; their

owners are f.lrdt'mt patriots so long /j.s patriotiran does not
ltmi t the:i.r PJ:'O.fi ts f'l'Oln the commerce of the

WOl'l.d

ottl?

1'he

wealthy class caused a further deterioration in the balance
of paymEmts p:i.cture by impo:cting a v·ast array of luxury·

itEJms ·rrom abroad.

It waD obvious to many that grave social

and economic inequalit.:i.es vmre creating a base for social

"1

offending tbose who had put them 1.n

t~\

power~ J.(J

The Greek people and the Greek nation survived only
because of a combination of UNHHA and British aid.
poure~ in $350~000,000 in goods and services.

UNRH.A

Britain sub-

sidized the Greek army with ~:n.25, 000,000 and propped up
the Greek currency with $20,000,000 in golct.l9

Between

17J·ordan, QE• _gj;.:~.·, p. 626.
18
··-·-·--·-·' . 11 'J'he Story Behind a Policy, Versa, .::mel

.£.?&·

ReHsons Why~ IT 12..£o
1 9constantine Poulos~ TTI/Jb.at. America Could Do In
Greece, 11 .tlat.i9_1}, (Jvlarch 29, l9h7),ppe 356~35R.

the end of the war :Ln EuropE' and· March, 19h.?, over
m:i.J.J.:Lon l•mrth of goods were sont. t.o Gr·eece.

J' .\

·~~F-550

De(=;p:tte this

huge influx of aid, the G:r·eok eco:nGmy refused to respond. 20

Part of the failure of st1dt funding was

~~.ttributed

to dis-

honest personnel who funneled relief f3Upplies to the blaclc
market, and the

H

crash" natu.re of the programs which made

it all but impossible to staff tho programs with high

cal:i.~·

ber personnel. 21
H.eports .from UNHRA est:i.mated Greek :needs at
~n ~ ll?, 000 ~ 000.

.Machinery and equ.ipment for bns:i.e const:r'uc~·

tion 1·.rould run to ~~593 m:tll:i.ono

m:i.ll:ton<.

~:he

U~S. load

wa~:->

Long range dEnre J.opment

c;o.n~s:i.dero'b1y l>E\~Lc..,v: tJ:teh(:: ct.;t;·5.···~

mates, allocating ~;150 mill:l.01J on mi:J.:Lt.ary (;:!qtdpm<:'nt ~ ~t~r;·o

million for airports and st:r·cJteg:i.c transport, a.nd only $20
million for agricultural development o

'l'hese allocations·

v-rere at a time when sqme 45 por cent of the Greek national

budget \IITas for mj.J.:ttary purposes. 22

In any event the cost

of repairing war damage alone had been estimated by a

20Poulos, "Report from Athens~' 1 .21::.~

2lu.~:i. GovernmBnt~

.£tt-.. ,

p. 269

U.S. F'or·e:Lgn Air·: Its Ptu·pose,
Sco:pc:; ~ Adn1inistrn.t.ion and Related Information, 11 H~ari.ngs
~6th Congress, 1st ~3ession, House Document No. 116, (Wash. ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 11,

1959), p. 27.

11

.

22
-·"'~'" --~'"·"' "Gamble in the Near East," ]}Jl§l:!l§.§£
Week, (AprJJ: 19, 19l~7), pp. h8·~51.

the summer of 19h6 at betw• J(:m
2

~~h~OOO,OOO~OOO.

:i;>J,Jkoo,ooo,ooo to

An ad.d.:Ltional ;!:~5t)0;000,000 wat:> needed for

general rehabilitation, n.ot ind.v.dtng reconstruc;t.:i.on neces ...
'

Strong rt=Jcommendat:i.ons v;r.,rE: made by UNHRA? the
British Economic Mission in Athens, and American emissaries
· :tnsi st:i.ng that the Greek Government awaken itself from :L ts

ind:ifference, take steps to rev:l.se its :taxation set up,
and take ef'fecti ve rneastt:res to halt

inflation~

These

recom·~

mendations were not acted upon.24

when the Big 'I'hx·ee had clec::i.ded that Br:t.·U.i3h troops were to

liberate and temporarily occupy the countryG25

Britain, of

course, had enjoyed special privileges in Greece for many
yt:~ars

before the wa:c..

Br:i tain had provided finance and

guidance to Greecf; after her independence from 'l urkey, and
1

loans t.o augment the country's alvvays meager resources were

floated on the British market.
2 3J a vi t s ~ 21?.. cit • , p o

££·

One-third of the Greek

189 •

2 1+Poulos, ,What America Could Do In GreE~ee,"
~it., p$ 356.

25Hanser, .22· Q,?-t~~' p. 10.
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foreign debt had been hold hy Britain and the Greek government had mortgaged
standing debts.

interests~

Guston·::~

rnono}.Kl1:i.0.G to Gover t~hose out; ...

Key bank.<::. l util:Lty concerns, and transport

In short, Greece had been an economic colony of

••
')C.)
C.rreat 13· :cJ.ta.ln."'c
t

During the \·var thr;;

Gret~k

people ini t:Lat.ed a b:l ttEH""

guerrilla warfare against the invaders.

Hesist.anco came

to center around two principal groups, the EAM or National
Liberation F:cont wi.th j:ts army of· approximately tw(:mty
thousand knm-rn

as

gLAS ( Peor.1les I NationH1 ll.rmy of Libe:ca~·

,....,, •.,

and under the leadorsh:i.p of Gcmeral

Z.;n-·'~ra::; ~

•- r

'rhe EMil: had originated as a pre-war gr'oup opr,osed
to the. mil]. tary regime of' General Metax:ts ~ 2 8

'rhe part:y wa.s

mado up .from overy shade of liberal or left

ng opin:Lon ,,

i"lj

Because of this broad base, the party boasted. of 16 gener<J.1s
of the old Greek army, 3l:: colonels) 1500 other off:i.cers 9
1500 clergymon and six b:i.f3hops, 30 u.ni versity professors,
26 11cl.lLi
J,.
"'G l.~ ,

27tJoseph M. tJone~3. 'l'he Fifteen Weeks, (New York:
'fhe Viking Press, 195 5) ) , r:-7)9-:.,·--~·-·-·-~· -~··---28 --~·~~-~' "Counter Revolution :Ln Greece, 11 T.h~ !LE!~

R~u?..:?.:bJJ_~,

\~h.1.1y

;o, 19h5), PP· 121·~·1~::2~
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the president of the PolytGchni.c Institute, and a host of
.
•
.
·.
. •'')9
outstand:tng

J.ntel1ectua..l.~,

'--

By tho time of t_ht.· :)J1A:n·at;:i.on,

however~

the EAM had

become domirH·l:ted by the EKE ox' Gr•eci.<.: Communi::>t; Party under
the leadership of the "Gret::k St.aJ.l.nn, George Siantos ~ 30

The two

group~

EDES and EAM, had cooperated initially

with British agents to harass the German forces but by 1943
had res~.uned

<:1

bitter pmver struggle )1

The British, whLLe displaying a lack of enthusiasm

for the Greek supporters of the Monarchy, plaeed thoir own
support solidly behind the Gr·eok King ).n exile.

Churchill

exile on April 9, J.944:
Our relations are definitely establishGd with tho
lmvfully const:i.t,uted Gre:n:::k gov(;.~:c-nment hcDdod by t hrcJ
king~ who as an ally of. Britf).:tn cannot be d.i~warded
to su:i..t tlle moml:urtary surge of appi:~tite a.m.ong emigre
nonentitie::J • Neither cr.m Greec;e find consti tu.tiorial
expre;;~sion in particular set~' of guc-n-r:i.llas, in many
cases indistinguishable from bandetti, who are masquerading as the saviours of their country while living on the local villagers~.~. Once the Ge:cman invadtn·
ha~ been driven out, G0eece can be a renublic or a
monarchy, entirely as the people wish.32

'rhc EJ\M recQgn1.zed that Bi··:i:tish support· o:f the
monarchy would entrench the old order..

29.....

_._

... ...,.....,......

_.'

11

F'ailing to prevent

Counter Hevolut.:i.on in Greece, 11 J.oc.

__

30H anser,
.
J ..
• .
CJ..t
.... _oc.
._...,.
............... o

31J· ones' ~-os:.. S;..it. ~
32Jones, QI~· ci..Y._., pp. 69···70.

ct,~~·
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the

of' the King tln·ougb

rc~tur·n

propaganda~

exile.33

po).~U,ical m.:tm~uvering

gAM finally ;] oi ned tlH;

G:r~eck

and

gove1·nment in

The strategy worked as the government of Premier

Papandreou lcmded in Gr::!(H;e witl:.

liberating troops

the~

in October, 1944, with u coalition of all parties except

th6 extreme right.
af

.c• l'
.1.

Five

o~

Papandreou's miriisters were

h J:' Al\~
u. J L~

"j ·'J.a t .ecJ T/vl.
r' t
..

1

Despite the grov-1ing :Lnf1uence of S:tantos Hnd th.e
C.!ommun:ist party the government of Papandreou was :tnitially
popular with the Greek people e

.Their faith was I'Oi"iarded <:w

relief supplies were flooded into the

country~

The optimism of the Greek people wns

right wing u lements in Deeembe:.c of

31'J

short~lived,

how-

19hl-r~

THE GHKSK CIVIL WAH

Wh.:ilo EAM had eorrectly interpreted Bri ti.sh

:i.nten~,

tions to re£-rtore ·the monarchy? Qhur-ch::LJ.l had correctly
interpreted the :i.ntentions of EAM.

~['hE";

Prime

Minist~1r

ch:!terrnined t;o forestall EAM control of Athens by

1-ras

lighten·~

:i.ng: parachute and naval entry :1nto Athens and the port of

')
·3 .) Jones, .21?.· g_;h:9_q pp. 69 .... 70

3hDavid Socker, nBackground
~ Cg_ntC?._!]ll~~?,.!:~ B.~Y.~;.§.vJ, (March 9,

35·r··
:::.f-!_1.; (~
l

e

By these maneuvers he hoped to gain time to

Piraeus~

return royalist troops from Italy and to
BntNeen the l!tb. rmcl 17Lh of

in pm·rero

~nsconce

October~

the King

194h, this

plan was carried out.36
The nreek guerr:LJ.l;:J ax·mier:; Y both the Communist ELAS

under Gene r<J.l Sara phis and Gene:cal Zervas of the

EDE~J,

had

agreed to plaee themso1V£:JS and their forces under B:citish

. . 37
General Sir Ronald M$ Scob1e.
forces were mov:'i.np; tovvard Atherw ~

Scobj_e ·vms mvare that ELAS

Premier PapandrElou, now

regarded as a lacky of the British by EAM, ordered all
guerrilla forces to throv..r down their at·ms and to leave

Athens~

rld.s order precipit.8ted t.h9 GreEd.·~ C:i.v:Ll VJr:u·. 38

1

that :r.ight:i.Ert bands, includ:Lng tb.e roya1iGt; f",cHnt,<).in T:h:·i;, --·-gade, trained by the British, and the Security Battali0n,

trained by the Germans, did tho same.,
been refused o

The EAfvi

r(~quested

Th:Ls reque::>t had

permission for a clemon·o

stration wh:5.ch was granted and then, be1atedlys cancelled.
'fhousands of unarmed GreekG gathered in Constitution Square

and the police fired on them.

EAM forces turned on the

police, national guard, and other "fasc:i.stsn elemc~nts~39

36J' ones~ g.£.
3~5Hiehard

vv.

.t

~·?·p.

70
. •

371."b.
. J.ae, p • .7J'•.
l

VanAlstyne; tt Anglo.,·American Policy in
( J'une, 19h?), p. 54-5.,

Gre~)ce," 211rr:~.D.l DJ~~9.;I_Y.,

39F'reda I)\:l.rchway, "Mr. ChurchJ.ll' s Way~ u Jl~L<2.!l,
( April 19, 1947 , pp. 439-441~

15lr

bloodGhed could have been <:-verto:J. by the eoali t:i.on eabine'l~.

J.s::,~.clor,

formi.ng under the l:l b£:n•al

Souphoulis o

Churchill

ended such a possibility by ordering Scobie to "••ssustain
Prem:i.or Papand:ceou ~ and not

he~:>i tDt.e

to f:t:ce on the Communist.

ass "l' J ')nt . . tthO
t..

'~ CJ.

.. (;\. .

._) fl

Roping to take Athens before the 3,000 mati British
garrison Gm.J.ld be reinforced, thE; ELAS atto.ckE'ld_ in force on
De,!embe:c 13 ~

The

batt1~~

raged for three weeks, during which

time ELM) forces announced their intention of partitioning
Macedonia and annexing :Lt. to Bulgaria& ·If they succeeded,

the prospects of Greek independence would he materially
compromisect.,4l

a1·'d
·Ei'l'Ac)·, c•:t'
<o
· " . ·tile
,
u. 0o·-~-E~d
l.l ~
P '"'9\"al.·J·. ".".d.
J.

J

1..

·t'l't(:'l
•
:..

1·'"·'· ~~':' '··· .d.< ••..
Va:r.·l"·"
-ir1
· ... '--•· J~~,
n i \·r•"'"·''Tll'"r····

February, 1945, agreeing to lay clown its arum B.nd

di~:;band~

Most of the rebels fled to the nortb.e rn mounta5.ns instead. h-2
'rhe main elements of the EAlV[ entrenched t.hemsel ves

in the hi.lls to the

north~

refu::;ed to f.:Hlrrender tho:i.r

weapons, and openly defied the governmento
h°K:irehway, .Q.E~

.2-tt·,

While the major

p, 411.0 ~

4lvr-m Alstyne, .=h.2.£o _cj:J~·

42staff, International Studies Group of the Brookings Inst.i tute, nMajor Problems of U OS. Foreign Pol:Lcy
1911.9·-1950, (Wash., D.c.: Brookings Institute? l9l,.9),
Po 147.,

r.· ")
{'
]..)

respon..sJ.b1.lity .for the DoGember-

d'i~aster

had to be borne

by t,h8 EAM--ELAS, and more : : pe e:'Lf:l.r;r).lly the KKE) the R1ght

and Centre part:i.es shared :in the: gu:l.lt..

'nw:tr refusal to

dt::;arm tlva Mountaj.n Brigade gave the EAM genuine
subsequent. r::vents

cons5.dr~rc::d,

to fear a

ground::~,

right~-wing

'coup' •

Tho Nat:iona1 Guard, hostJle to I·;iuvr even during the Nazi
oecupat:i.on, perr:d~lted :i.n that policyJ~3

As Pres:i.dcnrt• 'l,rurrw.n

o bfJervc~d, ?PJ'he government, :Ln tu:r.·n, seemed to eneourag;G
.
. . b]. J:::: n.g
. h t~st
.
.
,. J.L,
:Lrrespons:L
groups
o r--r •

1'he t,r:.!rritory held by thE:~ guer:t"':i.lla forees corist:l"'·

tuted

one·~tenth

of Greece, forming a lCJ.rge n'I'n from the

Albanj_an .border to Mt o Olympus Ni.th a

verl~:i.eh~

activity avmy from areas of v.rbero major

:for'.::~~~.

leg

E"~XtEmdi:ng

E.1nd. herw..y

weapons could b~ brought to bearG45
Guerrilla forces number(:Hl
15 ~ 000 t.o support action.

Em

ef:'>t:l.mated

8, 000 with

1.'l1ese opE-)rat(-:ld in groups of

20 or 30 strong CJ.ncl we:r·e 1Hd by officers of proven ex.peri·"·
ence.

The largest group ever observed was one of about

h3Edmund W:i.lson 1 If Greek D:i.a :r-y: Communist;, Socdali.st
and Royalj.st,n N~}~. X9.£lsg!:., (Oct. 20, J.9lJ.5), pp .. 32~.36~

hl}Tru man ~
.

!§J ~!: s 9..! TJ:i~l .~;..n q kl£Ee , 212.. .£,;~j~

o ,

·

p • 98 o

J.~5Erne~:;t 0. Hanser, "Something Rotten in Grt:~ece, n
!.b.~. :2,£:,~.!-Ir.:'.Q;.~ [;v(":DJ.:l2,g. }:.?..§~~, (April 5 , 19 47) , pp •. 2 6-2 7 •
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l~OO men.h6

With the~'>e troops t;hus (:;ntrcmched, incidents

began to develop at the jate of one every other day.

Heport:.s to tht) !)resident

~:'tated th:-1t;

many of the :i.nsur···

at various camps beyond "Lhn. Grl::;r:k borders. t~h7
surveys by the United Nations Spt:ld.al Balkans

Subsequent
Co!nmit".t<:~e

V<"'l:cified that th(:J rebels lw.d. rerc:d ved v-1-ar rnatc.r:talr3 and

other assistance from Albania, Bulgaria, and

Yugoslavia~

and that the rebels had been allowed to use the territories
of these states fo:t:' tact:i.ea1 retreatB from Gr-eece~ hR

~:'he

village of Baulke? s in Nortbe:cn Yugoslavia he.d 1+500 Greek

resistance fighters but the nationals of the bordering

GREEK PASGISIVJ:

wing government launched a e1=Jmpa.:t.{?;rl of violenc0-; and
dation throughout Greece.
called Security Battalions,

side.

j .. n'timi-·

Naz:i. "qu:i.sling" units, the
1rver(~

turned loose on the

so~
country~

Within a short t:i.mo those Royalist gendarmes had

46Hanser, loc. cit.
h7Truman, XQ_~::.§. 9f. :r.rit~S, ·~E~St .li<?~, QJ?..·· £J~~. • ~ p. 9EL.
lr.Bstuff, Interna·~iona1 BtucUes Group of the Brook..;.
ingB l:ilstitutt3, ~Jf;jor_: P..r.9J~~.~.~~'?. gf. Q.S,0 E~<!..~:.~...:ttm P2.:.1.t9J:. 19h9.-·
1.22Q~ (Washington: Brookings Institute~ 191,9) , p. 1/.J.$•

Po 129.

h9Hanse:r, nsomething Rotten :i.n Greece, n 9J?.•

.91:!-.•,

ro

perr:::ons ~ :>

evE~r

Anyone· who was

n:Lst.51

v.Ji th. EAYI was

labE.~led

a Commu-

11;:-:put.y Pr:i.rne Min:tster and

ConE>tant.ine

, thouE;ands of innocents, and the tactics of the government T s
n.ranatically faetionaJY security forces comrert.ed many

non~·

Corrmn.mists to bitter anti~,goverTlment sent:i.mentr-.; o 52

'l'ecJ:mically, the Greek gov·ernment 'Iivas cl<:issified as
a nnationalist coalitj_onn

Actuc:)_lly it

0

becamE~

u1tra.~reae....:

rightE-)St, with all the power in the hands of

roy·,<>_.~;-1, J. "~.'.r-:t_l"> ..
t i... onr--J..''··y·
~I..
....

.1. ,..,

..

.,.

Ar:r-e d I>r···l" >iJ(.\
(:-)

"'

...

J.... -.r

1\li·l·
~ 0::'1~1\.:.:
' '-Yr,
J'J. .....1'J.,.!.,.t.J

exclus:hrely

l)rc.\ f'o''l:~·t· '"')'I) <·:•
'-' ·''''""

'Jlf>aldaris persone.lly ordered t,h!::. ar>r'E-)st of

.I}.,".

~~onm

1·.)

'i'/1•.1
'· .t.f,~,;~-.:··-nr·
.~ ,.L,l. '•

"''

1.J

3DOO po1J. t>~

ical leaders, including members of the Socialist and Liberal
parties who h.ad earlier broken tl.es v-dth EAM.

Even General

Solon Gregorides, an independent progressive was arrested
. ..

r.'l

and imprisoned~)~

5°Jossph P& Ly.fo:r·d, HThc Ne:J.zis Who Never Left Greect~,u
TJ2~ .r:L~.'Y! !l;:U2'S.P l_i £, ( De c • E~ , 191.1-7 ) , p • 13 •

51 Phillip Jordan, "GreeCEJ in Purgatory, n .t!~'is~!!'

Dec. g, 1945), p. 625.
t'2

(~Tu1y

J - - ·..·-·~--'

"Flicker:tng Freedom,'' 'l'h§.!•. .!~L~!! H~J2.1:!E.:.1).c_,
10, 191-t-7), pp. 9 ... ].Q.

53 ·--..--~·· ·' "'l'he

Comin~ Greek Dietatorship) tt 'I'he
_Ne\Y. B.~.I>Ulli£, TJuly 21, l9h7 J, Po '7.

Observers remarked t:.hat. conr1:\.tions
e~r1y
.c•••

Nazi Germany had left

Greec~

rem:Ln:i.~3cont

of

with less freedom than

t:my otfH:n· liberated Eu:r'•TPfHm count' ry outside the Hussian

.J.ages, and a pr•ivate

arn~y

of st.Ol'n1 troopers 9 called

n organi-

zation X11 and led by an sc:ti ve colo11el in the Greek Army,
Colonel Grivas, terror:1.zod the d . t:1.es.,54

Thus terrorized, liberal and leftist elements feared
to show up to register for the Plebiscite or the scheduled

elections.

With the si.t.ua tion well in hand and the

Royal~··

ists certain of victory s the Bri t.ish proc(Jeded vdth the
elect:i. on on September 1 s 19lt,6.

until

19.4F~

but :such

E~ 11 fa1i·orable

'l'he elect:i.on t-·.ras not. t.o be

cl:imat,.e'1

v;::l~3

not to ·r:.:::'

•
d.l.• 55·
1gnore

over 13,000 of the opposition were in jailo

Some had been

the:ce for over eight months without charge and without
yJlans .for tr-j_al o

On the other hand, known Royalists were

reportod by competent Brit:i.sh and Am.erican observers to

have obtained more than one poJ).lng card~ 56

~,

+Hanser, nJJ.:urope t s Most. Frightened Country ,n .C2J2.c
£~!;.~.~ ' p. 11.
..J

55 Basil Vlavianos$ HGreeco and Its Allies," .l!?tJ...Q!l

(Sept.

2g,

1946)~ p. 344~

.

56Hanser, "Eu1,.;0p(~' s Most Freightened Country, n

2.12. •

rJ.!:. ~ , P c 47 •
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ber 1, l9h6, was far f'rcm

r)

6E.~

11

per cent voted for h:i.m

the plebiscite of Septem-

victe>-r·y for the Kinr.:,.

Only

j.n ;-;p:lto of tricks, terrorisrn 1

and psychological coerciort. n57
The

/\.ne;lo~·Amer:i.c.r:tr;_.,.F:n:mcb

v:L:>ed the elec:t:i..on
honef;;tly he1cl ~ TT
bc~st

agrG(~r-l

'I'he

super·~~

cornmis:i.on vrhich

that. the. elect:i.on wa::1

trnthfulm~s!'.:;

11

fa:tr1y and

~;tat.ement

of that.

can

be verified by the .fact that S·cal:tn felt that the

Bri t:i.sh wer(2! merely exercising the prerogati VE;s granted by

t.he

11

spher(~;::; of influencen a.groemonts ar.;reGd to bet;v·reen the·

Marshall and the Prime Minister. 5E;
Grc~eee

Bri.t.ish tactic~:> in

and Italy certainly rr,ave t.he Soviet Union c-:1use to

friendly reg:i.mes in courri.:;ri0s wi.thtn

t~h.e

Sov:let nc·<.::u:c:J..t;r

per·irneter·.
DE'l'ERIOHA'riNG CONDl'riONS'

As long as the civil war continued, the prospects
for improving the economy vvere limi t(:!d.

As. time passed,

funds for the military program .for bringing the fighting

to an end bE1gan to take priority over funding for recon··
st:cucti.on and other purposes. 59

r7 Vlavi<-mor::>,

::>

QP.,o

.9\i. ~

p

"'rhe return of the Ki.ng;

0

2h5 o

58vn.J.li.~un A. Williamt'l, :n~.~: :r::~.Qn;_e~.~Y. S2f.. A!.~~_:t:-1_q~

I!iJ?.~.?!LLa..2J~,

· (Cleveland: Vvorld Publishing Go., 191+9 J, p. 160e

59viilliam A. Bro\IJ'~l, J\mer:Lean Ji'orei rtn Assistance
(War:>h. D.c.: The Brookings 'Ti1iifft"iife·~·-'"J95·3-~T, .

_r)-:·---rJr;·-·. ·'
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only added fuel to the r:;_r·e," vrr:·ote tho
Offlc·~:

cJu1y 9 the Brit:ish. F'orcd.gn
appeared

n g1oorny 11 •

sE-~rious

t.u:t'n in

frontier from Albania.
appeared to be

On

reported that prospects

By ~ru.1·? 16 GC':n_t;n•al Marshall sent the

President an urgent merno:candum;
taken a

Pr0~sidont. 60

the~

!!The Greek sit;uation has

last. th:r.:·ee dayD. n

Mar:<hall

Those groups, it was thought,

r:~ttempting

the sei.zure of

large

sevE~ra.l

towns that could be establ:lshed as a pmver base for a

"people's republ:i.cn.61
On February 3 Ambassador Lincoln MeVEw.gh cabled from
Athens reporting rumor·s of a B:r·itish

sadoi· rnpo:r·ted that the BrJ.t.ish

rrrerc~

even t.he little they wore do:i.ng.tr62
ing

Comm:i.ssion~

withd:t"'~Iw·al

ttnot

.;Jbl€~

from

to

Greece~

!-~nep

up

The U. S~ InvcfJtigat·-

headed by Mark Eth.:cidge, cabled on FebruG·

ary 1~ that all evidence indicated an all-out effort by
the Communists to take over the cou.ntryo

On February 20

the London Embassy repo:r·ted that the Br:i:tish treasury had
recommE'mded agaj.nst any further a.ssistance to Greece

6o'l':cuman,

61I.1_2.icl.
62Jb:Ld.

s

X~~r:.~. 2l. :r~::t§...t E.lJd .H.2.P...~~-, 212.. sU~. ,
pp. 108·~109.

Po 99"

161.
because of the eli sasterouB .f:1.nanc:5 aJ. condi t:tons that now
threatened Britain herselr.63

'l'he

rn~oblEmw of tho· (~Conomic

reconstruction o.f

Greece and the solution to the Or'(-lf.!k civil war vmre rapidly
being overshA.dm,md by th•': more g.;m~~r·al problmns of E:uropenn

reeovery.6lt

63'I'ruman, . ..,..._~r:.s.
Yea "' f 'r ,. ~l a d H
•t
2.,;.;. ._:!:,,~':~;... ~-!!_· .___<?J2.£ ' .Q.'Q • £?:~ • '

p p • 99 ·~ 10 0 •

64Brown

'

loc. cit.,
-··---,
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The question of

8.:\ d.

to

fix'Bt presented to the I-'n!:-:d.dcnt 1 ~'> cabinet by the State

Department p.::1per

advocrrt.(~d

td.d to friendly countries,

includ:tng GreeGe nnd Tu:r·kr:'y ,.

1.'1~1(=!

paper recommonded a

gene rr.tl pol :Ley of Bupport. for those courrt,r1os nubscri bing
to goals and principJ.ss in line with those held by the
Un1:ted States, and wi.t.hrwld:tng aid vrhere ::;uch pr:i.neip1es

appeared at

to have

croGS·~pu.r-po::;er>.

bc~en the~

~~~,he

purpose of the

specific~

cont·a.inmont o.f C(Jmmunist

opportunity to c'.pply nuch a pol:tcy was not
:tng itself.,

Ambassador McVengh'B report on February 3, 19h7,
relevant to British intentions to

w:Lt~hdrm•r

from

Greece~

and h:ls subsequent. report on li'ebruRry 12, recommending

aid to Greece~ forced a decision upon the administration~ 2

1William Reitzel Morton A. Kaplan, Constance G.,
1

Coblenz' lflli;.!':_r;?.~ s.:t.~l!~~-~l E.2.!:~iJQ} I:..~?.hi9..Y 19Jr2.")·.l9_2?., (Vfash~
:l.ngt.on DuG.: The BrooJci.n.~:_;s Insti.t~utc 7 1911.9 , p., 110~
2r·Ial"ry S ~ '.Pruman. Years of 'I' rial and. Hone, ( Nei'l
Yo:r·k: Doubleday and Co.,: T94t;T, -·P·~ . . .99-;:--·
.
-~~-" ~.~.r·-·

., t.: ')
..
(.)..)

The Greeks needed aid and needed it quickly and
amount~>,.
'J'hn .'tl terna ti ve wtu3 the
loss C>f GreE~ce and t.hn extcnr•.:i . on of thE~ iron curtain
across the eastern ~editerranoan. If Greece were
lost s '.l.'urkey would b(~Gome ::.>n ~i.ntolerable outpost :Ln
a m~a of Communism. f>i.mi1n.·(·1.y~ if 'Purkey yielded to
Soviet demands~ tlw pofd.tion of· Greece would be
e~tremely endangered,
Jn rmbst.sn1tial

. the President reflected .. J
special U:t""gency by a repo:ct from

Gt~m:iral.

Smith, Ambc:wsador to Moscow s v1ho

st,atc:.~d hi~>

Walter Bedell

bel:Lef that

only the pror..;ence of hO ~ 000 Bri'tiGh troops had saveQ.

Greek leader·s themse1ve:.::; 'livere deeply
resignedo

depressed~

even

If aid did not come at once, it wmtLd be of

little use,,

and the mounti..ng pr·essm:'e for U.. s. assistcmce '"'ere a d:i.rtJC:t

co:nsequonce of a natural calam:i.ty;
ECONOMIC CONDI'J.liONS IN :KUIWPE:
ThE3 'Hi.rrter of 19h? was one of.' bitter sevor:L ty in
We~1tc::;rn

Europe.

A g:r·eat 1-:;nov-T whirled out ·of Russia and

stt'ltek Brita :i.n. ~ F':ranee, and much of Europe :i..n J amH:l.r.>y

3Truman, J.ea~

4I9l:£!,e·

Q-f :£r:La1 .§ill,£ H2J:£~

QE·,

_gJ!:_, ~ p. 100~

"covering them from throe to twenty feet deep with snow
which promptly froze

t•

ir~o

ice after one day of thaw".J

Britain was paralyzeda

The coal industry, long a

mainstay of the British economy and a major source of foreign exchange, was at a st:andst:L11.
the sec1ms of coal and t.he t.raf'f:i. c~
:.tmpN~sible

all but

6

Minert> could not; rGaeh

bloc~kage

made marketing

In the severa.l vmelm before flow could

be reestablished, $800,000,000 in export production had
been lostc6 The chaos of the domestic economy, plus the
,•t.

com1nitmei1ts to the dominions,

India in parti.c=ular, nmde

the maintenanee of Britain t s nav·y and 1, hOO, 000 trocips
imposs:i.ble if Br·itish living standards v.rere not to
appreci.ably lowered. 7

Additionally~ tho go'l.rr:;rnm(::,n\~ httd

c&lculated the nation's fuel needs Dnly for a
The bj.tter 'lrvinter brought severe sho:cte:1ges

caused a

~dowlng

bE:~

or

nor~nl ye~~.

fucd. i-.'h1.cb

of the economy and a comple).c of related

d:Lff:Lcultien <· 8
g:eeat blizzard forced hardship elsevrhe:re in

1

J.'hc~

Europe as well.

It j_ntensified the misery, and eonsequ.on.tly

5u. F ~ Fleming, ~th2. Q.0J.9. ~Jg: f.Ylsl It·P.. 9.I',i~.t01:n.:~~'
( Garden City, Nei'V York: Doubleday and Co~, 1961), p. hJ8.
6rb:i.d c
7J''b·'
__. _lC
...-""':l:. •
_,

_.

'1 l.>)
;: r
..

the polit.:ica1 instability o.f the Cc,ntinent in

gc~ner<.l.l.

Industrial :cecow;ry in Europe ',·.:n.t-;, begi.nn:ing to stall and
a grov·ring
mined

fer~ling

govc~:t·nment

of

hop;;des~m.e~)~~

i''.nd frustration under.,.

autho:cJty"

On February 17, l9i+'7

A-mtf:~

0 1 Hare McCormick 11x·ote in

into Eu:roj)e 1 s dile1mna nncl threvr the

bility to the American peopleo

ga1..:u1t.lE~t.

o.f responB:L""'

McCormick observed from

Every-where the preBt:mres to give up the fight, .for
freedom are almost irresistable. The fight for surv.::t 1>al is so prim:i. ti ve, the B'ubmergencc~ of the middle
eJ.H::>s so general, the indiv:tdual so helpless, the
sPm:::o of human dignit.y so blunted by inhuman trans~
fers of people, the desire for change, and the £eelci
irtg thnt any change must be for the bott(~r so overM
1rrhelming, that it in harder t.o stand fast than to
fc.d.lm.-v t.he eas:l.er path =~- tcn1ard a Communi.st dictatorship or react3.on~ .... 'I'he ext.ent to which
democratic government survives on that Continent
~lepends. on po\1 faT thin country is willing to hH1p
:1. t EiU rv:t ·,re o ';}
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HarJ::3on Baldwin f<)llovred ll:ri.ne McCormick's nrticle

in tho No\'J York 'I'irnes of }.!arch 2 by 'V'rarning,
The United States today J.ies squarely in that
stream of hi. story; :i"l~ e<=~n guide that stream or be
f3W\~pt <1''vay by :Lt < • ~. The;; Unitrs~cl. States is the key
to the destiny of tomo~row; we alone may be able
to avert. the deel:i.~"l(o of West(:n·n civ:i.l:Lzati~n, and
<:l. rrc~vers:Lon to rdh:iJ..:L.:·mt and tlv::>. Da:rk Age r:: "·· 0
·
B:c:i.t<d.n \I'Jas finished as a vm:cld

po-vmr~

Tho after ...

math of such a power vacuum, both politically and economically,

Vl<J.B

beyond the seope of most Americans.,

'rhe

d.emist~

of Britaj.n, coupled with the general economic collapse of
the econom:ies of V1lestern :E:urope? would gravely· effect.

American plans for an exp<:mding economy based on.

over:::~eas

of gross capital format:l.<:,L { J? per et:rrt, t.\·T:i.cs· ~:hat of the

lead~?rs

government
stagnate • 11
expressed

slump,.

to the dangt:.lT' of allm,v-:Lng Eu:cope to

.rhe President t s Council of Economic advisors

1

concc~rn

over the probability of serj.ous economic

'J.1he pieces of the American foreign policy puzzle

began to fall into place,.
of

cont.ainrn(~nt,

an echo of

George Frost Kennan f s concept
the~

past Br:i:t:Lsh po1icy1 caused

...•t /:.)''1
the bas i.e elc;ments of Amc:v:l.can pcU cy to comrtn"ge.
influence had t.o be

co;u:n.t;(~r·ed,

Rusf;ian

D.nd Europe had to be helped.

Both were esstmt:i.al to i\:::,e:::Lnvigm.'at;:i.ng Ameriea' s expansion 11
and establiohing the reality of an open door system through12
'1''t-, th :> ., , ·1 '
0

\

.. c

>'v01

Ct •·

The President had been advised that the United
Stat.es had been responcdble to a
of af:fairs in Western Europe.
lease~

dt~gree

:for the sad state ·

The abrupt end of lend-

the abandonment of price controls, the

tc~rm:tnat.:l.on

of UNHRA ju.n'G when reltef "VI!"as most urgent, had Cr(-;at,od a

~lo1lar

gap that the

exhc_~usted

economies of Europe <:ouJ.cl not

Acc
1 .t.•1. t·:wne
.,
..,1....l y, I''luropean

' ~
1:)l":tc.ge.

f'o11ow caut.1.<ms policies

ing bonds on a private

·bc~cause

market~

,. .

.

s1npp~ng

of the

1·mel o.ec
' 'l. U\cc..
'
1

nE~c•::ss:\.t.y

·f·
v

o

of f1.o::-l.t;,.,.

1'h0 E:xport, .. Jmport Bank

further aggravated concli tions by· 1:tmi.t:i.ng loans for goodH

to those made in the United States and shipped in U.S.
vessels~

A1so the Expo:(·t·-nimport Bank had curtailed loans

·for reconstruetion purposes in f,;H:t·ly 19Z..7 ~ 1..3
rrhe President was also awaro of the war·nings by
buEJiness lea.ders .and economists that;, without new a:td

12Will:i.am A. vvil1i<4ms, ~IT~~;. ~t'l:£Y!_;§dy Qf l~!Ileriq_g_'fl
Diplomacy, (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959),
p ~ .]-'7')
.:; •

tho~>CJ

progr•am13 'co sur-plant
be a sharp drop in

Ame1:--~1

economy in. general .. lh

curl~ ailed. s-

nlrz:;a.dy

cn.n

eX}JOrt.;:; ~

there would

employment, and the

T:r·uman lJ::J.d repoi'ted in tTa.nuary, 1911.7,

that receipts from the sale qf ftoods and

s~rvices

abroad had

recently been running ht:. a rat.e o.f about 15 b::i.11ion do11ars

a year prior to the
fj.g;u.re had

ri.f:"H:~n

.II:'

11m1· ~ - .. ".J

By ·tho first

half of 19lr7 tb:L:;

to 20.? billion dol.JarB, an amount Nhieh

exceeded by 12., 7 b:i.llion dollars

th<::~

annual r·ato · nt whid1

other countriE-)S were providing goods and serv:Lees to
About,

one~h<J.lf

us~

of the cxeess vJ'as being financed by loans

and other aids from the United Stat(~S c l6
a pattern of growth would

r~:~quire

'I'o sur.>tain such

a nevr th:r'Ust to American

rrhe Preedck:nt th.;;::cr:~fore ~:;m'b.~l..;:'kQd on. a

foreign po1:i.cy..

caxnpa:i.gn to p;:·eparc thl"J Amer:i.GD.Tl peoplt~ fo::.·· o. J'"OO't':iJ;:nt;.<:rl:.i(:cr;_

to as ninv:i go:cating our h:Lstor:ie policies" .17
Amer:i.can officials and the President wero aware o:f
a11. of the fae"tors in'V'olved with Europe' :3 economic pict:ut'e
and had planned a gradual shift in policy to deal with the

.

lhr,r•
•
vvL'l"J.. lams

9

., t:·

--- ..>Harl"'V S. Truman

PlJ~~; :.t~1§}) t. ~ .~Sli~.. 1.2!:rl5., i1.1~ ·~ -)-I2!t-'?";~. .;tl!IY:.J.ffi,
Reyna]. and
. . Hitehcock, 19LJ-f' , Po 27 ~
-..

1:..~.:1.£6[·,

16

p. 129.

1 7Willia.ms,

.

The Economic Rfmorts of the
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impending crisis&
, eel. :u~

The cri.sj.s came sooner than they expect-

On the afternoon of Fe br"'.l~;:r·::l ?1, the Briti. sh

Ambcu>~

sad or, Lord Tnverch()pGl, r·e; quested an imrned:Lat.E) appointment
wi t,h the rww Secr"etary of ~)tate. George C. JVIarshalJ..l9

~['he

Secretary v!as absont ~ 11mw-;r(2r, having J.e.ft for Princeton to
receive an honorhry Doe tor o:f

h -.J. c,.~ fJ' "''~-~ I')"'l:ll·i
'-' . -· c . .1d: c1·r.·P c• ,,
~

• • • J. -~l•

G.

......

;_,,,,,)

., C'
'·-"~

L~xNr·>

dt"!gree, and t;o deliver

('e c .r···~·a:r·y·
o·{'
<:' t,,. .
J.

1.! ·,

C).,vCJ.I.•
••.,~.(::,~

1..

20
Q

The Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, not desir-

ing to interrupt Marr::>hall f s plc:ms 1 eont.acted the. Br.ith1h

Embassy and found that Inverchapel desired to deliver to

the Secretar·y two notes conce:r.nine; B:r:·:i.tish intentions to
term:i..n&t.e a:ld to

GrEH3Ce

. Near Eastern and African

and 'l'u.:rlwy

Affairs~

b

.

Acheson arranged tltat

and John D ~ Hicken>on,

Deputy Director of European A.ffair.s, to discuss the conn
tents of the notes thoroughly o

f:)ince Hickerson had a prior

commitment, only Loy Henderson received Sic:he1~21

18

1,ruman,

J.9Jbtf.J.o'

Jj_~rg_ S?.f. 1):1.9.1 g}'}~i n2.1?.~;

2J2.&

£;Lt."' P~ 99,

P• lQQ,,

20tTOSHDh rvr. J'ones 'Jlhe Fifteen Weeks (New York:
The Viking Prqss, 1955), 'p.: .. ·7;~··~·-··-·-·-~· --·--~··'

21JbJ~~l·

1?0

'fhe notes informer:} the UnitPd Stat.on that Br:L tain
.
20
would have to pull out of Greece no later than April 1.-~
'Jlhe li'irst Secretary b:r.nadJ.y
C>j'J1 '
11o Jlr1e prol·)]
.
l
. l:..

si tuat:i.on ~

1
''S ,.E,>/'< • .L 1

C<

... ,,

•,-(f~(~.\C
f·.l·.c~
~ •·
. ..'l' __
~

-'-11(:)
l' , • ''

d '-~·.

of'

·'c}·1e

]'l)ecll'
·t·.er·..-.an(.~f..)ll
•
,
. -<
~

Sichel vmB avn:tr·e of ·the orn:i.nous rw.tu:r·e of the

messages he carried

G

~'<)

him, h<Yvrever, the notes merely

reflected a series of w:t thdravn1.1n
elsewhere

the nature of the

mn~I:i..1wd

·-·~~

~-M-

:Ln India, Bu:r·ma, nnd

that had occurred in Bx·itain' s

syst(~m

of

defense "by which Britain had fox· so long maintai.ned a

meast.lre of security :i.n the worldn. 2 3

It -vms un1:i..ke1y that

the First S!:JC:cetary had any -.i.dea that· he \·.,1fts del5.VeJ.;.:lng
note~;

that vrou1d ushex· in a nm-r era :i.n American polit:tes}

one that vwu1d catapult the

13n:i.tf~d Statt~n

:L:.1t.o th.e vneu:u.!!l

the hour handed the job of world leadership, wj.th all its
burdens and all its glory, to the United States~,2~.

Acb.eson alerted the
Commi tt.ee to prepare a

the weekend e

State~War~Navy

memor~mdum

Coordinating

of recommendations ove:c

On Monday, Fe b:r>ttary 24., Marshall presented

to the President the official copies of the notes given him
by the BritiDh Ambassaclor •. 2 5

22

'l'ruman~ I:?_§k~..§. .£f. .T.:r.J~?.:.1. .S!I.Lg_ '_tf.~~£.2.~ .212• £.t~.", P~ 100.

23Jones, .op. £it.
2

'J~:ruman, though avvaro of the

1

p. '7~

21

~·}J;L:L£1~.

5Trmnan~ Xf:-.0:-I:~. 2!2, T"';~}:I~, §Ll_q Ji.9. E£., 12.£• 5:-.JJ!."
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plight that had dictated thesd

mo~es,

was surprised that

Brita:ln had run out her Dtrlng co fast and was·provid:i.ng
so short a deadline fo~ h6r withdrawar.26

rnhe
f·n~r·.-;\cl~
r. ...,...r,.2]
.1.
·, '\J'' ee-I·l_)~'
<: x,gJ.nn:t"r:,
. ~.- .JrUct;
~ ...

,.r..,
v,ns

f'''L'J
't-} s taff'
: L .. e d. w1·c:t
:

meetings and the preparation of position papers from the

several departments.
t~he

· b.t-d.d by

Because of tho unanirriity of the viev.r

Cab:i.net the part-iculars of a policy v.rere lai.d

out wtthin t-.he .weekc

The Px·esident ·was able to clear key

recommendations with leaders in Congress, and a State
Department vmrk:Lng party prepared a detailed program of
")1'"7

action.,,(,

Strange1y enough, Marshall had ordered a. bill to be

h<~

departed for his weekend at

group 1tlhich had met to develop

·) ~~

Pr:i.neeton~ "-c

th~

G("':oc~~('~

F.,

proposals· for TvTarsha11 •.

The group included Henderson and Hickerson, Admiral Forrest
P. Shorman, Deputy Ch:i.ef of Nav·al Operations, Major General

Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations of the
War Department General Staff, and Undersecretary Acheson~29

p. 130.

p. 131b
p. 132.

1?2

The basic elements of a cout':so of HGt:ion '"'ore fornru.lated
through

tlH~

KE~ :nnan t

recommendat:\.on;, of'

s group by tho t:Lrne

Marshall rece:i.vcd Imrercha.pt-:1' s .formal note on Monday.
weHk' s wprk vms thus fox··rr1Dl:i. zer.:i. ihore rapidly

papers de_ve1oped through 'che seve:•:al
departments worldng on the project
t~he

polit:lc::J.l. nnd t.er:citor:ial

&

comm:i.tte(~S

strong:~.y

i.nt~;gr:i.ty

of

'fhe

All pol:Lcy
and several

recommended that.
GJ.~eE?C:e

and 'I'urke:v

should be mninta:i.necl and thn.t every effort should be made
to provide \\lhatevex.· aid war.-;; neeessary

"t~o

assu:ce tho deve1-

opment of those countrier-:J as democrat:Lc: states H'ith Etolmd

economies~"JO
- On March 7? the P:n::sident (:!Xam:i.nod the Greek

ques~·

t.hat procecht~·es could be initiated )1

Acheson outlined the problem.
w6uld continue their support of'

The British, he said,

G:r'ec-;c:~~-

for three ·mo:ce

months at a cost of about $B million per month.

would then have to vv:l thdraw.

They

AC':hoson reported that the

United States disapproved of the Greek gcnre:cnment f:tnd
that ·it Has shot through wj_th reaet:Lonary elementD.

He

30J orws, .QJ?.~ £t~.'' ~ p. 136o
31 walter 1:1:i.J).. 1is, TJ£. JL2I£fl?~tal £La..r.~~f~,
Viking Press~ 1951 , p. 250o
·

(NevJ

York:

'·

po:i.nted out thD.t. the

due to

\'lid<::~8pread

stl·:;-::-:c:~c-;;s

public

_;,·,,,,

of'

1'73

....
Hu::3~dan

J.;~nowlo!.JJ?;C?

propaganda vms

that the government

· was corrupt and ineff:i.C!:i.e:nt.32. Turkc~y ~ Acheson said, was
in

bE~tter

cond:ition but Soviet

p~;:•cssure

wa::; causing an

insupportable drain of manpower and· resourc<:H> for military
purpo~:>o::; .33
Forr0s~cal

fn part:i.c:u.lar vrantod to "turn to. bun:i.ncsG.

if what we are talk:Lng about is j.n reality h.olding out the

hope of people· in stricken countries that they again may
make a lj_y:Lng, and the vm.y to provide a J..ivi.ng for them
will have to be opened by business .. "31+

The general concensus of

thE~

Cabinet was that. the

public and Congr·essionri1 support would aD.(rvv.

The P:c.;o;l::;:L ...

dent appointed a committee headed by John :-3ny::kr and :Lnciud-:i.ng Patterson, Harriman 1 Acheson? and Forrestal to

out

c:.t

"lay

plan. of communications" \'llth the leaders of the

countrys
At the follm'ling Cabinet meElting on Monday, March 10,

the President announced that. he would.make

11

a very

expli~

cit; statement on 'l'urkey and G:rE"Jeeen on Wednesday, March 12.35

32Mi11is, £~· s:.t~:.", p. 251~

33Ibid.

35l£..=h£~

3hibJ-..9~~, PP~ 251-·252
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AMft~ICAN

ATtiTUDES

'fhe seeond world Har and the development of ai:r.
pow·er had v.wakened the j\meJ'ican. people to the fact that

the United States v1as

IJ.O

longer :iumn:me to attaelc,.

Pearl

Harbor and other incidont.s fol':'\.!Cd a reali2;ation that
ous conditions

an)I1·JherE~

seri~

in the vrorld ultimately effected

the peace and security of the Amed.cc:tn people.,

1,he :i.dna

that political isolation from Europe and As:ia was posE>ible
·was no longer quite as prevalent.)6

Gene:cally, Americans f'el t. that the United Nat :ions

\'muld be capable of solving any major prob1emso
\vR:r·tirne efforts in coopE.lrat:ion,

Lend~ALease,

The great

and rehabil:l.-

no cotlfirmed acceptance of its continuing :cesponsibil:i.ties
on a scalG COlmnensurat.e -w'i.th the nae:do u37

Popular Araerican

support of the UN was basically an escape from the respon.·~

s:i.bilities of leadership which hn.d been thrust upon the
United States.

American~:.'

wnre qtd.c:k to perceive the poten.,.

tial strengths of the United Nations but slow to recognize

36staff, 1'he Internationc:1J Studies Group of the
Brookings Institute, ~1~.12l: .EJ:.Q.btEl!ll:?.. 2I Q.~S~ f ..<21::rlill.l
?c:.ti:£:'L O!ashi.ngton, D.c., 19~.9T, p. 20~
37c.Tones, QQ• .Q.t1~Q' p. 9.

175
.l t~) 11mit.at1ons"

In

lv~-,1 . 1' Ild J~f>":''·l·; ·tv_
;~~~
J
,t-

,.

to

}_

•

~

,

11

... (.'A,

fOI

, .. -

short~

Amor·.ico:n attitudes lagged

'rbe det":dre of.' tho President, then}

\'leW

f3car·G h~)Jl out of the Ame:r·:tean people 11 by focusing

attention on the mc;:mace of vmrld. Communism which threatened

to end freedom

') ()

C:1Veryt"lher>(~. _;

.l

More practical considerations also had to be faced
:l.n irdt:i.ati.ng: r1. program of nuch broad

'I'he area of

BCOpf,;; ,.

th~~

pol:tcy ehoices appeared to have been 11m:Lted by
:i.ng nat:i.onal debt.

stagger···

Any pl"'OposaJ.s ·wouJ.d have to be w~~:lghed

1
·
t · t ;ne
'
bt
•
aga:tns
c1e
· · o i'' ~P"'• 2~ 7 )r ,_o:t, ] ..•] :ton.

Tt
..~

~as·
h,

?Ql~v

••.,, ...

0 ~ ·C~or1~~oas
t·tl
,J. r.::\V
~-c.:,lJ ........ ot..

w·ov.1d not be reeept1 ve to major expendi.turc~s for foreign

poli. oy propoDal~:; .ll-0
t;r:_<(~·~;·.i
~-~- n,_,.

v,rr·~•. t~ ·t·,·l1E'l

4
(t, ... ,"'fl- {/~·l~n
,;";
'· · •;;. ....

~·l··o
•

l·Je~=:t·,
-~

1?ruman therefore felt:. that the
1
t.ocLt.
·t·:l)
Pl"J·l.'l
11-'"
-·
,
~ ··--'-<''

1
}1"'J.{fh'
Arne·s·><'"J.C'11l
. ..:; _ b ' v'("'1
~"'
. . ~- J. • • c-.

Yl>'1""
..,
t'"'-·'->-L .•·1_I..;

..,,....,..... of'
·'·

£"~
. ,,-, c.,_ :,:,

strengthen support for the policy

f:;care t

"-~''-r'o")f'o'o"l'·'
....
.lx.·l.-·····-·•·

-l.,1."~'t:""l""s.,.,
'-'·-:>,_,.I .. o 7

~1ich

1

-..<:<_\l',
'-'

T\Jt.:~,··~
H c ..>•• I..

-")?'•
··:.
,..

"'l~'t'
..
J- u

the President had

pu:csued. hl
JVIoB t Amer:i.ec:ms tended to vi<-)1'1 foreign aid as phi1an-

t-hrop:Lc..

Some favored aid cmly \·ihere ass:i.Btance \'las obvi··

ously noeded but:, moGt vvere opposed to further 11 rH:1ndouts".
}

3 L J on€~ L> , 21! o

~~V!ct~_t,ej::

};;.2&2.~·13.t:".~

£i;.t.• ~

LaFeber,

A~~~.~J.S,.£, E.~;'l.~lil £~n~11j)-J- Qol.1.1';LQ£,

Hev-1 York: John Vh.lc!y and Sons, 19Y7 , p. J.~).

40Reitzel, Kaplan,
l.::l .'\. .•

p • 10 •
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'''1'
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reports of maladministered funds.
argument for foreign aid

t" ·•··l.-t 8 ('.1.1

\Yy·
....

Perhaps the decisive
in mDr·kets a.broad.

11'/HS in'Gcn:·e~)t

and the orders for indu::;t:d.al and agd.eult;u:ca:L p:r:·odt!..Ctt;,

that any ·largE~ aid ope:c&tion wou.ld bri.ng. h2

REQUESTING THE COMMITMENT
1'ho pol:icy had been developed with remarkable
conside~ing

the implications.

The President and his Cabinet

had examined the issues thoroughly and
general forms of action

~.ifY:~ed

identified~

alter~atives

and the

The Presidc:mt wo.s novv

prepared to seek the support of Congresso

Un:i.tecl Statt.':!s

sat in joint

sage by th~~ President h3
&

nes~d6.n

to hea:t '-'·

~1;>::ci2J. !.'J.:::,2'~-.

~Chere vms an abn.o:c·mal ::;.mount of

acti v:Lty and confusion in thE-1 Chamber as ex-.. congressmen,

senators, guests, and a multitude of funct:i.onaries filled
the hall..

'l'he Presj.. derrt r s wife, along with h:i s staff and

the wives of the Cab:i.net wer-e seated at the west end of
tl1E1

Cl'l''FJ1V:>Y'
,, t"l.. .. l. ·~ v ·'·

(I

l)J.

At 12:45, the Speaker called the session to order.
The President rpro temporet of the Senate arui members of
.

. .

~~-\.1.~-...,...,.,.-·-·-·o.-------

h2Har·ry B. Price, 'I'h0} Max·shall Plan and Its Meantr!fi, (Ithaca f New York: c·oi:i:i'eJ:l.~-Oniv·: Press -;-I955T, ~p·;-5.

r3J ones~

1

hhllli·

QJ!·

.9~·, p o 17.

1?'7
the Senate entered.

Tl1e f)pF;aker n.nd the President

tempore)' then appointed three

of s:tx to enco1"t the

pro

C;-)ach to a committee

momboj_~·s

P:ce~d.dent

9

of the United :::t.ates into

the Chmnber .'+-5
The prayers which opEmed the joint session appoDx-::;d

to have anticipated the nature of the message to be delivoredo

tto, let the nations be glnd and Bing for

chanted Rev. James Shera, the House ChaplainQ

joyn,
The Rev.

Peter Marshall, Chaplain of the Senate intoned, "Wtth th.y

blessing upon us, we need not fear decisions? nor hesitate

to actn.h6
At precisely one o ~ elock ~ lWr. 'rruman, sombePly
., l .Lll
.• '
d ..I ,-~"'"'
C•.h>E.C.

'='
o.

:J. "l' ·l.(
Lc.t

b"ll
. 'C.e.

<"·
.'f.. ·'"(,
,;:,U

') '( d 1:.!.,.
' .! "'
a_L

~

the Chamber amid::;-t crackling app1tmse ,.

the Greek eha.rge d' affa:i.rs) Pa.u1

Lor·d

Tnv~?rei':hpul,

Economou~-Gour-as

rest of the diplomatic corps rose to give him a
come.

The Soviet Ambassador,

Nikol~i V~

and the
11/etrm 'ltJOl<·

Novikoff, hur-

riedly recalled to Moscow~ was conspicuously absent.47
ThEl President took h:i.s position at the Clerk r s roB•r

trum) opened hir> black

Joor>e~--leaf

speech, drank J:.talf a glar::::;; of'

folder containing his

water~

and began to reacL
.

I

L"

+)

;r ono~~ ~ .QJ2.• .ci.!!.. ~

l~6

,

1
'

p. 18.

America~ s

(March 24. 3 19'i7'T}~ p •. 2h.
h?J:b:i.d.

J
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For JJ5 minutes Truman vu ~j\j'(~!xw(.'lit(J[:one spelled out the new
and challenp;:Lng deelsi.oni3 of h:l.:~·, o.dndnistrat:i on" hB
'I'he President's r::ace was a somber and slow 120 words

a

minu:tc s and the text 1 t

::~o1f

,;J,ppea:ced

disjointE~d.

The

latter problem perhaps stemmed from the fact that no less

than four advisors asG:i.nt.ed Truro an in framirig ·the message.
Dean Acheson, Clark

Cli.f.t'o~cd,

General Eisenhmvor·, and

George Marshall had all labored on the speech,. L~9

rr•ruman

himself had alt,ered the o:ci.ginal draft at the last m:Lnute,

since he

f<~lt

it was "too

half·~}1(;')C:J.l''tedt 1 ~

word Hshou.ld 11 to "1m.1stn in
put

it~

1:;ev~n'al

cl·wrtgc~d

the

places because, as he

"I vu:.mted no hedging in this

tyranny.

He

sp(~eeh,.

It had to be clear and free of

'rhi.s v11·as

hc~it~tion

and

double talk.t~50
'rhe large audience sat
appE~ar~ecl

to sense

~that

tl1e

1
'

avmd and silent 11 ahd

l~rE~sj.d.erLt

rr1 rnessa.ge

·hc~ra.J..ded

~=t

ne'l"i. era in the foreign 1'E':l<1tions of the Un:L ted States.
Only upon t.hree occaniom.:; was Truman vs speech interrupted
by applause; only once was the applause enthusiastic.51

hB

11

Turn1nP.' Point; in History, 11 Th~:. L1.~-'1

nqJ?E.2I.t~., ·-nEii~cK' 2h, 1947'Y,
1+9Ibid

r. 5.

6

50 Tx·uman'' x~ a l~§. 9.1: 1.~i<i1. ill1Q.
p. 23.

51~-~. ·--"~--·'

11

lLQ.P_I?_ ~

Q.P... 9 it.,. ' p • 10 5 ~

America's Date Vl:i.th Destiny~ 11 op. f_i t_.
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The crov.rd did not cl:i.spJnY

''pi\1:-t.J.:[:~ai:lship.

emotionally or chauvinistically u

It did not respond

l·Tost of those present

seemed caught up in the spirit observed by one of the
journalists present:
history~

'' ••• if thjs be a turning point in

as it may vrell

he~

we

~'~hould

prefer·

:i.t~

to be taken

in a somber reluctant silence than a' whooped-up mood of
hysterical emotionalism."52
In less than tvmnty

minutes~

Mr ~ 'rruman presented

He stated that the United States must grant

his case.

*~hOO ~ 000,000

in ec:onomic and rn:llitary assistance to Greece

and Turkey to bolste):' those two c:ountries

aga:l.m>t~

Communi.Gt

The President said that .to fail to do so wm1ld

pressure.

•rrurnan outlined the problems faced by the two count:d.e.s nnd
·eoncluded:
It is necessary only to glance at 8 map to realize
that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation
are of grave importance in a much wider situation.
If Greece should·fal1 under the control of an armed
mino.rity, the effect upof! its neighbor,. Turkey, would
be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder
might v.rell spread throughout the entire J.\1iddle East.
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those
countries in Europe wl1ose peoples are struggling
against grave difficulties to maintain their free~
dams and their independence while they repair the
· damages of war. Collapse of free institutio~s and

52
p •. 11

&

11
'"••·•·-··~·-·~··-·n)

'1'urning Point in History, 11 21?.·

.9J~~c
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for them but :for tbc; vwr1d.. Discouragement and
possibly failure would quickly be the lot of ·neighboring peoples strivirtg to maintain their indei)enclencE;.
Should "I,'.'C f.:.t.il to aid Greece and 'l'urkey·
~n this fateful hour 1 the effect will be far reaching to t;lw VJest aE> ~;,re 11 as to the Er;a)t. 1/lE:} must
take immediate and r·o ~:-.oJ.u.tc net. ton.:::>
The President emphasized
willing and able to provide

"no other nation is

th8t~

support to the Greek

nec.:e::G~3ary

government~n5h
rrruman, at this point in his address' had said

nothing the.t nev-.rs leaks fJ.nd background :information
tributed to the press had not led his audience to

d:i.s-~
expect~

'l'his phase of hJ.s speech proved bu.t. a prologue for tbe

ni am J'u11y av.rare of the hr\)<Jd ::i.mpl:Lc:D.thu·:~ :i_n\r . ~,Jve:-l
if the United States extends assistan~e tc Greec~ and

'I'urke·y
· n -~-tle
I)'''C''';l' 'lr.··nt 1~r·.,,,t 1' r1ll8•d.
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P
States :i.s the creat;Jon of' condit:Lor1s in which we and
other na.tions will be ab1e to work out a way of J.ife.
free from coercion.~. We shall not realize our objectives, hm,rever, unle~~s ir.J"e ai"e willing to help free
people to m.aintain their :i.nst:i.tutions and the :Lr !W.tional.
integrity against c:.1.ggressiv-ccJ rnovements that seek to
impose upon them totalitarian regime~;. This i::: no
more than a frank recognition that totalitari~n regimes
:i.mpo~:>r~d on fr(~e peoples, by direct or :LncJirect ap:gres-·
sion, undermine the foundations of internat:Lonal~peace
ar1t:J. 1.1P'J·1r'""
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to Greece a.nd 'l'urkey, 11
1947) pp. 322-324.
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Vital Speeches,
(March 15
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PointJnr; to tbe

choicE.~

N\<~t.·,

'

'

thi::!.t:.

11

3.s too often not. <?. ·fl~ee onE.

nc::~arly

ovory nation must

the President then

if!

underlined the pb:i.losop1Yy bohincl lns policy.

I believe that it must be th0 policy of the United

to \..">llP'l"'Ort
f'y•rC\r.>
1')8"(1}'1 1J. '"(~
.
../
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tion by armed rninor:i t:J(~S or by
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pren~'>t:tre~3.

I be1:l.ove that we must ass:i.~·>t free peoples to l'm:r·k
ou't their ovm desti.nies in.. their ov..rn way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through
.economic and .f:i.nane:t.a1 aid wh:t.ch is essential to
economJe stabiJ.:lt.y and orderly pol:i tical process .•
M:r .. •rruman concluded by saying:
Th~ s$eds of totalitarian regirn~s are nurtured by
. misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil
soil of poverty and sGrife. They rea~h t~eir ntll

groNth 1/Jhen the hope o.f a peo·oJ.c-: fen:' a
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people::..; of the ~o..rorlcl look to us .for sup~)o.r·t. :.i.n rrw:Ln·"
taining thGir freedom~). If v.re falter 5.n our 1e:adc:.~X''"·
ship, wo mc:.~y endanger the peace of the l'<'o:r·1d o • • • and
vm ~>hal}l' , .., surely endanp:er thEJ w·elfa:ce of our m-m
nation. :J 1
·
-~

Oi.--,her parts· of T·rumnn t s message

estab1i~>hed

clearly

that the administration intended to be:

Explicit about itt> resistance to Soviet expansion,
intended to produce a favorable psychological rc-?.aetion
in Europe, and worked to emphasize that it was proits re~:wurces to tbe containment of
l)ared to commit
,
Cornmunism •.5o
c~

5f~n.-e:t· t .ze 1 , K·.ap1 an, ano., c o·bJ.enz., 2J2.·

··
9J.;.....i;:.~,

111 ~
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The messBgo clearly fJrnpht.'id·i:;;ed that economic

meas·~

ures vvere to be given pr:tmaey, fo11ovmd closely by poli t-~
ical measures, VI:i.th lnLU.tnry me;?tnB decidedly subordinate. 59

vn1ile the message sought to bypass the channels of
the United Nations, it did not :i..r;nore itB

President

InEH'(:;ly

c~xh:tence.

stat-,ed thr.:tt. the cituati.cm wa::>

and roquired immediate

The

11 tl J'' o· e~· '1 •· 11
..

L"~ .J..l..r

He pointed out thE;t thH

ac:tion~

U.N. and its related organizations were not in a position
to "extend b.elp of the kind that

i[3

required o n60

As was customary \'then a Presid.fmt conclt:tdes a mei>..
sa.ge to Congx"ess, the audience rose, appJ;:J.uded 1 and remained

standing while the President and his cabinet left the Cham·-·
ber~

observed:
The Pres:ldent ~' s pr-ogram, and his statt.;m{~nt of it-rhat
b:c?me ~c~1ow17- a~~ ~~~:- ."~~'ruman Doctril:~:. .,.b6]~ught a
dec1dedly m1xea xcact~on from Cong1e~o.
REACTION 'l'O '.rHE MESD.AGE

As was to be

expected~

.the most vocal and extreme

criticism abroad came from the Soviet Union) its .satellites,

1)9p
,.· t ,.. ::. "1
•
.d.<;; .L .•<tC .. ,
(::.,.... _ .

K;:.rplan, · and Goblenz, Q.E. f:.,).t.•. , p. 111 ~

'

A'JtncL

61Arthur H~ Vandenber[r,, J.r ~. 'fhe Pr:i.vatE-} Pa:Ders of

!2.,~2lst9J::: y~~l!.9:~::..~~~n:.~n~., (Boston: · Houton ~1:i.1'riri:~-··co.

p. Jh:L

,-i 952l", ·~·

and the vrorld t s Communist

charged that the

PresideD~

partir:~ r:;.

was

Co1lecti ve1y, they

dir~ctini

U.S. policy

aga:i.nst trctemocrat:i.c elemE::nt;:~ in t.he Med:i.terranoan. 11 62

In

Britain~

however, the Doctrine received the

approval of both the Labor

Govern~ont

and the Conservation

cal of thE.! "ant:i_ ... Hu~lsian and impe:r·ia1iE>t:i.e 11 overtones of
the addrer.;s"

Thi.s sent:Lmcnt p:ceva:i.lod among 1:hird :Worce

elements :i.n both Europe 2.ncl Amf-.H"lcc-J.
cated neutral:i.sm between the t.wo

b

~poles

'rhese

eh~ments

advo.,

of pcrvh"lr, and inter"-

preted any policy of firrnnes13 tovmrd the Soviet Union as
playing :into the hands of the Arm-;riGan war pa:r·ty. 63

shock.

Libm:·als and 1eft.:i.r;ts c1:U.i1.iked

th~: :Lc=·n~;rLsge,.

America to a crusade aga:tnst Communism, to a

S):ti·r-Jt ,.

twentietb-~

century Mettern:iclc system , 1;6h

c

At home, the press placed tho President'n message
on a par with Precd.dent Nonroe t s vrar·ni.ng to Europe in
62
W:illiam A. Brovm, f\ltl.~!_!.i..Q~~-.!_~ ~~.QJ:f).i€;!1 At->fd!3tance,
(Wash~, DoC.: Brookings In::~titute, 195JT, ·:r.~nnr:--~q·---~--

63I,l_;_:i.;i"
6hw:tl.li.am G. Carloton Trw Rev·olut:i.on of American
(Nevl York: n~ncforri Hou~2~e-,~--J..95hT:· p-:-···~r~r:---

Y..s~~JJ~I! M.ts:.J~)

.-.). 65
1.()0-2?

of the President's words might jeopardize the Moscow
Conference v.rhere

Secr(~tar·y

of f3tnt.e Georgt:1 C. Marshall sat

in negotiations with the Kremlin.66
Most.of the news media felt that Truman was simply
enunciating in resoltite terms a policy which had been introduced more than a year before by ihen Secretary of State

Byrneso

On February

1946, the Secretary had proclaimed

2~,

"We cannot allovv aggress:ton to be accompl:Lshed by coercion
or p:cossure ~ or by subterfuges suc;h as political j_nfilt.ra.,.

tion. It

Byx·nes had decla.red ·that the tJn:i.ted

~)ttites

had to

veto or no veto~67

bt~en

not already

of the world
the same

t

p

extended to othf:H' nations :tn 'J'rJ.r:J.ow:>

prJ.rt.::-~

It.. was fc:'llt. the 'Truman Doe trine-)' t'>l'ould serve

control purposes' a::> the previous aid to Br:i.ttdn,

France, and several other countries, including Greece$68
'l'he genef•al opinion

't'la/::3

that :i. t was :Lmporta.nt that the

dition of aggression that

~fflicts

n con-

the world" should be

65
'""""""·····---,.t

6(;.,.,

'd

:~:.!?.L. ~o

67Ernost K. Lindley; "\· lhat the President's SpeE~ch
1

Mear.ts,

11

J:~~-~~!.!fe~,

(Hareh ~.:L~-, 1911.?), p. 31~ ·

1~:s5

out.l:i.ned bluntly by the .1L;Udt:t' of·
had

11

:t1h0

only nation '"hich

the means t.o assure t:bat th:t::> aggression ::i.G halted

and repelled. 11 69

While· t;he press and news media almost OVElrwhelrrd.ngly
supported t.he President' 0 polit;y·, there w-ere those who
acc<:;pted hitl message with reservat;:t.ons

$

J ;;.unc s Byrnes felt that the admin:i.st:eat1on t'las .not

wise in seeking UoN. support, and in not identifying
American action in. Greece as a Hflat and direct coi.mter
to Communist expansion. 11
unw·i~>e

Byrnes also felt that Truman v\las

in seeking unilateral act:i..on before a repoi·t had

been received from the joint United Na,t.ions commission on
Gree c~::J. 7°

Senator Vandenberg had two mt1jor ob,jcc 1, :ions.

as

11

cr:1.ses diplomacy 11 •

'I'Ll~

Vandenberg felt that a "continuing

pol:i.cy developed through continuing consultation with the
Congress would largely obviate the necessity for ••
cr:i.s:i.s method.u71

11

&

the

But, 11 Vandenberg not<-:d, "'l>Te confront

a condition and not a thoory. P72

'I'he Senator observed:

69u. ndley, J.q_Q,• £.t~ .
7°Mil1:ts 1 :fh£ f2£t.t~?J!.§:..~;, fJ.t. ~:.;.i;e~, .Q.P..• .91:.~··, p ~ 262,
7lvandenber·g) ~.Tr ,

72rt?J:..~l·

1

~12.· gA,~((~. , p" 34.0$

When the Presidc:rd~ <:l,~;;ks u.:.o to f declare vr<:n·' there
usually is nothin~ left except to 'declare war'. In
tlw prer-;ent instancn, the overriding fact is that the
President has made a long del~yed statemant regarding
Commun1.sm. on-the~m::.rceb wh:Lch mu3t be supported if
there is any hope of ever impressing Moscow with the
necessity of paying any soFL of peaceful attention
to us whatever·~··· I still think there is a chance
for Ivloscm'l and Wasl:dnp;ton to ~live and lEd:i live'
if we make it immutabiy pla~n that we are the lineal
descE:mdants o:f' tho::>c:: r"ngged o.ld p:toneers whose .flag
bore the motto 'Don~ t, rrread on, Me' " •• ~ Our on1y
choice is the leoser of evils~73
Vandenberg's other major objection was based upon

tho belief that the program outlined by Truman mado no
mf.mtlon of bringing the· program 1vithin the United Nations
Charter$

U~No

The

l~eeeived

had not.

regarding the new aid plan.

"The

any advanced notice

Administ~ati6n

made a

wrote~?h

Secret,ary o.f Labor Sehwel1enba.ch ht:,d
:i.ngs of a political nature

0

~3orw::. m:i.r:J[j;j.v •.•

Schvrellenbach felt that the

anti-British elements in the United States might charge

that Americ:a was again npulling British chestnuts out of
the fire .. "

"Jl'
r)

OthE!l'•

c~r:Ltics'

tnclud:Lng some newly elected

RE~pubo•o

li(;an senat.or·f.>, hold that the Doctr:tne meant unlimited

73vance:n.oerg,
l .,
74Jb}..£.

7 5rrruman, !£.Ql:fl
p. lOl.t.

gf Tr:i;~1

£lr.LS..H6£~, .212. Qit. ,

expendi turcs and that the thi1Eec.1 States was

11

hailing out"

the fail.m."'es of t;.he soe:J..:.il'~ :::;t Br·:L t:i sh Labor Government. ? 6
Still other critics feJ.t that the American policy meant

interfort:mce in the :i.nt:.ernal affa5.-r·s of' other states o
'rhese critics also thOU.J?;ht that., i.n the particular cases
of Greeca and Turkey, the policy also meant support for
reactionary governments.

They charged that the United

States was "being be[.";lliletP 1 into supporting B:ri tish

:lmpc:r:L~·

alism in the Middle East or, worse, was launching "oil
imperlal:i.smn on its mm.

The end rHsult, as these cr:l.t.ics

vie"md. ·the poli.cy, 1rm.s that the ''\fm~ld v'Tou1d be d:i.vided

into tvvo ax·med cumps ~· :i.ncv:U:.ably lo<?ld:i.ng to wa:r- ~ '7'7
GONGH.":~S.SIONAL
t,() I·1.·1'P
rn<~a~~~e
P .L":t.'o~.·
.L.
~J
.,.. Q ,:.> <~l t~::) .,.,

+o
v

ACTION

C'1 0ll"ME~q~
C:.)J.. •.. ,_. •~'

t')
J.L 0\,.•

attempted 'i::;o rally Congres:.-:;ional support for his intended

policy.

On February 27 he had held a top-level meeting

with key Congressional leaders at the White House.

Senator

Vandenberg, Speaker Joe lllcu~t.in, Representative Sam Rayburn,
'fhe House MinorJ.t.y :Leader, Charles

A~

Eaton, Cha:i.rman of

the House Committee on Fon:dgn Affairs, Senator Style::1
Bridges~

Gh,!J.:trma:n of the Senate Appropriat:tons Cornm:i.tt.ee,

Senator Tom Connalli, of the Senate Foreign Relations

76ve.ndenberg,

Jr.~ .91?.· s:JJ.:..,

77Brovm, S!J~~ .cit:,~, p. 127.

p. 3hlo

Comm:t ttee, and He pre Gt~nt<"ttl:v& ·. ~~bJ Bloom of tho House
Foreign Affairs Committee were all present.

Representa-

ti.ve John Tabor, Chairrnan of the House Appropriations
Comnittee wari absent but wAs later appraised·of the con-

ference at a special WhitA House meeting in the afternoone
George Marshall had br:l..E::fed. thiu group on the problems
fronting Greece and

Tur~ey,

eon·~

and upoh the consequences inher-

ent in any failure of their governments67S
Marshall's briefing of the representatives from Capitol Hill-had encountered devisivo opposition and Dean
Acheson had risen to the occasion, sutc&ssTully parried
each inquiry, and concluded by pointing out th::lt the

but were
.:, >,~ -·
~~
-~)~,.,
v u.
v •;;

r.1
~

\)Y.'O-

to protoct t.h<:! secur5.ty of tbc 1hl.:i."Ged

int(~nded

p C.i f. l:~e
.. - v'~ d ()111

.;.I. t

s·- (-.".•·!_.L:': •

1·· ~-·v 1•'.• u.
!> c•
'·')

h

~. C
"' (;' •{I•
}\
~. .0 ~-'

•·•
'·'

-j d. ~
o,..,.....

~. '· e ··~
"') .(,-1·1·;
C• ~d.• -· .c

of build:i.ng our ovm secur:l ty and safeguard:lng freedom by
strengthening free peoples HgalnBt Commun:i.nt aggression and
subYersion~

All present were imprGsBed by Acheson 1 s

cacy of action,.
none~

The PrQ;s:i.d(;;nt, inviting c:omment,

that the P:r;;.:s:ident hnd

~3(;J.ected

This was the~ group

to promote nupport for the

•:>

new approach to United States fore:i.gn policyo
•

r~wei VE~d

r't·Jot one registered opposition, not one asked tri-vial

qu.:::t;t:lons or raised side is[mes. n79

...

advo~

-~--, .,.,.._.,_,,_.........,._._...-~......,

••• __,.,.,.n
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The President's prciS16m.in getting Congressional
suppo:r·t for his policy

wa~>

compJ i. c~Hted by the fact that.

Congress was no longer controlJed by the Democratic party.
Truman was relying heavily upon tho help of bi-partisan
foreign affairs supporters such as Senator Vandenberg and
Congressman Eaton.so
rrruman hoped thHt enabLi.ng legislation would be

passed before March 31? but that hope vms not realized.
Congress debated the bill "thoroughly and conscientiously."~l
While Congress had originally set March 31 as a deadline to pass ligislation to Dnplement the President's
rEJquest, 82 V~:mdenbE-:.rg and. the others that a:t;·t.e:nd(~o. t:b0

himself included an arq(1ndment to the

1egi!::~1nt:i.t''Jll

g:Lvint,: t;h(;,

Urdte:id Nations power to suspend the aid program if it found

it unwise or ·unnecessary.83

While debate on this issue

delayed the passage of the legislation, it also overcame

objections to

by~pasBing

the UoN c and thereby gained su.pport

for the measure.~4

82

-~--·--'

"Amertcats Date With Destiny,n

~L9c.•

cit.
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Still~ there were~thoi~ Jlke Senator Walter Fe
'~o~~e
C.rc
.L (',-

'

+hn
v
"" Gaorg1'a
.H:.,. :) <

.i,

Do·11~c-~t
,:;! . C
.f. ""

'1•.r~tr.l
I •

presenting the problem on a cr:i t3'j s

r·esent·.e·c:l
-•-

+vI.1.1q
'c .Br•1"tJ~!)·1-1
_,

George reserved

basis~

tho right to bring to the floor a proposal to amend the
proposed bill to post pons :implementation fo:r· sixty days, in
order to perm:Lt the U~fL time to ae:t/~:5
Vandenberg hEld e..lready advi:x'ld the Pr·esident before

the March 12 address thats if the President was to sell
Americ:ans on the plan of action, the policy must be pro·,.,.
mated on the premise (yf a global Communist threat, not upon.
the basis of humanitarian ideals. 86

The Senator had writ.ten

a colleague at the time: .
The question of Gr<::::..:::ce c:annc;t bG :L::oJ Htfd. <'-.ly :'i.t~:;c·l:L
1 ••·
1 ., ,,,.,,r· 1 ·~
1 ···~·t·J . !·y·
On t"1e
cr'l"J''''"l:l-ry
-i·t·, .!"'
'-~~n·ll-'o····
·-·•·
L
•• ..., .. L<
v...
~
·'·
..L ,) T)Y'()
.t·
uv ••. •
,,,
.} I.l, .1 .t. '·
, .1.:. ·i·.d I. •.::.
n •...
.... \1.....
wide clar.:;h between Eastern Commtud.sm .:4.:,1d. \Vx:,t_;·(~t:H·n
.L

clen1ocr·ae:y; ar1d. i·t rnc:ty ea.~1i,]~Y bo ~t,lle t:b.l11g;
v·.,,,.,v
i'""tei'u·l
j ..·equl're·s l'S t·c) 1mal,.<-)
. . . \sc····~le·•
..
\:,...J,J
.r:-4
... ;:•r··d
.. 1-...
:i. ng deeisions. L7
.

~

~t.

~

.t

-~-

'"l

'

V.rmdonberg 1-rould promote that theme i.n his

\·r~~ricl.i
-~~··,.,.,.
.. ~.. -r·r:,-:•r··h.·~·
_,(.J,.J,
. . . . . . t..~~-~·.1

mis~3ionary

efforts with his other colleagues.

The G;:"eece-'I'ur1<:ey debate continued into AprLL
Attacks came principally from the left-wing Democratic
faction and the R.epuhlicc:m far right

element~;;.

Senator

Pepper of Florida and Senator Glenn rfaylor of Idaho wcmted

8

5Millis,

:f.h~ ~~9X:;J~~£.§!.~l P. 1§..!:i~§., !~~· c~~·'

86Hmnmond, 9.12.·
'

.9.Lt~.· ~ p. 22.

<

8-?vandenberg, ,Jr., QR·

.SLt·,

p. 3h0*

p. 261.
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the program channelE!d th((';qJgh the United Nation::>.

Repub·--

li.can Senators V.Jherry, Brooks, <Jnd l'Jl:alone cha.rged that the
program would load to eit.her v·na- or bankruptcy.

The formet·

Vice President, Henry WallAce toured Europe attacking the

billb~g

Senators Taft and Byrd and others opposed sending

military adv:l.sors on the grounds that such aid would be
"tantamm.tnt to dom:i.n ati.ng tho::;e countrietJ. u89
Speakei. . of the House Joseph 1H. Mart:i.n stated:

'rhe President's recommendation cal:J_s for a radical departure from our traditional Americ~n foreign
policy~
'rhere is no question but what. the request
calls for heavier burdens upon the American people
and raises new problems o.f :far reaching import which
will greably r,lf'feet the future o.f Amertea and the
world •• 09
The jsolatiohists were hitter.

Representative

gooders won't feel right until they have us all broko.rt
Repre sentati.ve Alvin 0 t Konsk:i. of iiJisconsin was acrid in

his comments:
We are i'ollov.r:ing the same path of stupidity that
our national leade~ship has followed for the pas~
fifte0n years in international affairs •••• first we
give $650,000,000 to Commftnist Yugoslavia to strengthen
Con~unism in the Balkans, and now our President asks

R8vnnclenberg,

J·r.,

QE· .c.:..?.-.!.·

f~9Louis

9

P~ 351.

t!. Koenig, :£.~~. TnJ_JA_a_l}. A..c:1L!!i.Dllixat~i~Q.n, 11.2.
9..Ll.2.. Pl:§ctic,:.~,, (\:'lashington Square, Nc~w York:
NewYork University Press, 1956), p. 301.

P~J.:n<;:i.f:l~~l

90L:i.nclley, 22~

.£2:.!::·,

p .. 2J.
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us to pour in hundrcd.9 of milliohs in order to stop
that 1rrh:i. ch \ve ourse l VG!S created. 91

. Senator Styles Bridges uummed up the view of the Congres·siona1 economizers with a terse five words:

trit knocks

budget p1am3 askew .. tt92

1\mbar:;Gador to

Gre~;ce I<~lacVoagh

and tho Turkish

saclor Edwin C. Wilson, along vrit!1- Paul Po:r·ter

or

Amba~3 ...

the UoN.

spec:l.al mission v.rere recalled to Washington to assist.
the Congressional hearing~> on the hill e 93
with Acheson, ForrestaJ, and Patt,erson.

~rith

'rhey were t~:~amed

The latter

~chree

appeared be:fore the Senate Fo:cc::d.gn He1ations Comrnit;tee on
~~arch

12,

Acheson f:ielded questions in a most inten-

whE.~rc~

sive discussion.94

colleague::;;:
'I'he Jlrnsident ts message~ faces facts and. so must
Congre~3s.
'l'he indepondence of Greece and 'rurkey
must be preserved, not only for their· o1-'m sako but

also ih defense of peace and security for all of us.
In sueh a. critical moment the President~ c> han dE> must,
be uph0ld. Any other course would be dangerously
misunder~.>tood.
But Congress must carefully determine
the methods and explbre the details in so momentoun
a departure from our previous policies.
'l'he :i.nm1edia.te pr·oblcm may be treated by i t~wJf.
But i.t. :i.s vitally important also to frankly vm:Lg;h :i.t

91Lind1ey, loc.
92

n:.tsl·

93Truman, YeQf::~3
9l.p.~··ll.
"'ll.
J. s

'

9.£ !!.l£~1.

§::. £~.12§., QJ.?.• .9.i,_~., p •. 107 e
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·ai"s

.for the future. vie
,;}t- o{_:i<i~3 \vi.th Commun:i.sm on
many fronts. T:le shc-u1d evo1 ve a total poJ.:i--cy. It
must clearly- avo:td itnperial:l.~;m~ It must primarily
consult American w·e:Li'a. re. It must keep faith with
the pledges to the charter of the United Nations
which v·l<:! have te:1.ken. ~ •• The~ olain truth j_~, that
Soviet~American relationship~ are at the core of
this whole r)roblem.
,, . , Now·.• j_f evc0r,
we rnu.st sav
!
0''
J
1
vrhat we mean and nH?<'ln :vhat vH:: say.;; J
_

W:ltr.t the backing of Vandt:lnherg and ot.b.er Congres ..
sional leaders who attended the February 27 White House

briefJ.ng, the program ga:lned t.Y:i.de bipartisan support both
in and out of

Congress~

After giving the bill much

tion _and :i.ncludtng the amendments of Senator

attc-'.!n~·

VandenbE-n~g

J:~E-llatl vc

to keeping the measure entirely "t'l!i thin the U., N~

~~t·""r
Ch.. •••
J..
'-"

t1"e
b·l]
1
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Tt.te bulk of the oppo:::d . t:L on c ;;:;s\C.

Republicam1, representing the

11

f~t'O?,J

1_._','>'
• •

fvTi

..

~1- ·~~-.r.~_,-_,_.·f.·,·,
-.. .. ' . "

d~·ic: ~:>t.

pers:Lst;enco c·f :i. ~~;oJat~:Lonifd:-

. ,.'~ o6
~
,
1·w.o.' approvea1 \.:.~ . h e .l.Gg:l.s
.,
. ..
'I m.JH'in
..
.
nen t J.ment
,~
· Tl1e ::;ena1:.e
on

April

22~

and on May 9 the House,_ by a three to one major-

ity, 2A7 to 107, passed the bill.97
vi.cto:C'y for bipartisan policy in a

It was the first big
HE)publican~controlled

Congress~ 98
On May 22, 1947, President Harry Se Truman signed

the b:i1l noting: vvvlith tld.:s ena.ctment by Congress of a:Ld

95vandenberg, ,Jr., £E~ .9j·~!:.·, pp .. 343~·31~-4~
9 6cnrleton, or.:· c:iJ!.• P~ 53 o
9

97'rrurnan 9 Xt_{l-11.?. gf .T.r.J.a~~ ~ ]-Io_p_~·' 5d?,· .9.tt,-,_o, p .. 10~~&
98vandenberg, Jr., .21?.• ciJ~·~ p. 351~352.

194of' Communism would not bo n.1.lq'l';cd 'to nucc(;~ed h.Y' clef ault . n99
'l'he required agreorn.ents \<J:i.th Greece and Turkey v,re:ce

signed on June 20 and July 12 respectively.lOO

The act

author:i.zed ~:~hOO miJ.l:i:on for t.hr':; pur·chase of goods and se:r•vm

trained personnel in limited numbers.

oth~r

The aid was

mada conditional on complete American freedom to observe
an.d report on the u.se of all fundD and equipmEmt obtained
th:r.:·ough the
pre~·exist:tng

agreements~

1'hfJ use of the!! fundEi to service

ftire:ign de bt.~3 was proh:t bj_ ted.

Tb.El a.greements

c::tlBo ca11ed for· J'ull publ:icity o.f tho AnKn··Je1:.n.
'tl'
('!'>
•
. .J'

·~Jo

1!.J

Gc:~~:t,:r:Unor·····
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tton, or lf United Nat:Lon.s objeetivns of the Act. ·were
cd.t~her

t.:tecomp1ished or deemed

impo0E:d.bll~ t~o

ar:h:Leve o

Prl)·~

vision was also made so that a joint resolution of Congress could also termin.att3 the a:td p::r.ogram0
11

' po:tnt~od

· de.emed a
••)·
i ('ll
•'<..1~,

•,r•"J"'
•'lie.,,>

1 '''(1
·'
"[",..
J.. '·'(
i>.; •..
•.•'-h>.

The latter vras

romindEH' of tho .Huthority of Congre::;su
~1"'
·~·'"

·:>
o.

1 'JC1E'"'~
""'.0:~'11·1
'·'•"·""'··"'J.

t·o

·+·he:>
.. or•·J.'
p-tE•1·1·to
tt·l·~·'c·
v .. ~ .;
..,,,
. .._, .
.<..
o.)
,}_ v. •

99'1'·.-.·:un
•)··J
-J.t
(;</..'
10°ne:1.tzel, Kaplan t and Cohlenz ~ QE• £!.~!:.1>, P~ 116o
lOJ.Brown, s~.E· _g}:_!_., p. 130 •.
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was to c ont 1. nue .102
Pre t_;ident. 1.'ruman stated :1.n

h~. s

J·. remoirs:

This declaration of policy soon began to be
to c9.[5 the ''l'tu.r:mn Dor~t.·d.ne 1' • Th:i.r;; ~..,as,

referr~:~d

I ))?lieve?. the turn:'.nfJ; po:lnt_ in America t s fore1g17

po.L1 cy, whJ_ch nov·T cl.C': c Jrt:r''F~d th<it wherever aggrest>J.on,

direct or indirect,
"'0("1"''),.
,
• l,.,~J.
-·

L)

{·~r
\1 .)'

0J'0.

t~)Yr:"eatE-mf.HJ

t· 11')f'.,., Ur.·1·1'
'"'''-.t:>C·
. • • 't'• '"''d. .c~·t·. C.-\
~
.J \;,.,

'l'he press c:ommented:
future~

··-'

•

U

\.,J

the poaee, the..,
v,t•"'.l
WV 0.. S

1• ''l'IJ'O]
.
.. ij'.C>(~
t.;:.,. A ~

•. .l

.J.Od')

"If to.rm.·ds could :::;hape the

of nations, these unquest:.i.onably wou1du

They had

clearly put America into power politics to st&y*nl04

lC)
J,~ Brown , 21~.!..

£i.t., , p. 13 0

1°3·rruman, l~.f!:£:2.
lOh··-· ..·-~·C·,-'

tt

£f..1~J.:~tgJ. ~ I!..~P..~-'

.QJ2·

r:Jt. ~

p .. 106 ..

America 1 Date Vli th Desti.ny, n fl..£..

QJ~

c ·,

Cl·IAPTEI~

X

THE IMPLEMENT A'.fl:ON ·OF THE rr'IWMAN DOC'.PFU:NE

The rebelliow3

fc,;'GE!S

C~r·t:::(:lce

in

reaJ.i~~ed

thEtt they

would have to score a quick victory before United States
Hid became_ f~ffeeti ve

~

'l'he Gr·eck guc:.;rr:iJ.las made every

effort to secure substantial political and military gains
before the Greek governnmnt could be strengthen(1d ,,

By

Jun.e 9 » the American Embassy repor·ted a ma:r.·ked deterioration :i.n the ability of the Greek army to cope with rebel
forces.

aid~

On the s:i.xteenth t the Greek government appealed

1

While the Br:i.tish 'l'rere holding t.hc:) line :ln GrE";.0ce
e.wai ti.ng a:i.d from the United Btate s, the PrEHddent was
organizing the assistance program.

The post of Adminis-

trator of the American Mission to Greece was offered first
to \ll!al ter

Gifford~

a.lto:rnBti.vc,

For

\v:i.th Robert
TG·.~tsons

IVIot~es

which

mentioned as an

~eruman

cl:td not reveal, the

appointmEmt. went; to DvJ'i.g;ht P . Gr1 svl"old, forrner Governor
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of Ne braskR, who had be on

:-::.~:::cv:i.ng

with

th<~

mil:l tary

govern·~

ment. tn Germany. 2

Grimvold proved a. c;-:q;ab1c

<:v:~mirdstx·ntor.

'fhe Admin-

ist:ca.tor resisted straw: G:r.'eek efforts to subve:r·t the
1_,

economic recovery aspects of the aid program in favor of
the miJ itary.

Truman C(Y·nmurrted ~

lt'J'he G:ceekt:> \'llanted

(~quip-·

ment, B.d\dsors ~ money to c:xpand its army, and would haV()

g:i.ven all ou.r aid to

the~

m:i.l:ttary if.

WfJ

had

J.<.:~t

them dc.1

'rhe former Nebr.ask£-1. gove:r·nor \Wrked •rigorously t,o

build. n staf'f and to orgo.nize the distr].but1on of relief'

developing popular suppc.rt ~

Th:} J.tl.tt:.or

uncl.,:n'·~~-aLiug 'i'lH.f.i

continually th'i"larted by· the Greek f r:s desire nto twe our aid
to flu:·ther part:tsan po1:ttical, rather than nat5.onal

aims o tr4
Paul

A~

Porter, chief of the

Presidr,~rrt v s

SpecicJ.l

Ec:onomic Mission to Greece, had· ::>trongly Ur'ged the establishment of a DepartmE:nt of Foreign Trade und::Jr the

Viking

~:.:;~~r 1 ~~}}~sp "2~.~6·1 ~'2.E££.D..tJ~.±. P-1-Jiri~-~-~
3Truman, I~-~l!'~§~
4-Ib:i~}.o

9..J:.

T1:ial.

(New York:

g11~i H~~,£.~, QP..· £it.~» pG 109.

l9B
Ministry of Nationnl Ec.:H'F1ll1;t.
ha~e

Th:L;:; depa.rt;ment;

to

been headed by an experienced American working under
c:

contract to the Greek

•r .J;,,.,(.'"'''
c<

F'o~"eJ'
rYl'I
.1.
·IC'

.

)-:-.;>

'·'o1•ld
V<

"-·

The Department of

gov~rnment.~

work:Lng c1osely \-rith the

vvould

enable~

for· e:x:···p_. O""tr-:

1' ~.-...'·•_;!',,.<.·'.· .·'•. J·-'-•'
..... ' .~.. r·!,''.·(.~
...'~·'
..

tisticn for purposes of analysis.

tee~

I··Tas

.t.

P"'d
nu

.-

Such a department,

Ang1o~·Am\·:n:·ican

the American Econom:Lc

Currency
I'~Iiss:-i.on

Commit··~

( AEivi) to

k(~ep track of how the t:~id monies 11ere being spent o 6
Most Amer·icans vie1ved Greece

HS

a laboratory fo:c

Amer:lcrt v s Gxper:l.ment in <-l rWvf form of foreign policy.
Hather tha.n the tradi.t.ionel1

dole~·

mJ..l:Ltnry ::n;_;J.

(;~:OJJ.{lil!~ .. e

,.,

mi::;s:Jons \lf.ou.ld implement c:onf3tr·uct.1ve prop;:c<:;ma. r

PorteP 1 s r·oeonmwndt3.tions had

b(~en

b,:wed \.qxm Che

fact· t.hat Anglo·~·Amer:lcan cdd had furmeled. ''..lfiW<~,.-cc<. of
*~l~Oh6 5 000~000 i.:n.tq Greece since World. War II ::;tarted~

the tv-ro

yea~;~s

:i.1W11<::d:Lately· follmving the 'ltlar

In

anoth€~r

$500,000,000 had gone the:r."'e for relief and :r'(~habil:i.tat'j.onJS

Most of this assistance had little effect in promoting
the stability of the Greek economy.
5con~~tantine PouJ.o~3.

Greece~," lb.-~~.Q!l,,

11

WlurL America Could Do In

(lVIarch 29~ 19h?), P~ 356b

611 •ct
~~--~l-~ ~ ~ p • 3r·7
:> ..

J'Je~~~

"Guidance Not Dole for Greec~"), tt U. §_.
~!l<!·-:~.Ql~~:~f~1~~P..?.!'t §., ( lVb rc h 2 R , 19 4? ) , p • l h .

7 .

8J.J?.tg,o
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',

Porto:r· and. GrisvmJd.

'

vmrc~

'

.

d.evoted to the task of

developing a de~ree of seJf-sufticiency for the Greek govet'nment and

:ind.u~:>try &

Ttl<c) ma:tn

O~r1tl:LnH

of Plans called

for the inlt:ial use of *;300, 000,000 in Greece o

Of t-;h:i.s

amount, abcn.rt ~~50~ 6oo f 000 vouJ.d go for reli.ef

ThE: funds

3

\'.rould come from t1'lo ~1ou:rcG s, th:;. ~~J 50,000 ~ 000 European
relief measure and the $400~000~000 that was specifically
request~~d

for aid to Greece and 1.'urkey.,

Of tht':! total

amount., Gri.ov1old antic:i.pa.teq sp8nding $150,000,000 on

!U:U.. :ttar·y supplies and equipment~ and ~~65 '000' 000 to reha·-

bi1itate the nation's railroads~9

the G:r·eek economy .1°

f.-3h:iprno:nt by road or .·c:d.1 in. Cr·;;,,r::; r:o

was more expensive than air freight due to shortages in
ro11:tng--stock cmd general d.eter:torat:i.on $11

This condition

was especially serious in the important food-producing
areas of Northeastern Greece and aggravated the general
shortage of food.12

HGu:i.dance Not Dole for Gri::ece, n

1.:5l.S £. J:..t.,

10
, "The Story Behind a Policy~ Versa, and
Rea sons Wh·§·;y;~,··.BQ.~§.Y!e eJs., (March 31 ~ 19 47) , p e 2 5.

111_1?.~.£.•.
12

"Guidance Not Dole for Greece, 9.1'.•

gjJ~.~
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Gri.m'l'old viewed lLc) tranDpo:::t.ation system as

the~

tt}.wndmaid 11 of agrieultun:; and industry, and .felt that
irnpro·lrf~mentr:;

in that aren would be the forerunner of th.eir

successful development. 1'. ,;
some

~00

The a:i.d progra.m vras to repair

miles of railway facilities.

Prior to the aid

ef:t'o:ct only· 200 miles l1<:1d lJeen operable because of war
d.Hmage ~ ll1'Ehe need for rural improvements was even more

press·~

ing than some of those tied in with industrial developmont.

GreQce hadbut le31 acres of arable crop land per

farm p0n·son and a pe:r· capita annual farm income of well
r

l
und0~r ~~50.·)

farmers, and to develop an equitable distribution of agri-

cultural products.

The Food and Agricultural Division

under Mace also initiated research and extension services
that not only contributed to gains in total yield and

. 1 JBenja~1~n A~

J·av:i.1:.s ~ J:.f;,Q£2. ]2y: .l!!Y.~~E.:t.!.~i~l'~.t (New
York; Funk and t:.fagna.lls, 1950/, p. 188.

ll~rl?.J:.Q..
15vH.l1ard 11 Esby, Bold Nev1 I<'rontiers ( Ne'w Yo:r·k:
Harper and Brothers, l95or;·-·p'7 Irr5·Q·-..-·-·~--·. -···'
G
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production per man hour, but aJso

~8rved

as

~odels

for

other countries.l6
'J:he most diff'LeuJ.t. probl2m :1ncountered by Mace and

t,he F'oocl and Agr:i.cultura\ Dcpar·t.mc:nt of the Amer:ican
sion was the improvement: of tJ:.1e

dJE~tB

Mis·~

and general health in

the v:U.J.ages.
'l'he Greeks r villages did not have contr·o1 vvater sys-·

terns.

Water was usually obtained from a spring, often at

some distance from the v:i.llage.

Ko~:~lclnides,

Apostolos

a

superv-tsor of sanitation for the l\fear East Fotmdation,

reported that of 1?500 in the village of Rizo not a single
O:r.]e
·

,,"'
WC'~i;)

.:.,1, n

"'· 4 gor·ou <' he!.:.]
,u_,, ·l·l'l
V
'•
>/.J- .,

.L)

..

'~.'

1'J' '1" c1 e ,.,.
t·I ·r<c)•''
••
>J;o,_
,.1 ,4, \

,dJ

built a cover for :t t, and d1:·a:tned
:i.t e

'I'hr<:.>.e years later R:i.zo

vnt~1

Y

.:.;. .:,: ,..,.,.)•·

c· ,., -,·,·v·~·
::;~:·'"·>·•' ·,.-.,

, ) J,

thG~. DW.f-lm:p :JJ·er~

.ncound

a cli.fforent v LL1age ~

The

total cost of the project, beside a much hard ·Nork, -vms

$t50).7
In Ivla.ndra, a toi'm of 5,000 only 20 miles from

Athens 1 worricm had made a three mile walk for vmt.er each
morning for more than one hundrod year·:-..7.

A pipeline vms

laid and. a gasol:Lne pump p1:-ov:Lded. by tho Amermican Iviiss::i.on.

'l'he village bad ru.nn:l.ng

~..rater~

With the building of

16Harry B. Price, ~J;:h~. ~i~}.:.-:~11. t~&ll gnQ. ];_Y._s ~§;ni.n~,
(Ithaca, Nrn•l York: Cornell University Press, 1955T, p. 278 •
.l?E·•.soy,
t
J.oc.
' t...,.
c:1.
_....,
...... _
_._... .·•
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..

properly located latrine

:~··

'

.,, -.;

-:.

. ::'

fr.>J.:il1t:ic~f:

the dlsease rate was

cut in half .lf.~

FAO also embarked on a program of water-power development to raise

employrn(~nt

1eve1.'-' 1 and to provide power for

modern agricultural deviceo.

The Organization estimated

that :.i.ni t:i.al stages of the· program i..Yould cost ~f·6J) 000,000.
Completion of the project would require an additional
~~3 75,000,000 expended over
th(:~

;25 yGars ,,

About ~~o per cent of

money was projected for pm,mr development 1 H:Lth

thE~

balance to be spent on flood control, drainage, and irriga .t..:ton~ 19.

Ov ;:,~r.·

25,000 }·walthy calves were born by the end of 191+9 from
starting-stodc comprised of B:tx

pure~·bred

Svriss bulls

shipped from America.20

MILI'I'ARY AID TO GREECE;
'I'he

m:U.it.a:c~r

aid prog:.:·am to Greec·e d:i.d not. have a

terminal dates and the
any reciprocal

favors~

l8Esby, .212·

G:r'OE:~ku t-'TOJ''E'

T'h<\y· · '1'-!ero

gi~. ~ p. 186.

19rqJc~.
20 Ir?._j_.d., p. lR5.

not. a8ked to concede:;
requ:i.x·{~d

ord:y to make:

20.3
off(;eti vc twe of assi st::-mce fo:r heJ ping to maj ntain thei.r
own free institutions and national irrtegrity against
aggressive movements aimed at
regimes upon themo 21

irnposi~~

nificancc in the Groek assistance

totalitarian

pro~ram~

The Joint United

States Military Advisory a.nd Planning Group in GreE)Ce
1'
( ,.J.USI•:JAPCx')
.• 1vo.rn.ng
vn'th
·

~-h
-..~

. h nn....
J l.• t ar-y m:tssJ.on,
'
.
e F3YJ.'t,l~'

supervised the development of effective armed forces.
pite assurances from President T:cmaan that American

Des"·

person~

ncl would not ps.'rticipate at the~ operational lev(~]., offir·

talion

lE:vel~

sat as a non-voting mernbet· of the GrE";ek SuprelHEJ Nat:i.ona1

Defense Counci1~22
C~mtrnry

to original cr3timates v.rhi.ch placed the

need for· American advisors at be'cvwen 10 and 4.0, the num.,
ber of Amer·icans thus deployed g:revv to 527 by

~Tune

of .

19h9. 23
2"J
~·-vJ:i.ll:i.arn A. Brown,

!:..Ir]~.~:t~I:D. F.~~U:.'?J..&;n .f\_!3_~>:!-..?J:,2:I!f.2.,
P~ l1l1-l,

. ( Washington: Brook:i.ngs Institute, 1953,,

22 Ihi.d

-·~···---

$

23I.h.t9~·

'

p. M~3 ~

Soon after the Greek program began, an escalation in
the p;uerrillr-J 8.eti v:i.ti0 n c:1.used bc,tter than 57.5 per cent

of the first $300s000,000 allocated to Greek aid to be
sp(:mt on materials to r:;vp_p1y and. c>q.land Gr·c~ek

Over $70,000,000 was speDt in
replacements on ar·mamerJ.l:.n

B;~Lain

f'orees.

for repnirs and

furn:t'~;hnd pricn"' to the~ U~ S. aid

program .. 2h

In the course of l9/4A) th_e Btrength o.f Greece was
gradually built up entirely on the basis of

U.S~

and under increasing American supervision.

In 19!,9 t.he

· ci V'il vvar V<las ended.

Mo1:>t expe:r·ts feel that

the part of ·the Grer:'>k government. or the U,.:.:.

resources

the conc1u-

T~'~i.:l.'5.t.:.~.r·y

1\d\?J."

sory GroupQ 2. J

1:.

The rapidity with

1~1ich

aid was reduced following

the conclusion of the civil war left a number of businesses
nhor·t; of' cap:1.ta16

Livh1g ntandards vrere stjJ.l

Greek nat:l.on faced a grlm c;hoicE:

c-md FJ.CC:e1erated

grovJth~

k~t"~AJeen

lo~1

and the

cap:itnl expanston

and a lo H rcotte of· :lnw::strnents to
1

control inflation and develop financial stability.26
24nrovm ~

QE.

s:i~.. t pp. hl~J-·"hh2"

2 5T:l:L11:Lam R.ei tzel., r. ·1orton A. Kaplan~ and Constance
G( ~ Co1:lenz, Y.r;J!:~sl §t.~t~-g_ ~:;].r.~~):ft~n. J?.2.lt~x .J;,~h5:~J:.?L]5,
Wasrungton! 'L'he Broolnnf';s Jnr:>tJ.tu.te, 1956, ~ p. 219.
26Pr:i.ce, 21?.•

.£.~~-">

p., 278.
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di~-;appointingly

Economic recovery :l.n Greeee had been

small.

Agriculture was the major exception.

plant:i.ng reached F35 per cent of tlw pro1-mr

however, lagged seri.mw1y,

<"~.nd

In that area

level~

Industry,

ac:tuall.y dropped from 75

per cent to 70 per cent of the 1939 level~27
e~trried

Vigorous program:3 wor'E.l
faro 1 public
and finnnce

o

health~

out :ln Dor.::ia1 ,,rel-

mining, labor, civil administration,

All o.f these effortr3 v-rere er:i.tic:ized by later

observers on three count.n ~ · too much vms attempted too

fasi~

\-vi th resulting waste? economi.e 1m balance~ and :i.nfla:tion;

secondly, it was felt that more responsibility should have

resources <1nd capabil:i.t5.es of the G:ceek economy, so that
it would ht-tve been f3C1f':'sustairdng h'hen a:!.d 1--ras

C'l.J.Y.'··

tailed. 2 8
Henry Wallace remarked:

Y.le have been timid. when we needed to be :i.mmob:tle ~
By supportirig cor-rupt and backHard looking regimes :i.n
••.• Greece, \"TEl defaulted i.n our moral posi tton before
the -vmrld. eo
At Uds c::cucial juncture the U o S., :i.s
bulwarked neither in spirit nor in fact;,. 29
0.

2

?B:r'CY~m, 2.P..· £1-t.·, P~.

1306

28Pr:i.ce' 1s?.£ • £Lf~
2 9Henry A. \IJallace ~ nrrhe Way to Help Greece, 11
li~~~ fl2~P}!b1Js~~! Oliarch 17, 19h7), p. 13 4>

!1:1£
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.(
THE ASSUVT'MiJCJ'} PHOGHAM 1'0 'rUHKEY
.

T'he sharpenh1g of Jts
Un:i.on had made it imper:i.t.:Lve
abnormal

p:r.opor~ci on·

expencU.tur(~S.

d:Lffr;~t·ences
f'~)r

w:lth the Soviet

Turkey to allocate an

of :1 tB annuHJ budget to m:i.l:t tary

'l'he subs'::?f1Ut:':nt tstra:i.n there by imposed on

the 'l'ur·kish economy was a major.· factor :Ln leading the
United t>tatGf:l to furnish aid to Tu:r.l<:ey ,)0
'rhe central problem vms ·to reduce

·den imposed on the
l:!.shment:. o

pr.oblem ~

~rurkish

the~

econom:i.c

bu1:-~-·

economy by the mil::Lta:r·y est.ab··

'l'vm steps were felt em:>ent:i.a1 to solyj_ng the

'I'be

first~

Btcp, wh:i.ch was regarded a;::; imperi-

of the Turkish eeonomy th:rough t.he develorxw..::nt. of m:tn:?.;:e.1

resources, improvements in ·c;:cannportation, the upgre,ding
of agr:i.cultu.ral

tE~chniques,

and the stimulation of

inve~rt

ments ,)1
The interconnecting nature of the economic and mili-

tary :needs of 1'urkey was

refl(~cted

:i.n the recommendationE>

of the American mu·v·ey team which reported that the

eco~

nomic position of the country could best be improved by

_.

30staff, The International Studies Group of the
Brookings Institute, ~·1a ·ior Problems of !I... §.~ !:.s?_E:E2_ign !:2.1~.£!~
{Washington:· 19h9), p-.-J:-5I .··-·-·--·-:--· -~31 Brown, Jog_.,

£2:1.,

20?

tnodorn:i.z:tng the a:cmy
possible

rc~duction
0

.t:'

t.hr:~

in

.l)f.>'t''
f
1
cl r'~
..... . ' o,
' c .. · t , c:;'ln:t.rna "'s
~··

to

t~eo a.D

fn.ciJj.t:::~.te

the EH.trliost.

t3mcru.nt. of manpm'ler' and th.e

• ~- " d t•, 0'
.,
1
rc'd''!"'
t·..J' 1·1e c.
'1rmy"
•
• "J. /,(... '"· -r•p
.k. ...."
.
">

')

.

I)

num~

I)

_.)t..

I

rc~duc~~

objective vv-as to

'Pln•k:i.sh r:lcDfense coste by crf3at:ing

a more _eff::i..cient ~ but mrwJ.:i cr:c ~ n:cr:.ty ,,

'l'o aer.tieve t:-he dr.;s}:_.·•ed ob:_iect:i.ve ~

profo~.W:i.Onal

ur-H~d

arm<'ld and trained by Amod.cam:> s wo:r·o

pea13ant conrJer.:i.pts on Turkey 1 f3 frontiers.

a-lite troops number:ing
cer~3

90~000

insidt~

\'re:ee t:eained :i.:n camps
of'ficerf:~

v-:ts:i.on of 250

and

men and

m~!n

GOJ.~·

to replaee

A ne\IIJ' forc:e of

12~000

Turkish off:L=

1'urkey

und.e:::~:-

the

supc~r·~

headed by

~~ajor

General

Horace L~ McBride.33
In nd.d:Lt:Lon

McP1···~
,._.,
j,J
". __
,
..(., ,.1.. do
\,r _i 'I...
i.~o G0""'J'!1·.··:J_··.L
r

.. :u.e1.
~
";-'
Tur·,1•·~
\..J••.C<;) ol1 o.r..
,) ancl me.1.
(lf'\f

,,

r

•'\('C

~

,f,,"'

J.L.

~·

:~

c:tpp:t1J~,,c.Lo.~··1"l
). c\•
I''.

·•

1\"-l>

to training schools in the United States.
these m:tlitary
sJ..asm

rm:m

for American

Thzndreds of

returned to Greece filled vrit,h

enthU···

') l

methodsn/~

In the f:lrst yea.r of the progrc:un, Turkey received

$4a,500,000 which was alJ.ocated to the UaSo Army Mission0
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Ac:tua1ly y tho 'I'u.rk:;:;
weaponry· had been

r<'~cci vc:d

nn.wh rrjore in

decl~Ln>d ~3urp1u::>

value~

since the

and marked dm-rn to ten

cents on the dollar or less.35

American advisors dosigned an ongoing training program.

Im;tructi on in thn n.se o:f !.! S.
Q

mat~'! rials

star'ted

in schools f'o:r· off'icerD, v1·r,.o bad J\rner:ican instructors.
~I'he Turkish officers~

in tu:cn 9 wen.t out to st:l.11 larger

schools to train men in the

f'it~ld

vih.ile American instruC··

tors acted as supervisorse36
Unlike Greece, where most military assistance was
concentratr~d

on the army f :Lt. was felt neeossary to

teet Turkey against Russian

eff~rts

pro~·

to seizA control of

A U.S. Naval Mission of 132 off:tcers tmd.(·n: tl:.&; eorJrua-:Ld
..,

(iJ~
/

~-:--·

Admiral Thomas G~ Settle, was established~~~

Submarines were viewed as the major naval defense
for Turkeyo

The 'ru.rkish navy took deli very of four

mod~·

ern, long-range submarines, bringing their fleet to four, teen.

They also receive~ eleven other vessela.3~
'1. he
1

element that

~1Tas

most needed :i.n the combat capa=

bility of the 'rurld.sh cU"mEH:l forGE)S waG a1r powero

p.

24~

No

lf'J.'urkey; Outpost i.n Cold t•lar, 11 .212•, cit_.,~

(
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.. ·'.·

could be affected with-

forc~c.".l

sizable redueti6n :Ln gY'(nmd

out the development of tact:i.c:al support wings.,

A TJGSe

Air Misr::>ion. o.f 100 officers undu:r· I':fajor. General Earl S ..
Haag vm.s established to cuper.v:l..so tho

expc~ndit.ure

of

$26,750,000 on planes, equipment, end training for the
Turkish Air li'orct:J.

An und:lscloscd number of C-h?

portD, day and night fighters, c::tnd attack bomb(;rs

trf.triS<·
~V'ero

delivered aboard three carriers in the spring of 194a~39

Because the forces trained through the American aid
program v1ere not required to perform, as had been the ease.
in Greece,

jJi

was diff:Lcult to

of the military assistance

made

armarm~nt;s,

evaluat~)

program~

the effect:t voness

Th8 def0ns0 estab-

the supply of AmerJ.c<-111 eqt;,:i.pment d::td serve

to relieve the strain on. the Turk:L:::>h budget imposed by

the. ma:l.ntennnee of such a large force. hO
Although the stB.tod aims of
gram was
pof.H~~J

t~he

th~::

military· aid pro-

reduction <.)f expend:i.tures for m:U.itary pur.:..

and the free::tng of

manpovn~r

from m:U.:i:tary

rer;pon~

ot b:t1:ities, it has not been :r-ove .:=i.led to vlbat ElXtent. ·these

objectives '\1\TEn·c~ achieved • 11-l

39

-··--· ~~~··-'

"rl\1dcoy; Outpost :i.n Cold vlar," QP..• cit.• ,
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'J.'HE 'T'LlnKISH I::CONOMY

\V'hi1e tho

propoE~td. r';

for

t(H'e:d primar·ily on mi.l:t Lary

the m:UJ.tary build-up

<:J

sf;intance to Tu:ckey

objt~cti ves,

cen~

thc1 'I'urks v5..e\1ed

part of a general plan of eco"·

;:.J.E;

nom:i.c; deve] opment ~ 1+2

Turk.ey orrtered upon thEl rec:overy program as an
underclevelopc)d. eount:cy"
j_n.g

A generation of ferment and v-viden·'·

with the West, u.nder Ataturk and Inonu, had

c~ontacts

rn<:J.de the people recept:L1re to
evE~r $

change:]~

lim.s tochnologicaJJ.y backw-ard..

'fhe eeonomy,

how·~

Conmrunicat.ions were

poor, and 1i ving standards ~.Yel'E! lov.r o h3

cent r::d.nee

1 0'20

•.~~ / ...J /

IJ

In add:i.tion to the unstable financial Gtructure of
the country s the

tions.

~?urkr>

suffered from severe clar:;s

d:i.st:i.nc-~

There was a problem in assigning tasks because of

the el:i.te t 8 loathness to do meninl chores.

tion of technological

posit.:ton;~>

crEw.ted a

rJ.'he int;erposiw·
furt~her

strain

1 2

~· Hcr:.rr:n:·d M,., 'l'oc:•.f, '.Jr.~ .ll!}!!Sl.~~- !S.£.01:~,~ :~JlC:?.. !~J.:2n1~Je£~~;
9_fls~~:.. §.~~.l!§J~fJ.fl. .:~n To£b!l~~9.?J.. 9_92.Efr-~~i:.ic~g , . (Ithaca, Nevf York:·
Cornell llniversity Press, 1955,, p., 3 6.,
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bct~·men

upon the relationship oxir.>tiinp;
unsk:i.llc~d

Jaborers.

t..he elite e.nd the

fv1ech8>lizrxtJon also changed Uw char•n

acter of the directing group by plncing the elite, those
who plcteed greater import on. b:l rth ~ family, or economic .

f.or ..ed
J ,rd
<-•' •
/.,.!)
..
.. erun:tp~
t·.e~"l·a
The most :i.nrportDnt a::;pect of 1\mer:J.c;an general
assistance vms the Turkish road

program~

This v:t tal series

of projects was visualiied as the key to basic devalopment. of

the~

economy.

Originally concei \red as a mattf)r of military expedi.a

cated

enterprise~

'1.'\f:i:t.h ohjc(.::t:i_"(tes

·~,rh5.cJ.l trztn;~.~o:~0i1.oj.ed

'fYur·eJy

m~litary ends046
Vecdi Diker, the Chief of the Turkish Mlniotry of
Public Works, vras a oolicl support;er of both the mj_litary
and economic aspects of the highway programo

Diker had

studied highvray ·enginecrix1g at the Uni versi t.Y of M:i.ssour:L, ·
and had vvorkE3d w:i.th highway departments in the Un:i.ted

States.

The Turkish public vvorks chief had outlined his

country' G highv.ray needs

ference in

1946~

~.t.

an

Int.c:~ruTviin:i.s"t...,ry

His recommendations

P~

38?.

Roads

Con~

at that conference

212

N'En·e

tht~

basis for thn T!F.dd.sh [';')Vernment, vs requ.ost in

19h? for r;ome ~~100 y 000 ·~ 000 :in h·J e;hlr.I;::J.y d.evelopmorrt. funds h7
0

'J?he roads projeet became
force of 23 U ~S.
oper·ato:r-n o

ongineex~~.,)

th;:~

concern of' an el:Lte

su r·~n~~yors, and road equipment

1'he pd.nctph; highvn1.yn

~~onst:r.ueted

by this

group linkAd the Turkish districts of Kars and Ardahan on
the

Htu~s:i.e.tJ

frontier vri.th ports on the Med:i.terr·anean Sea.

Some $5,000? 000

expended on th:ts project, most of the

N'ctG

funds being spent. for the purchase of American ... produced
:coc-l.d build:tng; equipment. hf5

'Jlhe developmel1t of an

n~n~tclJy
....

.A.Ct.l'"'"'-.

('·pAr~f
.l_.v .. J. .... ,l

<;;:Xt~Gnsi ~te

cross-eountry

high·~·

tln
-«-J-'1:

tr:tal e.nd commercial

expanr~ion

quicJ.:rened, f:.i.nd the nat:i.onal

:i.ncome ro~3(-:l hO pen: cent. h-9 ·
'J.'he m.ost. dramatic ga1.nt:J \'lE.n"'e :i.n

agr:teu1ture o

\IJher.eas

~Hh, 000,000 \'1ort.h of whea·t imports had been required a:nnu~

ally by th<:;~ Turkir.:;h p(~op1e, m.o:r.-•e t.han 600,000 tons t valued
at ~S59, 000 J 000 W'(~re armually· made available for export.
Cotton output tripled.

'I'hese t·N·o stapJ.es 1:-.J.rgely repJ.aeed

h ?rre a.f, .212. s;.J~&. ~ p o 3 66 ~
&

p& 2h ..

l~.8···---~·-·-,--~,

11

T'ti.rkEJy; Outpost :tn Cold

War,~'

Q.'E• cJ:_-t,0,
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luxury items such as to·bacco Dn6 Jr··ied .fru:Lt. as principle
exports.)ro
A cyclical o.ffoet,

vn~.s

put :Ln motion as a :result of

ar,ricu1tural tt,ains r:rt.ernnl'i..ng f:cont the roads p:eoe;ram,.

Vlith

ability to market thei:c p:coducc, and vd.th :i.nereased purehas:i.ng povrer 1 t~he agricultural ?:Jogment. placod

on steel production for farm implements.

ne1·.r demancl.t>

Even a doubl-

ing of steel output could not meet these new demands~51
Eventually, through f..\ttlH.:.lequent extensions of the

initial aid program, almost every aspect of the Turkish

economy reee:tved
technical

attention of American financial or

tl1(~

assistance~

Emlarged 1. experts

'¥rGre

The copper, lead, and c0al mihing

provided :Ln. publiC!

&.c<;n:i.Td~;t.:ca.tion ~

and :e-ura1 education and publi.::: health programs were :i.ni.·~
t'2
tiateclo :>
All of this a:Lcl \"las not w1tbout consequences,
r.~owever.,

'rhc
ing p13:inn ,,

extraordina1~y

:eapid grmvth ca'l.wed severe grov-r=

tv!u.ch of the imported rnechan:i.cal equipment

. 1acked nervice a11d r(::pa:tr :facilit:i.eso

Wheat production

outstripped road aD.d rai.lvray transport capab:i.l:i.ties, as

r:o
) P:d.ce,

P~

r]

) ·IJ?);.Q.e

52Teaf, ]..,9c .•

£tt•

272.,

.

21h

supports p.sed to encourc.1.ge devGOI opr-1ent :Ln specifj.c areas
placed new burdens on t;ho e;ovcrnmcnt ~53
Add:Lt:i.ona1ly, t!H:: nG'i\' d.mrwnd for tractors ·and other
problem.

'rur.-key ~

wh:1.ch in l9h5 had an expo:ct sw~'plu.s of $.33 1 000,000 and in
19h6 of r.i?t\)' 000,000 deveJopr;-~d a consistent patt~.;J"n of t:ra.de

deficits, -which reached

H

htgh of ~Pl93,000,000 by 1952*5L~

VJhiJ.o the T'urldDh govermn.ent vms fel:t to b(3 Hfollm·r-

:i.ng sound

d~-;ve1op1~1.<:mta1

policies and making good progr·ess" t

:i.t was felt that tt \vould be many· yea.r·s before the country

c:r:.
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BHs:Lcally 1 'I'v.rJ.cey :i..f:; f)1J.ff<~:c:Ln[; today frow too nwch
economic devc~lopment ~.too :fast' with too little e • •
0

The United States

~1st

share some of the blame for

'J:urkeyt s overambitious E';conorrdc development .,56
'J.'he pressurElS of Ame:t·ican advisors and the

dtsloca~

tions caused by rapid economic and social change brought
'.))'J
<:..

e a \J,J 0t:rr""t
•'t'f''
•· ~' 0.
...
vt..{-.}.-..,.'
a smoldering resentment, on the part

pv
j,t.l~

C•-.;)'
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, . 5~·.Tanw;; l:J • .• :v~€:giJ:lfl) ~n~ .. Helm-t~~ . . ~>ehoe.ch, I~:g...r~Jgn..At~1
( J as1u.ng,ton. lubl.J. c Aft cdrs Press, 195f~) ,

f.'':..E!e~-~-~!l-]1_.g;.£i,

pp. 3o-37.

5 5Edward S •. Mason, ]~?E2.i8..\~ :~.:1:.0~ §[!d
(New York: Harper and Eowe, 196~q, p. 39 ~

56v.Jiggins, op,. £J:.!~. ··) P~ 37.
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of CC:Jrta:tn elernentf; of. \.Jtr:! 'l'urk Ln.h
which

seem(~cl

to captuJ."'P

t;}·!t::'

population~

One commcmt

ncH fenl:Lnr; was... • "VIe must

dollars vron' t make us
knuckJ.<:.'! under any more t h:::u·, Huss:J. an threats~ n I'?
::>
ach:tevo democracy in on:c

0\'l.tl

\'lety. , • ,

CHAP'I'EH XI
SID·IT·ilARY AND

'l'he 'I'ruman

Doctrim~

CONCLU~JIOt.J

aehic: ved its fund&.rnental purpor;e

in keeping Greece and Turkey out of the Soviet orbit.

In

his fa:t·evmll add:ref3S on ,Jr:.muar.y 15, 1953, Trtu:1m) vvas to be
·able

say:

i~o

11

Toda.y

:i r5 a l.ruhu:t:l"k of

Gr<.:>CG(3 if)

strc~ngth

r:>till

j_ndepend~)JTC;

'furlu~y

nt- c:t strategic corner of the

w6rld.~nl
'l'hc~

proclamation of tho· 'I'ruman Doctrine, and tt::-'i

1
.;J-,·n
•).m·:'l'·t·
-1 :r. l
,J,.•lr··tc.J-.J'-•
1 o(·~·~·-·1·
.. v .. c) 1·1
.....

··\1'~
lu. ' '

1 ~~,'l1't1J"'lc 4 ,-.1·1
Q-y·r~c~
_ <c>.-1>.
•.•
..1.0

problemn t.o a world set t:t.ng,

!:".;Cl

<:>...!..

pl"oo·x"-~'·:r
c:> cul

'·Jas
t"'1e
v
,_
l

The real pu:rpose behind -thEl

19ft.? e.ddr·ess v.n::J.:::.; to lay the :foundations of a n£uch larger
invo];,ring the. eccmom:i.e problems of VveBtEn·n
Ho·vvever~

even by the· time of 'I'rumnn t s address

21'7

to the jo:Lnt session, the field of v-i;;3ion had been e:n.largedo
'fhis new

SC(')pe

to tb.e President's policy did not come about.

beca:use of any marlced Commtmist reaction to thG .Prest dent t::;
messagt-) ~ "but becatH.le t.hG United

taking a nev.r look at
.. J'e•'"
J·,
.v
. 6.:)

•.

it~>

Oh'n

~:~.tate s

Government had been

ecotlond.c objectivHs and

po1·~

J+

The wording of 1'rumants speoch opened areas to exam~
:Lnat:ic>n far beyond Greece n.nd 'I'urkey.
treat<:;d

the~

E.xecutiv(~

problems o.f the Em.:;tern T"Ied:i.terranean ars

cal and not &.s isolated instancoB ~ n

the basis

The Chief

\'VD.B

"typ:i..~·

By such project:!. on

laid .for poJ.i.cieB that were much broader than

'doctrine t bec.auae i.t :lni tinted

H neN· pattE.~J'n

of

Ame:cj,{~~\n

act:i.o.r.;.~ n5

T:r·uman sai'r the impact and f:>COpe of his pronounce-

I had a very good pic:ture of w·hat a rev:i val of
Americ:a.n isolationism vmu1d mean to the world. After
World War II it. Vfar:r clear tht:tt without American par"·
tic:i.pat:l.on there was no power capable of meeting
H:m:>:'3ia m:. nn equal, If ive v.re:r<:) to turn our back on
tbJ 1·m:r-ld:1 areas such as Greece, vreake:ned. and dlvidod
cH.l a re~~ru:J t of tb.e vwr, v.rould fa11 j_nt;o the Soviet..
orbit vtith.out much effort on the part of t.he Russ:i.ans
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Inactions w:1. thdr~'-'<vDl f 1 F'or!~:ceE;s Amer'j ear notions
could only result in handing t;o the f(ur-3sir.m.<J vnst
areas of the globe now deni~d to them.
o

~

•• o

This was a time to align th0 United States of
f\lner1.ca clfJarly on the~ ~:;:ldc, D.nd the head~ of 'Ghe
free vJOr·ld. · I knev.r ·[;hat Gc orge Washington's spir:L t.
~>>Jould 1x:! invoked aga:iJu::t; mot !J.rld Henry Gla·y·' s 1 and

all the other oatron

s~ints

of the isolationists¢

But 1 \'las conv:lnct:~d thnt. the policy I l"lilS f1bout to
· ·· \IOJo.S
·. . . • ..!.110.88(\
·· ' ' -, -l (),,-,, 111UCLt1..•....., t:q
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he then faced. )
·

th<.~

c:•·J·~-U'·''f'l.··on
u
.. ~ v _,(;(,.,1

·\r1
.-J.. ••

ci.rc:umstnnc,3s

Even F'or:cesta.l, who had ar>s:l.stod i.n framing the
pol:i.ey r was :tmpressed with t.he "firmneF.Js and franknesr.> of
the

languar~e ~V"hich

he used and the breadt.h '"'hJ.ch he
announced~ n.7

t.o tl1.e policy thus
r"\"'l
(•:1~.,_) .,.~'t-1.
l.l Ll ;_.,~
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ul . -~
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Vlh:i.le some may haye
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P&c:t, and the Ko:cean T:Jc.1r on.ly eon:f:trmed the ·\.,<:i.Llo:f that
thE~

'l'r"t!man Doctrin<2) b.ad initiated a crucial turning po:lnt

in American foreign policy.g
'rhe Doc:t.:ri.w:.; vu1s a. ttrational and expedient act; 11
'llrhich of'fect.:Lvely replar:ed B:c:l.ttsh v-lith Amer:Lcan. pmrer :i.n

and

vrh:l.t:~h ch·:d'endE~d

the eapita.1i at;ic Hfree
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7wa1 t:.er M:i..lli.s 'l'he· Forrcsta1 Diar::i.eo (New York:
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dcmoerat:i.c 11 nations

everyl·rht~re

or ind:i.rect aggreBsion 11 •

:J..n the vrorJ.d nr,c:d.nnt.

ttct:tl"HC:t

rl'ruman · n-c:rr:mslated a concrete

American interest for a limited urca¢ ••• 2nto a general
prlnc:Lple of worldwide
posa.ls for

a.s~d.f)tanc(;

SCO}:JO ~

to

('.
n)

}~

C:.."t"H:.~CP

:.:1nd

had lifted his pro'rurkey and converted

Amer'ica:n action any1Nherc-! on the globe o

Undc:c the ·rruman Doct.r·ine the

policy

~egan

to appear

strikin~ly

pattE~rn

oi' American

similar to that of

Roof..iE.lVelt t s in the bu:Lld.ing of defenses aga:lrwt; Nazi
Germanyj in

r)oct·•,. 4 nr-•
J...L.

...,.-

1939·~194J..

The general publ:Lc had bE;e.n lulled

,_1~,,.1
'1
l.
..·1·r·1J.·~··1·
-•.
\J. •4+r.•cl
C..
~l.'""-

~

,(.";~\..•'.:•

1
1•·••.1·"""
ll(.I'-'"l]CJl
.
(."":t....
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'l'he courfv:. of action ::'lf:laeted by the Presidr:mt and

his eh:i.ef advisors seemed to hav-e been \'Wll ad.justed t.o
meet the px·oblems facing Amer·:ic;an :i.nterests ..
It id.(:lntj_fied a ne..rvv objective, not

of old ones, and set more realistic
rJ.'he

neiiiJ COUrse.

defined

Fi

policy e

eo o

th<~ abandoning
priorities.~~·

that employed

the most readily available United States resources
in the manner most a.ecoptable to the American people.ll
9K on net h W, 'J:'h om p s nn , X~2.tJ.J~ts:.2:~~ I~~.tl~hJ.~D.l .~~!JS!. !-1!.~~
.S~~:~L~~t§. $?L6l~o,..£.11 l:Q.J..~.JJJ;:§.., ( Pr·inceton: r)rinceton Uni versi t.y
Press~ 19·0 , Po 124o
Povrt,!l",

"""·-·~·,-·····

'

1°samuel Flagg BE'Jmi r.i ~

:r.bg_

!Jnt!~§~ti. ~.!-~.t:g_~. £..?. .~ World

(New York: Henry HoJ.t. and Company, 1955), Pe 45"2~-·

1lne:L tzel t Kaplan;, and CoblenT, ~ Q.£· .£2.~,., p. 112

6

220
I3)tl
.c ·1

<)I......'-r.>J·.cJ"_;"l
""

1
• d.gmen.;:.
JU

·
-4 pu ,.,,.
n.nc,
).,_:tc

in the oamo d:i.roct:Lon bnt.

~~t

\,.,ere

t'-1-...
flilJ
__ ,_ ·t'J.ng

d:L:fferent rates of speed.,
gov~rnmont

rrruman 9 s speech served to \,veld

lie opinion into a nev1 VJorld

-~''.
J':tng
J ee ..

.1:\~x·c:n ba.sE~d

vievrn and pubw·

upon the premise

of perpetual Soviet.,.,Cor:uTn.ud ~~t E'i-wl:tty and the need for a
connt~n·

po\<Ver to

posals ~
sion

that :i.n:f1uEm.ce"

pn::serrt.E.~d

The Pres:tdent Y B pro-

in te:c-rr:s tbat :i.mplied Communist ex pan·~

rm.pported by thE~ American people e 12

W61'(;)

While the majority of r~ople~ both in and out of

governments soundly baeked both the Truman Doctrine and
the 5_nit:tal commitment in Greece and rrurkey, ns well as

out r!ri t1cism ..

pr·esEm.ted a disturbtng mHmo:r:-and.um to Secretary George

Marsha11"

The report war;

1'h(~

kE~pt

secret at

t.imc.:; bu.t was

r·eport of the Policy Plarming ·Staff pointed out

tho :neceard.t;r of e;l.a:c:i. .fy:in£~

t·~rm

t.he E:u:c(Jpf::!?.n 01J.t1ook creatf.:;d by
t.hat. the

thE~

Un~i.'Led

major mj;sconceptions in
th<~

'Eruman Doetrine: l}

3tat(;;iS "<vould g:Lve e.id cm1y to combat

Cornmurd.r;m? :not out of gem.d.ne

intf~rest

in :cecover·y and,

2) that the '.P:ruman Doctrine i"lH~::; a blank <:heck to give

Kaplnn, and CobJ.enz, Ql~n S':Lt.~

,

p" 93.
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cconomie and m:i. l:Ltary a:l.d t.o <:.1.ny area. of the world wherfJ
tho Communi si:.n shov<J· rd gns of he:Lrtp; r..;uecess.ful ~ 13
By far· th.e most .frr:qucnt et·i.tic:i.. sm of the Doctrino

v.ras the :immediate censur'r:
:it::> support of corrupt c:;nd

direet>.c~d.

at the government for

ro<JJ~~t::Lo:n.a:cy regimeu~

SinGe the

GrE.~ek

government hnd a :tepuLat.:i.o:n for cor·r11pt:Lon and

sion,.

Axw:~:ric;a

react:i.on., lh.

opr(-.:8~·

r;ccmed to bo v.ndfH''i"iT':itj.ng the foi"eE~s of

An article whieh appearod shortly after 'I'ruman t ::1

J2 address tmderse:ored th:i.::1 ltno <.>:t' 5udg;m'i.:m·t.,

~1arch

The Truman Doctrine~ s first magn:i.ficent g;esturo
w·as to be the democ:r-at.:ic: UcS., Government':3 mt-tjestic
undtn:·t.aking :i.n behc-1lf of 1~he surv:L vors of .:m old .
ln~tched ordere.~.the royalist office-holders
pledged to King (}x?.orge II ('f GJ:'HCCe and t.'h·::· :Y•rt:i".:.c:~~:~
ta:(':tan 1'.'\.lle:c:-:; of the; Tudd.r;;h poli.(:E-~ stc:ttc;':,. ~r.t.;:;
rJCllJ~tr:)
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sio:ta, as long a.s i.t. might rt:.:p:r·esent :i:i::.~:v:..!...t' tt.:; aJ~.t.::l.··
Cmnmintc~'rn couJ.d count. o:rt. the support of E('l t'('\1
~l':run\<~m t s lJ1Qthod for sus t-ain:l.ng vfl'c~e peoples ev·et·y··rn
v{h.t:: r<:: ~ , • .L 5
·.
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Still anot.h!:n· judgment on. thE! merits o:f the Truman

trnd.or

tkH~

UiJtgTOI:·tt.h

p:rogr::-m1 and subsequent programs ·wh:i.ch were an

oJ' thr;.) Doct:r:i.:ne"

1/:Ji~ric F. Goldman
Alfred A•. Knopf, 1956),
.. 15-r,--,-~~·=··.,--·'

.E.~2lll3..L~:.5~?

11

Also, this

l:i~ne

of judgm.ent

The C:r1..1ci;"l Decade>
p. "t?r:·
-·~~----···-- ~---·-·-..-~

( Ne\'l York:

'fu~"n:i.np; Point in History,\! The N(:n.v
6e ·

,J·'!<ir'ch 2h, 1947), Pc
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was highly critical of the deeper motivations underlying
t 1.1'-'v
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Edward Barret, .tllli overseas infonnation specialist,
cla.:i.med

tht:~

'l'ruman Doct'd nc bac1:;:f:l red becatwe of a lack of

avrarenef:>s of

foreign

:c('iJ.Ct ions,

po~tnted

B;:n·ret

out tha.t ~

since the P:residen.t had E:aJ.d. Ame:r::ican of'f:Lc:tals "Vmuld
nuperv:i. se thr.:~ us<~ of U. ~3. doJ..J..ars in Grec~ce, the Pr~H3id~nt
SE~emed

to be underscoring that America was

11

hellbent on

economic imperialism."l6

based on some

c~qual:i.tar·tan

eont:E)pt; of :;;ocial justice rather

s;nnpath:teD have not;, boon 1ack:Lng :.i.rl the. Clt!\•e1opment; of
p1..1.blic

~m.pport

for assi::rtanG\-:l

progr<:~ms ~

t.he fundamental

considerations have .been economic-strategic in natureo17
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of the 'rruman Doctrine to
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f.;mall nations as "pawns :Ln a gigantic conte::rt v:ith the
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Of nll the criticj.mn levaled at the

~:'ruman

Doctr:i.ne,

however, the most effE!Ct:i.v·e hHs been the cr·itic:ism of

the "revis:i.on:i.stn histor:tans on the Cold Wr.l.r.

'l'h.o revi·M

sionists have been particular1y critical of the basic

'L«:r.p·;JJ ,;
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Af.t?ltn~ UJ1rle;~r the bylino of nilth'.. X. u20
B>:.r~revor ~

of trw We::rL t s

11

Kennan htm[3elf gre\1-l :i.ncreasingly critical

propensity to see :Ltself' as the embodiment

o:f .a11 v-.ir·tne u..nd the· adver.,sary as ev-:Ll. :i.nca:r.-nate ~ 11

He

..... ··
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wh:ich had fostered

11

a long

.::Jc~cmr:nce

of errorf>,

miscaleu·~

lations r unreal dilemmn::;, fal.ss cteciEd.ons ~, and grave sct·w

expansion concept of the Soviet Union failed to consider
key

fnctc':t'[~

1

and that cuch a co:nc(:;:pt depEmded. ·upon certain

as::mmpt.:Lo;:w t}:.at were untenable.
oxrunple o:.:'

that :i.t t
effeet.

.rtt.

th.(~

Ol>k

Horow:tt?.; cit<::s the

fa:tlure of the concept to explain the fact

tho Soviets four years,
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the a:t""ea of Sov:let corrc rol.

the

~3oviet

Union~

Jt;

<."l5SUm8d

tho lndcfin:i.to

Stteb a pol:i<:y an.d such a

ttvoly rtt1ed out any sQa:rch

fo.~'

\t:i.cYvJ effec~·

(Wcommodat.:i.on..

a po1:Lcy the Soviet Unlon had Co uwke all

the~

Under

~mch

adjustment; r..:; ~

o:c the:i.r awti ons <appeared Hhot'>ti:L~~ 11 2.3
Q

As a concept, alno ~ the Doctr-:tne had ser··:Lous lim:t··
tations¢

Tt was 8. long range fJtJ.,.ategy ~ not a prograrn. of
act :ton thnt could proctu.ee i.mmed:lat,e results~,, o ~ It;
:r.·equir~~d a constant, ta6ticaJ. maneuvering of a k:i.:n.cl
difficult for democrat:LcaJ.Jy organized states., ..• ~
1'hoy vJ'EH'E~ consequently <J.t a disadvantage r.ts compared to the Sovic~t Union :in conductin.g r:rt·r•ategy
<•
O--~.f,• t})-!
•. ·•· •=>

.1 ...1 ""ld
r-..,~ .t •

.

• 2l~

all r.iOUl'ldar:l.t=-.?.s throughout the globe could not be nread:J.ly
trmJ~>latt~d

in.to tho provi.si.cm and allocation of resou:ccef.> ~ 11

'fhe pc1liey tEmded to rule out very j,mportc-mt a.1ternati ve
cour~~es

(

of' aetion.

"'J
~- · Pr-d t- 'Z"··1
• 1.. ...1' .J.,

J \,;.; ... ~ :;

p.

It; mGde comprorn:i.se all but impos•n

Kaplan~
10'7~

p., 10·/..o~
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the rrruman Doctrine ini t:i.<:1.ted ;:_ n strategy of l'eacting",
and that the Doctrine left tlH! :L:ni..Llati ve to 'tht:l Soviet
Union.,26

princJ.pl~~

Doctr:i.Ile did add c-1 very high

between sovereign

to tho :r:elationsh:tps

The Doctrine added a new dimen-

nations~

sion to public th:i.:nld.ng ::l.n te:r·ms of.' foreign pol:i.cy·,,

IJ.'he

Pr·es:ldc·mt, perhaps w:t thout fu11y real:i.:?;ing: :i..t at the

time~
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p:r-oclamat:l.on:
Our policy is d:i r<::!ct~ed not r:.<gainst anv country
or doctrine but ar:airwt htm:'?>":J.', -poverty· 1 • dc:.!sperat1on,
and chnos. Its purpo::w r5hcn.d.d be the revi va1 of a
work:Lng eeonomy in Lhl; :qor-Jd ao as to pe:mdt the
emex~genGe of' poltt.'ie.a.l r:md F:oc1a1 conditions :l.n
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the
1'~:'uman

Doctrine may· \'Jell be cons:Ldered the most im-portant

and f'ar·-reaching prm:wunceme:nt :i.n the history of' 't'wrld.
'rhe t.:r·ue

forcdgn policy,.

sign:i..f:leanc:c~

of

the~

philan·--

thropic: forces unleashed by these pol:i.c:le::; hem only recently
mrxn:tfested itself"

The ultimate judgment of history on the

envi~:.doned

Henr·y. L ,, Stimson

tho

challenge~

.. ~~~'he esscnt:i.al question. i.B one '-'lh:i.ch ·we should
have t:.o answer :i.f there \'J"ero:~ :not a Communist. al:i.. ve"
Cnn wo :owke frQedoru and proBperi t.y real in the
p:;~·e.aent. 1'mrld ?)0
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